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Introduction 
Fret not yourself to make my poems square in all their parts, but like what you can ... The true reason why 
parts suit you while others do not is that my poems are fragments - i.e. that I am fragments 
The subject of this thesis is Matthew Arnold's attempt to reconstruct Christianity out of what he saw as 
the ruins of its past historic manifestations. "The central fact" of Arnold's experience, as Douglas Bush has 
said, "was the loss of traditional Christian faith".^ T.S. Eliot, hinting at the wider background against 
which Arnold attempted his reconstruction, said of Arnold's poem "Stanzas from the Grande Chartreuse" 
that it voiced "a moment of historic doubt, recorded by its most representative mind".^ These two 
statements taken together indicate that Arnold is particularly important in any question of faith and doubt in 
the nineteenth century. The great religious controversies of the middle of that century (the questions raised 
by Darwin's Origin of Species and the related furore over the question of the Bible's infallibility) reached 
their height at the same time as Arnold reached intellectual maturity. The fact that Arnold's "doubt" is so 
"representative" is because he was caught in the middle of the antagonists. As the son of the deeply 
religious and conscientious Dr Arnold, Matthew was raised with the view that religion was necessary for 
both the personal and collective good. Equally, however, he inherited his father's liberality in religious 
matters (Dr Arnold being opposed to dogmatism and coercion in religion)'* and because of this he felt it 
necessary to find a solid intellectual basis for Christianity - however much this might upset certain 
Christian believers. 
The type of "solid intellectual basis" that Arnold feels he needs is one of the primary questions with 
which this thesis deals. The above letter to his sister is an indication that, at least at the age of twenty-
seven, Arnold himself was lacking in solidity. The fact that he is "fragments" suggests that he might have 
had some difficulty in coming to terms with "the loss of traditional Christian faith" and in finding a 
'Letter to "K" (Arnold's sister Jane), c. July 1849, Unpublished letters of Matthew Arnold ed. A. Whitridge (Yale University Press, New Haven, 
1923) p. 18. 
^Matthew Arnold ^ A Survey of Jm Poetry and Prose (MacMillan, London, 1971) p. xv. 
^A C^hoice of Kipling's Verse (Faber and Faber, London, 1941) p. 7. 
"For a description of Dr Arnold's religious ideas see, for example. The Liberal Anglican Idea of History - Duncan Forbes 
(Cambridge University Press, 1952). 
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satisfactory basis for a religious reconstruction. Yet the truth is that his fragmented nature and his loss of 
Christian faith are two sides of the same coin. He had to attempt his religious reconstruction because he 
was fragmented. The point is that Arnold is well aware of the problems that Christianity faces in the 
nineteenth century but he is aware also that its difficulties are a facet of a problem that is much more 
fundamental. As I shall show during the thesis Arnold clearly believes that he is living in an age in which 
certainty of any sort has become problematic. In the Preface to his 1853 collection of poems, Arnold writes 
of "Empedocles on Etna" that it represents a man in whom "the dialogue of the mind with itself has 
commenced; modem problems have presented themselves". If the "central fact" of Arnold's experience is 
the loss of traditional Christian faith, then this modem realisation of "the dialogue of the mind with itself 
is the central underlying cause of that fact. 
As I shall show in Chapter One, Arnold's poetry is full of this realisation. The majority of the poems are 
arguments, dialogues between either Arnold's mind or Arnold and another protagonist. These poems see 
Arnold thinking aloud, setting opposing interpretation^r philosophies of life against each other in order to 
come to some definite answer on the "modem problems" that the poet faces. That these problems are the 
subject of his poetry is clear from an 1865 critical essay of Arnold's: 
The end and aim of all literature, if one considers it attentively, is, in truth, nothing but [a criticism of life].^ 
Arnold's belief that nothing less than life itself is under study shows that the very basis of existence needs 
definition. Just why this is necessary can be seen from an early poem, "In Utrumque Paratus"^ where 
Arnold ends with the proclamation that "I ... but seem". This is a graphic illustration of the fundamental 
problem that faces all thinkers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries - that is, the definition of reality 
itself. 
The subject of epistemological interpretations in what is called the post-Enlightenment era has been 
widely studied.^ The starting point for what Arnold identifies as "modem problems" is generally accepted 
to be the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century with the establishment of the empirical method of 
observation. The key figure in coming to an understanding of what effect the scientific revolution had on 
man's pursuit of knowledge is John Locke. His ^ Essay Conceming Human Understanding (1690)^ is, as 
A.D. Nuttallsays, "the cornerstone of English empiricism".^ Locke makes it clear that, under the empiricist 
method, we have no direct knowledge of external reality. All we have is an image on the retina which we 
interpret on the basis of our experience of the world. The problem is that, as Nuttallpoints out, "the whole 
'From "Joubert" in The Complete Prose Works of Matthew Arnold 11 vols. - R.H. Super (ed.) (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1960-77) 
vol. 3, p. 209. (Hereafter referred to as CPW). 
®For a fuller examination of this poem see below, , 
'One of the best of these studies from our point of view is A Common Sky - Philosophy and the Literary Imagination - A.D. Nuttall 
(Chatto and Windus, Sussex University Press, 1974). 
*ed. J.W. Yolton, 2 vols. (Everyman, London, 1961). 
'Nuttall p. 15. 
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range of knowledge is private to the knower".'® The extreme result of this can be seen in the philosophy of 
solipsism which suggests that external reality may not exist at all. For the purpose of this thesis the less 
extreme, but still far-reaching, conclusions of the eighteenth century philosopher David Hume are more 
important. Hume suggested'' that the conclusions to be drawn from the empiricist theory of knowledge 
were that ^ our actions were based on inference. Every decision, from the simplest upward, had to be 
made on the assumption that the evidence before our eyes is true. Hume used this picture of the breakdown 
of objective certainty to question religious phenomena which, as he makes clear in the essay "Of 
Miracles",'^ have no basis at all for existence apart from the "evidence" of the arbitrary claims of religious 
people. 
As I said earlier the problem facing Christianity or spirituality of any kind, underlined here by Hume, is 
really just one facet of the larger problem brought into view by the scientific ascription of reality. This can 
be shown, as Nuttallsays, by the word "substance". After the sixteenth century, substance (literally 
"underlying reality") has come to mean that which is material.'^ If the underlying reality is the material, 
then what place is there for the spiritual? 
This is the background against which Arnold attempts to reconstruct Christianity. The fact that he is 
aware of the problems facing him is clear, I think, from the phrase that I have used in my thesis title. The 
true purpose of criticism, says Arnold, is to see the "object as in itself it really is".*'* The phrase has some 
echoes of Kant and his inability to know things "in themselves". Only in the post-Enlightenment era would 
one come across such a marked attempt to pin down the object of reality. 
In Chapter One I show Arnold attempting to answer this problem in his poetry. The religious problem is 
made explicit by Arnold in a letter to his friend A.H. Clough in which Arnold discourses on the need for a 
new poetry that will provide the spiritual direction that recent poetry has lacked. "Poetry", he says, must 
become a "complete magister vitae as the poetry of the ancients did" and include "religion with poetry".'^ 
This is one of Arnold's most enduring beliefs. It illustrates the fact that Arnold sees himself as in some 
sense post-Christian - that traditional religion is no longer adequate to fulfil spiritual needs. The fact that 
he goes to a pre-Christian age is interesting. It indicates that the more recent poetry has been afflicted by 
the inability to see its way in religioyf matters, has been unable to provide a "rule for life". Arnold's letters 
are full of this criticism of the heritage of the Romantic poets. As I shall show his criticism can be summed 
loibid.. 
'^In A Treatise of Human Nature - (Everyman, London, 1911). 
'^In Essays: moral, political and literary (Oxford University Press, 1963). 
I 'Op. cit.,p. 19. 
'*From Arnold's 1861 essay, "On Translating Homer". 
'^See below, p. li'. 
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up as aimed at the Romantics' inability to find an objective vision (the "magister vitae"). Arnold's 
unhappiness with the "dialogue of the mind with itself and his distaste for Romanticism are, in fact, 
closely connected. He is stating the fact that the Romantics' taste for subjective visions does not provide 
the objective certainty which he lacks following the disappearance of traditional religious faith. His 
attempt to come to terms with this fact is the subject of Chapter One. 
Chapter One shows that, however much he may wish not to, Arnold is in fact firmly entrenched in the 
Romantic tradition. His parents' love of Romantic poetry, his godfather John Keble's indoctrination of 
Matthew with Wordsworth's poetry and Arnold's personal acquaintance with Wordsworth all ensure that 
Arnold is unable to escape the Romantic estimate of life. This creates a conflict within Arnold between a 
desire to escape from the Romantics' subjective visions and an inbuilt inability to do so. His own poetry 
illustrates this conflict. As I shall argue, the majority of his poetry suffers from an explicit denial of 
Romantic poetical philosophy in the desire to achieve objectivity and comprehension. My argument is that 
this is merely Arnold's inevitably failed attempt to escape from the Romantics' (implicit) realisation that 
such a denial of subjectivity is impossible in the post-Enlightenment era. I use, in particular, S.T. 
Coleridge's statements on this question as a critique of Arnold's position, arguing that Coleridge saw well 
enough the modem epistemological problems and that his attempt to include religion with poetry is a far 
more successful solution than Arnold's own. 
Arnold's failure to forge his new poetry can be seen by his conscious decision to attempt a criticism of 
life that is more obviously practical. Chapter Two sees Arnold approaching the same problems as were 
approached in his poetry, only this time he attempts to pin down "the object as in itself it really is" via 
prose criticism. In contradiction to those critics who claim that Arnold's move from poetry to prose 
indicates a coming to terms with his spiritual problems I argue that the truth is quite otherwise. The change 
is in fact owing to Arnold's perception that he has been unable to conquer the epistemological problems I 
have underlined. His search for objectivity has been unsuccessful. This paves the way for the same search 
to be undertaken in the field of prose criticism. As I show during the chapter, Arnold takes on the theories 
of J.G. von Herder and the German historicists in order to come to terms with the loss of traditional 
Christian faith. He finds therein the humanist argument that humanity is engaged in a process of steadily 
progressive development, at the end of which man's capacity for social, artistic and religious development 
will have reached its zenith. The idea has the advantage for Arnold of appearing to provide some objective 
certainty in an otherwise uncertain world. 
During this time we also see Arnold reading Locke and Spinoza and embracing what we may call a 
broadly "rationalist" view of life. The effect of this on his religious views is clear from Arnold's two 
essays on Spinoza - his first critical attempt to come to terms with the religious phenomenon. His 
rationalist solution is, however, no solution for Arnold. As I argue Arnold has a temperamental need for 
"something more" in religion than Spinoza's determinism. Throughout his criticism Arnold identifies 
"emotion" as a need that demands satisfaction. The significance of this for my thesis is that "emotion" is a 
particularly intangible property on the empiricist model. Arnold's need of it, however, brings us to Chapter 
Three. Arnold's return to Christianity is, as I see it, a need to find some place in his scheme for emotion. 
Chapter Three charts the same struggle that was identified in Chapter One - Arnold's personal need to 
allow for spiritual knowledge against his intellectual inability to allow for the truth of such knowledge in 
the post-Enlightenment era. This struggle is centred most specifically on Arnold's idea of Christianity. 
Arnold attempts to reconstruct Christianity on the empiricist model. That which is verifiable, for Arnold, is 
true. The characteristic outcome of this method is a God whose property is merely an underlying tendency 
(making for morality) in humanity and a Jesus who is the moral exemplum par excellence. As I argue this 
is entirely at odds with the tenets of the Christian religion and the "evidence" of the Bible. Arnold's 
reconstruction is inadequate because he is attempting to force together two utterly opposed world views. 
As in Chapter One I use Coleridge's observations on the Bible and Christianity, this time in order to deny 
the conclusions of such critics as James C. Livingston who claims that Arnold's approach should be the 
normative one for Christianity t o d a y . I n contradiction to this idea I suggest that for Arnold himself such 
a reconstruction proved inadequate. His attempt to pin down the object that is truly certain collapses on the 
empiricist model. I conclude by arguing that Arnold himself sees the collapse of his system in that he 
realises that Christianity on the historicist model lacks the authority of the traditional model of history as 
controlled by God. The complete relativity of a universe without God raises the specu-e of a collapse 
towards chaos rather than the historicists' desired scenario of a coming to perfection through inevitable 
progress. 




Harold Bloom's comment that Arnold was "a Romantic poet who did not wish to be one" ' seems to me to 
sum up Arnold's career in poetry. His poems are "fragments" owing to, as I hope to show, contradictory 
impulses that run below the surface of each piece of work. Whilst on the one hand he was in a direct line 
of descent from the English Romantics and much of his poetry shows their influence, there is another side 
of Arnold which revolts against their solutions to life and to their thoughts about life. The first part of this 
thesis will examine the early influences that inform these two sides of Arnold. 
The important question of Arnold's motives for becoming a poet has, until recently, been answerable only 
by conjecture. If Lionel Trilling's Matthew Arnold,^ the standard text on Arnold's life and work, has an 
obvious weakness, it is that the author had few autobiographical materials with which to work. Park 
Honan's valuable Life is the first biographical work on Arnold to make use of the notebooks and private 
correspondence made available in the last few decades. Honan's psychological method presents a portrait 
of a young Matthew Arnold very much influenced by his upbringing. Arnold is seen almost in Freudian 
terms as the eldest son repelled by the father's stem intensity towards the mother 's protective haven. Honan 
believes that many of Arnold's later poetic themes arose from Mrs Arnold's early influence. Inclined to 
"tragic imaginings", she made her son "a master of pathos": 
Minor themes in her journals of the 1830s, such as time's evanescence, the poignancy of the past, and the 
inconsequence of the world's routine hubbub, swell into major ones in his own poetry.^ 
If this tended to drive Arnold into himself - and Arnold's poetry is consistently self-questioning - then it 
is clear that a similar tendency in Romantic poetry (the example excellence here is Wordsworth's 
autobiographical Prelude) inevitably harmonised with Arnold's juvenile thought. There was no shortage of 
possibilities for Arnold to come into contact with such influences as is clear from the fact that Matthew saw 
'Harold Bloom (ed.) - Mauhew Arnold (Chelsea House, New York, 1987) p. 1. 
Co lumbia University Press, New Yoric (2nd. ed., 1949.) 
^Matlhew Arnold - A Life (Wiedenfidd and Nicolson, 1981) pp. 7 & 3Z 
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much of John Keble in his youth.^ More significantly still, the Arnold family holiday home, at Fox How in 
Ambleside, was close by the Wordsworths. The two families were often in contact and there was much 
conversation between Arnold and the old poet.^ Although his admiration for Wordsworth fell far short of 
hero-worship,^ the influence on Arnold of such a grand figurehead of England's immediate past was 
immense and lasting: 
He is one of the best and deepest spiritual influences of our century 
Arnold told Ernest Fontanes in 18797 
Conversations with Wordsworth no doubt gave Arnold a thorough and vivid knowledge of England's 
immediate poetic heritage. Certainly his first published poem, "Alaric at Rome", written before his 
eighteenth birthday, shows a strong Byronic influence.® It also, however, contains much that, 
retrospectively, we can see as distinctively Amoldian. It was deemed to be original and powerful enough 
to gain the Rugby School poetry prize for 1840 by a unanimous vote. Such affirmation was, no doubt, 
extremely important for a young man strugghng in the shadow of his father. It was probably this success 
that determined Arnold's early poetical vocation. 
"Alaric at Rome" is notable for showing so early the tone of reflective melancholy that is the main 
characteristic of Arnold's poetry. Arnold seems to have fallen prey to (and to a great extent furthered) what 
we might call a post-Romantic malaise. The subject-matter, of course, favours the tone of despair, with its 
concentration on the overthrow of once-glorious Rome by the Goths. But Arnold's handling of this 
favourite post-Renaissance topos has none of the calm, studious melancholy of a Claude painting, or the 
heroic despair of his original Byronic model. Arnold's observer in Rome is not an impassioned Romantic 
activist; he is a muted, passive commentator, coming across in tone like a fin de si5cle pessimist: 
Alas! far other thoughts might well be ours 
And dash our holiest raptures while we gaze: 
Energies wasted, unimproved hours. 
The saddening visions of departed days: 
And while they rise here might we stand alone. 
And mingle with thy ruins somewhat of our own. (199-204) 
^Keble's book of devotional poems The Christian Year (published in 1827) is deeply influenced by Wordsworthian themes and 
imagery. Parte Honan mentions that the infant Mauhew "learned to "repeat" Keble's lyrics in exchange for his mother's ardent 
attention...". (Honan, p. 12.) 
^See Honan, chap. 2. 
®John Peters argues that the contrast between Wordsworth's early poetry and the man Arnold knew must have been painful and 
disillusioning for Arnold. By the 1840s, Peters claims, Wordsworth had become a misdirected idealist who had withdrawn from the 
world, not because he was holding fast to something precious and true but because he was "atavistic". (Matthew Arnold - The Heroes 
of his Poelrv. (1973 Ph.D. thesis for University of Wisconsin), [University Microfilms Inc., Arm Arbor, Michigan] pp. 43-46.) 
Certainly Wordsworth, with his appeals for authoritarianism in all walks of life as a cure to Eurc^e's ills, would have been 
uncongenial to an Arnold under the thraU of his father's authority. 
"'Arnold to Fonunes, on sending him a copy of a selection of Wordsworth's poetry to which Arnold had written the preface. 
(Related in Notes to "Wordsworth" essay [CPW 9:336-340]). 
®Amold admitted as much to Edmund Gosse in 1888 - "You wiU see that 1 had been ve^- much reading Childe Harold". Quoted in 
Matthew Arnold: The Complete Poems - ed. K. & M. AHott(Longman, London, 1979) p. 3. (Hereafter referred to as CP). 
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A tone not entirely Arnold's own is detectable here. We have already noted Mrs Arnold's probable 
influence on her son's imagination. Dr Arnold, however, also seems to speak through lines such as 
"Energies wasted, unimproved hours". The combination of a stem, inward-looking morality and a pathetic 
musing on time's evanescence shows Arnold to be very much the child of his parents. 
Another theme of Dr Arnold's own work is, however, taken a step further by Matthew. Dr Arnold's 
sense of history was cyclical. He saw parallels in the states of past and future civilisations: 
Thus the largest part of that history which we commonly call ancient is practically modem, as it describes 
society in a state analogous to that in which it now is 
Herein Matthew found authority for seeing the fall of Roman civilisation as a possible foreshadowing of 
the dissolution of his present European civilisation: 
Perchance that solemn sight might quench the fire 
Even of that ardent spirit; hopes and fears 
Might well be mingling at that murmured sigh. 
Whispering from all around, "All earthly things must die". (177-180) 
Arnold's descriptive epithets all have this distinctive note of portentous fore-knowledge - "glorious ruins" 
(1. 45), "solemn grave" (1. 49), "eloquent silence" (1. 67), "mournful loveliness" (1. 104). Over all history 
Rome gazes "with sad prophetic eye" (1. 24). It is an altitude of fatalism that will occur over and over in 
Arnold's poetry. 
Distinctively Amoldian, too, is the narrator's appeal to nature as an aid to understanding the human 
drama. Lines 97-102 see a pause in the action of Alaric's conquest of Rome in order to interpolate a 
Romantic nature simile: 
Hast thou not marked on a wild autumn day 
When the wind slumbereth in a sudden lull. 
What deathlike stillness o'er the landscape lay. 
How calmly sad, how sadly beautiful; 
How each bright tint of tree, and flower, and heath 
Were mingling with the sere and withered hues of death? 
The likening of the destruction of the glorious city to the autumnal death of a landscape has a self-
conscious force that brings to notice the fact that Arnold, not Alaric, is the "prime mover" of the poem. 
Here the poem becomes a vehicle for Arnold's juvenile thoughts on the relationship between man and 
nature; thoughts, notably, of the disorder contained within beauty. 
An understanding of Arnold's attitude to nature is important if we are to compare Arnold's and 
Coleridge's poetical philosophy. As we shall see later, Coleridge sought above all for unity between man 
and his (supposedly) external world. Now it may indeed be said that the stanza quoted above indicates 
such a unity. Man's condition is mirrored in the natural scene where the foreshadowing of death is 
contained within the beauty of the natural forms. Later in the poem, however, such a unity has 
disappeared. Lines 193-198 speak of Alaric's extraordinary burial in the bed of a river: 
' Thf Misrcllancpu!, Works of Thnmas Arnold (B. Fdlowes, London, 1845) pp. 108-9. From "The Social Progress of Slales" (1830). 
One Utile year; that restless soul shall rest. 
That frame of vigour shall be crumbling clay, 
And tranquilly, above that troubled breast. 
The sunny waters hold their joyous way: 
And gently shall the murmuring ripples flow. 
Nor wake the weary soul that slumbers on below. 
Here, nature's relationship to man is sharply dichotomous. Man in death is "troubled" and "weary" 
whereas nature is tranquil and "joyous"., In the passage quoted before, nature takes part in Arnold's 
perceived sadness of death. Here she becomes something apart. It is possible, in ^ poem, to put such 
inconsistency down to youthful thoughtlessness, but in reality the confusion points to more than this. What 
we see in "Alaric" is, in fact, an early example of Arnold's struggle with Romanticism. The "double 
movement" we have observed here in Arnold's attitude to nature - the wish for a Wordsworthian 
identification of man with nature combined with a sense that man is in reality isolated - is a tendency that 
we shall see again in Arnold's poetry. 
1.2. Coleridge's Poetical Philosophy 
Arnold spent most of the 1840s in Oxford; as an undergraduate and, from 1845, as a Fellow, of Oriel 
College. His reading list for the fellowship examination is interesting for the high profile given to the 
debate between idealist and rationalist philosophy. Included were Kant's Critique, Mill's Logic and Plato's 
Republic and Phaedrus, together with works of Augustine, Descartes and Berkeley.^® It is particularly 
interesting to find Arnold reading Kant. A similar reading of Kant during his undergraduate years, led 
Coleridge towards a profound change in his epistemological theories. A prolonged discussion of 
Coleridge's position as it evolved will be insU-uctive for the light it sheds - in the shape of parallels and 
divergences - on Arnold's own later development as a poet. 
In the light of my prime concern with Arnold's religious work, the comparison with Coleridge is useful 
for throwing into relief that "central fact of Arnold's experience". It was, in fact, the central fact of the 
experience of both men that religious concerns and poetry were inextricably intertwined. For Arnold, 
however, the relationship between the two in the 1840s was an uneasy one. Although intellectually, as 
Honan says, Arnold had given up his belief in the Resurrection and Atonement by 1844, ' ' a turbulent poem 
from that year, "Stagirius", indicates that, emotionally, a gap had been left: 
From doubt, where all is double; 
Where wise men are not strong. 
Where comfort turns to trouble, 
Where just men suffer wrong; 
Where sorrow treads on joy. 
Where sweet things soonest cloy. 
Where faiths are built on dust. 
Where love is half mistrust. 
'®See Honan, p. 78. 
"Ibid., p. 73. 
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Hungry, and barren, and sharp as the sea -
Oh! set us free. (30-48) 
"Stagirius" is a passionate search for a deity not "built on dust". The description of the soul uncertain about 
its true goal and hence in turmoil gives way to a plea, at the end of the poem, for unity: 
O where thy voice doth come 
Let all doubts be dumb, 
Let all worlds be mild. 
All strifes be reconciled. 
All pains beguiled! (52-56) 
There is, notably, no suggestion in the poem of how the lauer stage can be reached, only that it is absolutely 
necessary for Arnold's well-being that it is. 
"Stagirius" shows that, at the time of reading Kant, Arnold felt a sense of loss and a desire for recovery. 
His early poetry is undertaken as a form of enquiry. Coleridge, too, came to Kant in a spirit of enquiry, 
albeit a more positive one than Arnold's. Coleridge's enquiry took the form of rebellion against the 
empiricist orthodoxy prevalent at the time and an aspiration towards Truth by alternative methods. This 
had always been a tendency in Coleridge's character. Thus in the decade of the 1790s, prior to reading 
Kant, we find Coleridge becoming a political agitator for the republican cause, attempting to initiate an 
agrarian commune in America, and, in 1798, planning to enter the Unitarian ministry. If there was one 
controlling factor in determining Coleridge's life, thought and poetry it was the idea that there was an 
all-encapsulating Truth about life that could be known. In the last years of his life we find Coleridge 
obsessed by his Opus Maximum, a projected work that would embody his philosophical system, one 
designed to unite all previous systems in sifting the fragments of truth from each. 
Coleridge too, then, came to read German idealist philosophy in a spirit of dissatisfaction. An 
uncompromising logician, his dissatisfaction can be traced to a feeling that the epistemological theories then 
current failed to square with his own experiences. He came to believe this particularly in his acquaintance 
with Wordsworth, whose poetry "found him" in a way that others' did not.^^ In Biographia Literaria he 
describes how the poetry of Wordsworth introduced him to new possibilities of perception. He was struck 
by 
the union of deep feeling with profound thought: the fine balance of truth in observing, with the imaginative 
faculty in modifying the objects observed; and above all the original gift of spreading the tone, the 
atmosphere, and with it the depth and height of the ideal world around forms, incidents, and situations, of 
which, for the common view, custom had bedimmed all the lustre, had dried up the sparkle and the 
dewdrops.'^ 
There is a marked Platonic tone to this description of his new way of seeing the world. Whilst Wordsworth 
is observing just the same objects Coleridge has always observed, there has been constructed around them 
an "ideal world" which, though always there, had been lost to sight by a sterility of perception, a lack of 
"imaginative faculty". 
' ^ e expression is from Coleridge's later description of the Bible in Aids to Reflection . ed. T. Fenby (Grant, Edinburgh, 1905) p. 
272: "In short, whatever finds me , bears witness for itself that it has proceeded from a Holy Spirit". 
Riofiranhia I ileraria • ed. J. Shawcross, 2 vols. (Oxford University Press, 1907) vol. 1. chap. Iv.. p. 59. 
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Coleridge took these ideas a step further in his reading of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. He found in 
Kant the argument that all percipient acts require an act of faith. As J.H. Muirhead puts it, the very 
existence of an objective world of fact depended on a "natural metaphysic of the mind" postulating 
"necessary connections between the dispersed elements of sensory experience".''' Where he departed from 
Kant was in denying Kant's view that the only knowledge we can have is of the phenomenal worid (Kant's 
' "Understanding"). Though for Kant there was a "real" world (that of the moral sphere), we could only 
know vague regulative principles which had "no validity as a revelation of the real or noumenal worid". 
Coleridge undermined such a view by arguing that Kant's belief in the truth of the phenomenal world was 
of just the same kind as his Reason (or "knowledge of the real worid"). Following Plato, Coleridge 
maintained that we can know the noumenal worid by using a higher form of the same creative faculty that 
we employ in all perception. As Coleridge understood, the vital difference was that 
while the emphasis in Kant was upon the conceptions of the understanding, into which the ideas o f the 
reason entered only as regulative principles bereft of any substantiating power, in Plato the ideas were the 
underlying basis of the whole structure of knowledge, being not merely constitutive, but "productive".'^ 
Coleridge's reading of philosophy served to confirm already nascent ideas as to the nature of religious 
language. He saw that certain sorts of language implied adherence to something beyond the merely 
phenomenal world. Most specifically he found this in the use of symbolic language. In The Statesman's 
Coleridge writes of his experience of reading the scriptural histories. He describes them as being 
"the living educts of the Imagination", that "reconciling and mediating power", which, through the "senses" 
and organized by the "Reason", gives birth to symbols. A symbol, therefore, is "above all" the 
"translucence of the Eternal through and in the Temporal. It always partakes of the reality it renders 
intelligible."'^ Coleridge is here starting from his ov/n Platonist/Christian convictions and, finding them 
affirmed in Scripture, analysing in what way the redactors put their convictions across. He sees in the 
writers' use of symbol their successful attempt to explain noumenal experience and their conviction of 
universal truths. Symbol thus has the power, for Coleridge, to create meaning, to point beyond the 
temporal moment. In it the particular and universal meet, the individual brings into being the belief that he 
is part of a larger purpose. 
Coleridge is insistent on the fact that the writer or spectator "brings into being" this slate of 
consciousness. As he had seen, any act of perception involves an act of creating meaning out of raw sense 
data. For Coleridge the natural corollary of this is to see ourselves as partaking in the divine act of 
'^Coleridge as Philosopher (Allen and Unwin, London, 1930) p. 90. I will be relying fairly extensively on Muirhead's exhauslively 
detailed work for information on the relationship of Kant's philosophy to that of Coleridge. 
'5 lbid . ,p .91. 
"Ibid. , p. 95. 
'"'The Complete Worlds rf Samuel Taylor Coleridge - ed, W.G.T. Shedd, 7 vols. (Harper and Brothers, New York, 1884) vol. 1, pp. 
436-437. Coleridge notably does not find such fertile use of the Imagination in the years foUowing L-ocke, Hume, Berkeley et al.: 
The histories and polilical economy of the piesent and preceding century partaie in the general contagion of its mechanic philosophy, and are 
the product of an unenlivened and generalising understanding. 
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creation.'® What he termed Wordsworth's "imaginative faculty" in the remembrance of his early struggling 
towards understanding, now becomes defined as the "Imagination". The Imagination is not to be seen 
merely as a systematizer of impressions, reproducing in the mind what is seen on the retina. In its highest 
form the Imagination allows us to partake in the boundless nature of noumenal reality. 
As Muirhead says, Coleridge is at bottom taking his inspiration from the old distinctions between natura 
naturata and natura naturans - that is Nature as a dead mechanism and Nature as a creative force 
"essentially related to the soul of man".'^ To use our Imagination is on one level, then, simply to put us 
into a right relationship with God, to see ourselves as part of his whole creative scheme. On a higher level, 
however, (and this is where symbolic and poetic language comes in) Coleridge places the poets and the 
artistic faculty. With help, according to Muirhead, from Schelling, he postulates a higher "Secondary 
Imagination", that faculty which allows the artist to embody in his art the divine working. In thus defining 
the artistic process Coleridge is able to satisfy himself as to what is happening in his own and 
Wordsworth's poetry and the symbolic and metaphorical language of the Bible. "Art", to quote Schelling, 
"effects the impossible by resolving an infinite conu-adiction in a finite product" - a result it achieves 
through the power of the "productive intuition" we call "Imagination".^® Art and poetic language thus have 
the ability to encapsulate the very essence of what it is to be human. In a particular "finite" woik of art we 
can glimpse the "infinite contradiction" that we are both individual and yet part of a greater whole, both 
divinely creative and yet part ourselves of Creation. 
Coleridge is here attempting to come to terms with the tensions and ambiguities of human existence. His 
enquiry into the workings of the artistic process is undertaken in order to try to understand the "infinite 
contradiction" that in art and poetry one can seemingly partake in the eternally creative glory of God whilst 
simultaneously one remains a human being subject to the same laws as the rest of nature. We can now see, 
then, that Coleridge's poetic enquiry is a fundamentally religious one in that it is an attempt at synthesis, an 
attempt to unite the polarities of existence, to bring order out of seeming chaos. As Muirhead underlines, 
the Imagination must bring discordant qualities into balance or harmony in order to reveal the truth that is 
implicit there, to "unite sameness with difference".^' 
We should now be able to see fully the power of symbolism for Coleridge. A symbol encapsulates in its 
very being the religious process, the eternal and particular meeting whilst for ever remaining distinct. 
"For example, from a leUer to Thomas Poole (23rd March, 1801) berating mechanistic philosophy: 
If the mind be nol passive, if it be indeed made in God's Image, and that, too, in the sublimest sense, the Image of the Creator, there is ground 
for suspicion that any system built on the passiveness of the mind must be false, as a system. 
f;(>lleclcd Letters of Samuel Tavlor Colcridfe - ed. E.L. Griggs, 6 vols. (Oxford University Press, 1956-71) vol. 2. no. 709.) 
"Muirhead, p. 204. 
^Werke.vol. 3, p. 349. Quoted in Muirhead, p. 202. 
2'Muirhead. p. 210. 
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Thus, as Stephen Prickeu underlines in Romanticism and Religion, art is vitally important as a tool in any 
explanation of religion: 
The symbolism of art makes us grasp "presentationally" the eternal truths of human nature through the 
particularity of an individual situation.^^ 
This was Coleridge's most important contribution to Romantic poetic theory, a contribution of which 
Arnold would surely have been aware. Whilst it does not solve the ambiguity of existence or the question 
of the status of art as an explanation of existence, it is nevertheless one of the most thought-provoking 
responses to that disjunction in human thought that we have suggested is the crucial existential problem 
handed down by such philosophers as Locke and Hume. It is this same problem, as we have seen and will 
continue to see, that afflicts Arnold. His efforts to come to terms with it and his use, if any of the 
Coleridgean "solution" will be examined in the next section. 
13. The Poems of Arnold's 1849 Collection 
It was never likely that Arnold would follow Coleridge's precise course. reading of German 
philosophy has to be seen in the light of familial attitudes and notions in the areas of epistemology and 
religion. Ideahst philosophy had to contend with the strongly imbibed common-sense morality of Arnold's 
father, a peculiarly English combination of Lockeian philosophy and the wisdom of the Anglican divines. 
Notably this led to a battle in Arnold between opposing philosophical systems. Although the sonnet 
"Written in Butler's Sermons", was probably composed before his reading of Kant, it serves to indicate the 
way in which Arnold's thought was moving: 
Affections, Instincts, Principles, and Powers, 
Impulse and Reason, Freedom and Control -
So men, unravelling God's harmonious whole. 
Rend in a thousand shreds this life of ours. (1-4) 
Arnold vigorously denies the possibility of explaining human nature as if it were a matter only of a number 
of inter-connecting chemical reactions. He goes on to assert that man has "one nature" which "queen-like, 
sits alone, / Centred in a majestic unity". At this time in his life he sees Bishop Butler's attempts at 
theology (attempts which, notably, were later on to provide much of the inspiration behind Literature and 
Dogma) as an unnecessary schematising of man's God-given unity. 
The idea that he has a "real" self buried somewhere deep within his apparent self is one of Arnold's most 
enduring beliefs, and a constant theme of his poetry. It is a complex matter, owing its existence to a 
number of different sources. At the time of the above-mentioned poem it has probably been suggested 
primarily by Arnold's reading of Classical philosophy, although the influence of Goethe - the modem mind 
most important to Arnold - is also likely. The pure aspiration after Truth of a philosopher such as Plato no 
doubt offered great comfort for a poet who, as we saw in "Stagirius", was finding trouble in defining his 
"Romant i r ism and Religion - The Tradiiion of Coleridge and Wordsworth in the Viclorian Church (Cambridge Univereily Press, 1976) p. 30. 
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self and his goal in life. If Arnold saw himself as in some sense "post-Christian", then a return to the 
wisdom of an intellectually similar time was a comforting bulwark on which to rest. Goethe he saw as the 
modem face of Classicism's underlying principle - the "wide and luminous view".^^ He was able to 
suggest to Arnold that, even in his own sickly times, one might fix on certain ideals and follow them; that 
somewhere the Truth might still be found.^ '^  
The extraordinary poem "In Utrumque Paratus", probably written in 1846, sees Arnold experimenting 
with idealist philosophy. The first two stanzas follow the ideas of Plotinus in seeing the goal of the soul as 
one of re-ascent to the original fount of purity from which creation sprang. The remainder of the poem 
describes such a journey, but utters a plaintive warning to any who see themselves greater than "the wild 
unfathered mass" who have known "no birth / In divine seats". Arnold ultimately discounts himself as an 
idealist, for, having reached the "solemn peaks" where his soul might be re-united with the "One all-pure", 
he looks down to see the natural "brother-world" only tamake the self-effacing utterance: 
Yet doth thine inmost soul with yearning teem. 
- Oh, what a spasm shakes the dreamer's heart! 
"I, too, but seem." (40-42) 
This indicates the parameters within which Arnold's thought is moving. In the 1840s he seems to hover 
between the possibility of finding Ideals to which he might commit himself, or of giving in to a mechanist 
philosophy in which the self is unknowable. 
Interestingly enough, Arnold had been reading the B i o g r a p h i a L i t e r a r i a in 1846.^^ Whilst he may have 
been aware of the claims Coleridge was making for poetry, however, Arnold's debt to Romanticism seems 
to have been on the level of tone and imagery (as in the hints of Byron and Wordsworth in "Alaric at 
Rome") rather than in an adherence to the Romantics' thoughts on poetry. In fact Arnold's whole desire 
seems to have been to look beyond Romanticism. Many of the letters of the 1840s to his "confessor", 
Clough, convey his ideas about the true role of poetry and his feelings that the English Romantics had 
failed to realise it: 
What a brute you were to tell me to read Keats' Letters ... 
What harm he has done in English poetry. As Browning is a man with a moderate gift passionately desiring 
movement and fulness, and obtaining but a confused multitudlnousness, so Keats with a very high gift, is yet 
also consumed by this desire: and cannot produce the truly living and moving, as his conscience keeps telling 
him. They will not be patient neither understand that they must begin with an Idea of the world in order not 
to be prevailed over by the world's multitudlnousness: ... 
... But what perplexity Keats Tennyson et id genus omne must occasion to young writers of the sort: yes 
and those d - d Elizabethan poets generally. Those who cannot read G[ree]k sh[ou]ld read nothing but Milton 
^ F r o m "Stanzas In Memory of ihe Author of "Obermann"" (11. 79-80). 
^ ^ e fact that Amold saw Goethe in the light of Qassical wisdom is clear from a letter sent by J.C. Shaiip to A.H. Qough, 24 July 
1849: "I don't think he (Goethe) will ever be an oracle for me, though Matt says "he saw life steadily and saw it whole"". (Quoted in 
CP. p. 139.) Amold had originally applied the phrase to Sophocles in the 1848 sonnet "To a Friend". 
^Allonsuggests that Coleridge's work ii the probable source of the imagery in 11. 15-21 of "In Umimque Paratus". (Ibid., p. 45.) 
15 
and parts of Wordsworth: the state should see to it:^ 
A somewhat later letter conveys a similar reproach: 
More and more I feel that the diff. btw. a mature and a youthful age of the world compels the poetry of the 
former to use gt. plainness of speech as compared with that of the latter: and that Keats & Shelley were on a 
false track when they set themselves to reproduce the exuberance of expression , the charm, the richness of 
images, and the felicity, of the Elizabethan poets. Yet critics cannot get to learn this, because the Elizabethan 
poets are our greatest, and our canons of poetry are founded on their works. They still think that the object of 
poetry is to produce exquisite bits and images - such as Shelley's clouds shepherded ^ slow unwilling 
wind, and Keats passim: whereas modem poetry can only subsist by its contents: by becoming a complete 
magister vitae as the poetry of the ancients did: by including, as theirs did, religion with poetry, instead of 
existing as poetry only, and leaving religious wants to be supplied by the Christian religion, as a power 
existing independent of the poetical power. But the language, style, and general proceedmgs of a poetry 
which has such an immense task to perform, must be very plain, direct and severe: and it must not lose itself 
in parts & episodes & ornamental work, but must press forwards to the whole.^ ^ 
These letters give us representative ideas on two of Arnold's most enduring beliefs - that the modem age 
presents new problems for the poet and that Keats, Shelley and the Romantic poets generally neither 
perceived the need for a new approach nor provided one. Arnold's thesis is that the modem poet has to 
adopt a new manifesto in order to deal with the larger range of thoughts and feelings now current. This 
belief in a cumulative idea of history is underlined in another letter to Clough: 
... had Shakespeare and Milton lived in the alinosphere of modern feeling, had they had the multitude of 
new thoughts and feelings to deal with a modern has, I think it likely the style of each would have been far 
less curious and exquisite... The poet ' s matter being the hitherto experience of the world, and his own. 
increases with every c e n t u r y . ^ 
Arnold's remedy for the modern poet confused by such " multitudinousness" becomes the distinctive basis of 
his philosophy. At the heart of one's multipartite vision, one needs a ruling Idea. The making of the word "idea" 
into a proper noun indicates its abstract nature for Arnold. It indicates less a set of fixed principles and more an 
unfocussed cri de coeur - a resolve that some regulative principle for life, and thus for poetry as a criticism of 
life, must be found. 
The end of the letter from 1852 indicates why there is a need for such a prevailing Idea. His call for 
poetry to become "a complete magister vitae as the poetry of the ancients did" sees Arnold taking the 
position we saw in "Stagirius" a step further. It is clear that Amold now sees European civilisation as 
moving unremittingly to a new stage of unbelief in religious matters. Poetry's role is to suggest, by means 
of content and style, new mles by which to live. 
On one level Amold is looking back fondly to a civilisation - Greece in the age of Pericles - which he 
perceives to have been more cultured and open to culture than any other. His hope is the unlikely scenario 
of a retum to the days when a people (supposedly) lived by the plays of Sophocles. Arnold's invocation of 
the poetry of the ancients betrays, however, a more personal need. His answer is his effort to lay to rest the 
^letter to aough, after Sept. 1849. (LC, pp. 96-97.) 
"LettertoaoughfromMilfordBoysSchool, Oct. 28,1852. Gbid..p. 124.) 
^London, Tuesday [Dec. 1847 or early 1848]. (Ibid., p. 65.) 
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"raging falsetto" of "Stagirius".^^ Whilst his prescription for poetry is outwardly addressed to other poets, 
to critics and to Clough, it is primarily Arnold addressing himself on the necessity of finding a clear, 
unobstructed rule of life. It is his realisation that he is being pulled apart by rival philosophical systems: 
For me you may often hear my sinews cracking under the effort to unite matter ... 
he tells Clough in 1847/8.30 And again: 
The spectacle of a writer striving evidently to get breast to breast with reality is always full of instruction 
and very invigorating - and here I always feel you have the advantage of me: "much may be seen, the: 
nothing can be solved" - weighs upon me in writing.^' 
Arnold's feeling that reality escapes him leads him to exalt those poets who have shown evidence of a 
cool objectivity, who have seemed to him to be self-possessed and in touch with that unity at the heart of 
themselves which we saw posited in "Written in Butler's Sermons". Thus one early sonnet, from 1844, 
treats Shakespeare as the objective poet excellence. "Self-schooled, self-scanned, self-honoured, self-
secure," he is likened to "the loftiest hill" at which we gaze in awe in the attempt to encapsulate it within 
our vision. The attempt is doomed to failure - "Shakspeare, Shakspeare, you are as obscure as life is:" 
Arnold tells Clough in 1847.^2 yet the sonnet, as Park Honan says, "is a tribute to Arnold's best hope for 
himself a hope that he may be able to find the same cool detachment he perceives in Shakespeare. 
According to Arnold this is, as we have seen, a detachment notably not present in Keats, Shelley, 
Tennyson "et id genus omne". In concentrating on "exquisite bits and images" rather than "the whole" such 
poets have failed to perceive the changing needs of poetry, failed to see that "dawdling" with the "painted 
shell" of the universe is not likely to help anyone to in it.^ '^  
Arnold's letters give us his generalised view on the Romantics - that their poetry is inadequate to fill the 
spiritual gap left by the decline of Christianity. According to the 1852 letter quoted, the "contents" of 
Romantic poetry existed as "poetry only" and left "religious wants" to be supplied "independent of the 
poetical power" - a startling suggestion when we think of the claims Coleridge was making for the type of 
poetry he was creating. 
To see more clearly what Arnold is saying we must look further at his poetry. The substance of "The 
New Sirens" (1846-7) is the debate in the author's mind between leading a life of sensuous pleasure or one 
dedicated to the laborious pursuit of knowledge. The New Sirens are a symbol of Arnold's awakening to 
the possibilities of a religion of pleasure. "Come", the Sirens say, 
^'From a letter to F.J. Palgrave in 1869, speaking of "Stagirius" and another early poem, "The Voice" - "the falsetto rages too 
furiously". (Quoted in CP, p. 36.) 
p. 65. 
"London, July 20, [1848], (Ibid., p. 86.) 
^^[London, shortly after Dec. 6, 1847.] (Ibid., p. 63.) 
"Honan, p. 78. 
^''From the letter to Qough, [shortly after Dec. 6, 1847]: "Yet to ^ the Universe as you try to do is as irritating as Tennyson's 
dawdling with its painted shell is fatiguing to me to witness...." (LC, p. 63.) 
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"the soul is fainting 
Till she search and leam her own. 
And the wisdom of man's painting 
Leaves her riddle half unknown." 
"Come," you say, "the brain is seeking, 
While the sovran heart is dead; 
Yet this gleaned, when Gods were speaking. 
Rarer secrets than the toiling head." (73-80) 
In the poem Arnold rejects the proffered allure of the Sirens - the philosophy that "only, what we feel, we 
know". Arnold's "argument" to the poem, in a letter to Clough, explains why: 
I. . . ask myself whether this alternation of ennui and excitement is worth much? Whether it is in truth a very 
desirable life? 
And, were this alternation of ennui and excitement the best discoverable existence, yet it cannot last: time 
will destroy it: the time will come, when the elasticity of the spirits will be worn out, and nothing left but 
weariness.^^ 
At one level this is obviously a personal rejection of youthful excess. There is, however, a larger thesis 
afoot. The broad question of the efficacy of Romantic ideas as a rule for life is posed from the beginning. 
The protagonist is a poet, formerly following his art whilst clutching "awful laurels" (1. 31), but now 
wondering if the "frail forms" (1. 43) of the New Sirens might not be "more enduring / Than the charms 
Ulysses bore" (11. 43-44). Perhaps the vociferous claims of the new poets of romantic love are greater and 
safer than that allure of intellectual love which proved fatal to Homer's sailors? The promise certainly 
appears to be rewarding. The nightly revels in the "humming festal room" (a suggestion, perhaps, of 
mystical beliefs and practices) culminate in a glorious dawn in which divine communion is suggested: 
And immortal forms, to meet you, 
Down the statued alleys came. 
And through golden horns, to greet you. 
Blew such music as a God may frame. (101-104) 
The poet is charmed for a time. Later in the poem, however, he admits that "Long we wandered with you, 
feeding / Our rapt souls on your replies," but (and here we are reminded of Arnold's sub-title to the poem 
"A Palinode") now he is beginning to question the Siren's message. In the light of "the sombre day" (1. 
116) (a figure for the ever-seeking brain "that must be fed" (1. 130)) the Sirens are forced to think instead of 
relying simply on their senses. The result is that they droop and dwindle. The poet decides that such a 
philosophy can not, finally, be entertained: 
Can men worship the wan features. 
The sunk eyes, the wailing tone. 
Of unsphered, discrowned creatures. 
Souls as little godUke as their own? (247-250) 
That Arnold's decision contains a turning away from Romanticism is clear from the reasons the poet 
gives for not, finally, committing himself to the New Sirens. A hint of Arnold's dissatisfaction with the 
Romantics' common inspiration from Nature is clear: 
And if the dawning 
"March 1849. Gbid., p. 106.) 
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Into daylight never grew,... 
Or the day were sooner done, 
Or, perhaps, if hope were stronger. 
No weak nursling of an earthly sun... (105-6,110-112) 
Arnold here suggests that the seeming divinity of the glorious dawn is only, as he re-iterates later, a "vain 
ovation" for "mimic raptures" won "From some transient earthly sun",^^ one's excitement at which soon 
fades when subjected to any deep thinking. The Sirens' claim to supply all one's spiritual needs is met 
with similar disbelief: 
Once, like us, you took your station 
Watchers for a purer fire; 
But you drooped in expectation. 
And you wearied in desire. 
When the first rose flush was steeping 
All the frore peak's awful crown. 
Shepherds say, they found you sleeping 
In some windless valley, further down. (139-146) 
If Arnold saw himself, in "In Utrumque Paratus", as unworthy to be proclaiming the Truth on the solemn 
peaks, then the Romantic philosophy is too weak even to aspire after Truth. In this powerful image Arnold 
anticipates the letter to Clough about the failure of recent poetry to combine "religious wants" with poetry. 
The Sirens, like Jesus' disciples following their spiritual source, are discovered asleep, in abandonment of 
their pretentious vows. 
Arnold takes his thesis further in the title poem to his 1849 collection of poems, "The Strayed Reveller". 
The "Reveller" is an impressionable young Romantic who, straying into the environs of the goddess Circe's 
palace, is prevailed upon by Circe to surfeit himself on her intoxicating wine. Ulysses joins the company, 
eager to hear news of humanity, and the Youth tells of all he has heard that day. He has, he tells Ulysses, 
been in the company of Silenus, "the satyr companion and instructor of the youthful Dionysus"^^ who, 
when drunk, shows great powers of comprehension. Silenus has imparted two visions of the world to the 
Youth - that of the "Gods" and that of the "wise bards". "The Gods are happy" (1. 130) as, detached from 
humanity, they view their playthings as a picturesque harmony. The wise bards, though seeing the same 
things are, however, made to feel the suffering as well as the beauty: 
They feel the biting spears 
Of the grim Lapithae, and Theseus, drive. 
Drive crashing through their bones; (227-229) 
The Gods exact a price of the artist for his creative gift - "To become what we sing" (1. 234). 
There has been some divergence in critical opinion as to the meaning of "The Strayed Reveller". Lionel 
Trilling, for example, sees it as a typical Amoldian theme - "Arnold's celebration of the painful glories of 
3®ParaphraseofU. 152-154. 
^•'Note in CP. p. 78. 
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man's bondage to the emotions",^® a celebration, in fact, of one of Romanticism's central tenets. Allott,, 
meanwhile, decides that it is contradictory to the majority of Arnold's poems: 
...clearly in one mood at least before 1849 poetic volatility powerfully attracted him. 
Drawing attention to the Youth's enthusiastic utterances at the beginning. 
Faster, faster, 
O Circe, Goddess, 
Let the wild, thronging train, 
The bright procession 
Of eddying forms. 
Sweep through my soul! (1-6) 
Allottclaims that "the movement of the whole stanza suggests a Shelleyan a l l e g i a n c e . . W h i l s t I would 
agree with the results of such conclusions I differ, however, on the estimation of Arnold's motives. I would 
agree with Leon Gottfried's estimation in his Matthew Arnold and the Romantics'*^ that the Reveller is 
"strayed" in more senses than one. Although he hears both the visions of Silenus, he is attracted only by 
the superficial overview of the Gods: 
But I, Ulysses, 
Sitting on the warm steps. 
Looking over the valley. 
All day long, have seen. 
Without pain, without labour, 
Sometimes a wild-haired Maenad -
Sometimes a Faun with torches -
And sometimes, for a moment. 
Passing through the dark stems 
Flowing-robed, the beloved. 
The desired, the divine, 
Beloved lacchus. (270-280) 
This is, in effect, the same claim as that of the N e w Sirens - the simple, carefree delighting in pleasure with 
the suggestion of a glimpse of die divine as the reward for one's discipleship. Arnold is not showing such 
"poetic volatility" allegiance. The Youth is, after all, not in control of himself. "Drunk with superficial 
beauty and variety," to quote Gottfried, Arnold likens him to those Romandc poets who are "prevailed over 
by the world's multitudinousness". At the end of the poem, despite his being offered the profound poetical 
vision of the wise bards, he is as astray as he was at the beginning, calling for more wine in his satisfaction 
with sensuousness.'^' 
It is clear that Arnold is on the side of the wise bards. What is not clear, however, is who the wise bards 
are meant to represent. Trilling feels that they stand for Arnold's brief celebration of the Romandc 
temperament. Such a reading, however, direcdy contradicts Arnold's accusation that the Romantics played 
with "exquisite bits and images" rather than pressing "forwards to the whole". The wise bards are notable. 
^^riUing, p. 100. 
3'CP. pp. 67-68. 
••"University of Nabraska Press, 1963. 
•"Gottfried, pp. 124-125. 
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on the contrary, for their comprehensive vision. Such a factor leads Warren D. Anderson to posit 
Sophocles and Apollonius as the wise bards and, further, to see the poem as the typical Amoldian 
opposition of Classical ideal and Romantic sensuousness and multitudinousness.'^^ 
It is here that I come back to Trilling's conclusion. I ^ think Arnold is celebrating "the painful glories of 
man's bondage to the strength of the emotions", but I agree with Anderson in finding that celebration 
centred on the Classical poets, not the Romantics. What is happening is, in fact, an unconscious 
displacement on Arnold's part. "The Strayed Reveller" is a celebration of the painful joys of poetic 
creation (a thoroughly Romantic poetical idea) in the guise of an admiration for the Classical "wide and 
luminous view". Arnold is, in effect, applauding Classicism for showing Romantic characteristics. 
The confusion lies, I think, in Arnold's desire for "the whole". We saw in discussing the "Shakespeare" 
sonnet, Arnold's personal desire for cool detachment in the face of the world's "multitudinousness". We 
know, too, from "Stagirius" and the 1852 letter to Clough that he saw this "wholeness" as something to be 
found only in religion. Now that Christianity was failing he needed to find that religious sense of the 
essential unity of matter, die religious fubess of purpose, in poetry. Arnold's knowledge of the lives of 
Romandcism's central protagonists makes him doubtful as to the efficacy of the central tenets of Romantic 
poetry for enabling one to follow a ruling Idea of life.'*^ Thus his claim that Romantic poetry did not 
address religious wants, did not provide for this wholeness of purpose. The New Sirens and the Strayed 
Reveller are the results of Arnold's perception of Romanticism's failings - characters who become 
"prevaUed over by the world's multitudinousness" and who, failing to follow the ruling Idea, will 
eventually wear out the "elasticity" of their spirits. 
So Arnold seeks for his cool detached vision in the likes of Sophocles and Apollonius but, remarkably 
enough, portrays them as in possession of what Coleridge would call "The Imagination". Arnold's "wise 
bards", in "becoming what they sing", are showing that semi-divine creative faculty which Coleridge saw 
as the essence of the poetic office. Their uncomfortable vision is the powerful one of a reconciliation of 
"discordant qualities"; knowledge of both the beauty of the divine vision and the agonies of human 
existence. They emerge from the sublimities of their vision much like Coleridge's Ancient Mariner does 
after his - "sadder but wiser". 
If this is all true, it would suggest that Arnold is, as we suggested at the beginning of this chapter, 
showing Romantic characteristics in spite of himself. The desire for "the whole" leads him to find it in a 
place he thinks he is rejecting. It is clear however, from the remaining poetry, letters and official poetic 
42 Mntthew Arnold and the Cl.i.s.sirnl TrnHit|nn (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1965) pp. 24-31. 
^ addition to Arnold's probable opinion of Wordsworth at this time (see note no. 6, p. 3) we find him dismissing Coleridge and 
SheUey in a late essay m the following terms. Coleridge was a "poet and phUosopher wrecked in a mist of opium" whilst Shelley was a 
r ® luminous wings in vain". (From "Byron", the preface to the Poetry of Rvron 
( loo l ) . CPW9:237.) 
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pronouncements, that Arnold is not aware of his additions to the Romantic heritage. The poem that ends 
the first volume and is presumably meant to sum up the whole, is his most unremittingly anti-Romantic 
piece of all. "Resignation" is the first of a number of notable poems, each of which serves to sum up and 
define a particular stage of Arnold's poetical philosophy. In "Resignation", Arnold makes what he believes 
are firm definitions of the man/nature relationship and the role of the poet. In his resulting re-definitions of 
the nature of reality, he attempts to substitute his own unified system of beliefs for the fragmented vision of 
earlier poems. 
Many of Arnold's early poems are arguments. Such pieces as "In Harmony with Nature (To a Preacher)", 
"The World and the Quietist (To Critias)" and "To a Republican Friend, 1848" set up debates between the 
author and the person addressed. "Resignation" is another such argument, addressed "To Fausta", 
Matthew's elder sister, Jane Arnold.'*'' 
Like "The New Sirens", "Resignation" might equally have the sub-title "A Palinode", as the poem is a 
deliberate retraction of ideas the poet might once have entertained or even partly believed. The full title of 
the poem sets up the tone of recantation with its suggestion that Arnold is resigning from a position still 
held by his impetuous sister. The substance of the poem further emphasises the idea of re-definition of the 
self, since it is about re-visiting a place and events which the memory had marked out as a previous 
self-definition. 
Leon Gottfried sees "Resignation" as Arnold's deliberate attempt to re-define the Wordsworthian poetic 
philosophy of "Tintem Abbey".'*^ The address to the passionate sister and the poet's own past certainly 
suggest this. So, too, does the setting, since this is the English Lake country, containing all the associations 
that Arnold knew would be readily in the minds of his readers. However, as always with Arnold's larger 
theses, behind the denial of Romanticism is the catalyst of the personal desire for integrity. "Resignation" 
is Arnold's attempt to close the debate going on in his own mind about the nature of nature, a debate that 
we noticed was certainly unfinished at the time of writing "Alaric at Rome". 
The main action of the poem is a repeat of a walk made ten years earlier by Dr Arnold and the Arnold 
children. Matthew recalls his youthful reactions to the original walk, evoking remembrances of an almost 
Wordsworthian sublimity: 
And now, in front, behold outspread 
Those upper regions we must tread! 
Mild hollows, and clear heathy swells. 
The cheerful silence of the fells. (64-67) 
The description of the close of that day sums up the young Arnold's sense of Wordsworthian empathy with 
"^According to TriUing, the name suggests "a female Faust" who "desires poignam experience to relieve the dullness of her life". 
(P- 79.) 
"'Gottfried, pp. 219-223. 
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nature. The headlong rush of the recollection thus far pauses, in order to give an effect akin to one of 
Wordsworth's "spots of time": 
But, Fausta, I remember well, 
That as the balmy darkness fell 
We bathed our hands with speechless glee, 
That night, in the wide-glimmering sea. (82-85) 
On t l ^ walk, however, a new tone is introduced. Mature reflection has taken the place of "speechless 
glee": 
Here sit we, and again unroll. 
Though slowly, the familiar whole. (94-95) 
We soon find, though, that Arnold's sister is still in possession of her youthful disposition towards nature: 
Still this wild brook, the rushes cool. 
The sailing foam, the shining pool! 
These are not changed; and we, you say. 
Are scarce more changed, in truth, than they. (104-107) 
The effect of the deliberately awkward punctuation of the last two lines is to deny the certainty of what has 
gone before, to set up the antithesis in attitudes that is the substance of "Resignation". Arnold, it is clear, 
diverges strongly from the opinion of "Fausta" that this walk can be described in the same manner as the 
one a decade earlier. He adverts to the gipsies "whom we met below" (1. 108) as the true natural inheritors 
of what Fausta sees as "scenery". Unmoved by any Romantic sense of spiritual "oneness" with nature their 
pattern of life is one of subsistence: 
- they rubbed through yesterday 
In their hereditary way, 
And they will rub through, if they can. 
To-morrow on the self-same plan. 
Till death arrive to supersede. 
For them, vicissitude and need. (138-143) 
Having described what life is like for the common lot, Arnold contrasts the expectations of the gipsies 
with those of the Wordsworthian poet. There is a marked line of descent from Wordsworth's description of 
the poet as a man "endowed with a more lively sensibility",''^ to Arnold's definition of the poet as one 
to whose mighty heart 
Heaven doth a quicker pulse impart, (144-145) 
but a rebuke of the author of "The Prelude" is surely intended in the following couplet, where Arnold's poet 
Subdues that energy to scan 
Not his own course, but that of man. (146-147) 
Moreover Arnold's poet seeks not for communion with his fellows, but rather for detachment: 
Beautiful eyes meet his - and he 
Bears to admire uncravingly; (160-161) 
Arnold's poet identifies with nature, but such an identification is the opposite of "the love of nature leading 
"'^From the Preface to the Lyrical Ballads (1800). 
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to the love of man" of "The Prelude". I f c contemplation of nature leads him to decide that the universal 
order is one of "peace" not "joy", a "placid and continuous whole" (11. 192 & 190). For Arnold's poet, the 
comprehension of nature leads to his resigning from the love of man. 
Fausta, though, is not convinced. She listens, but retains a "wandering smile" (1. 199), still, it seems, in 
possession of Romantic beliefs. Her reply is that, compared to the gipsies who "feel not, though they move 
and see" (1. 205), the poet is able to feel more deeply and is, at will, able to breathe "immortal air" (1. 207). 
In what may be a reference to Coleridge's claims for the "Secondary Imagination", Fausta's poet shows 
that ability to partake in his art in the divine process of creation. 
In a passage that foreshadows "Dover Beach" Arnold retorts that the world "outlasts" such feelings as 
aversion, love, interest and hope, implying that nature is indifferent to whatever the poet might choose to 
think about her. Arnold implores his sister to become reconciled to a philosophy of life that is very close to 
fatalism: 
Blame thou not, therefore, him who dares 
Judge vain beforehand human cares;... 
Who needs not love and power, to know. 
Love transient, power an unreal show; 
Who treads at ease life's uncheered ways - (231-232,235-237) 
It is only those who resign themselves to a mechanistic universe who are able to "conquer fate" (1. 248); 
only then, in other words, can one overcome the Romantic urges within us. 
The poem's conclusion sees Arnold deliberately cutting short all further conjecture by asserting the one 
thing we can know with certainty: 
Enough, we live!... (261) 
If we can sense anything about nature it is that the hills, rocks and sky "seem to bear rather than rejoice" (1. 
270). Any attempt to see oneself as somehow apart from this order - and this is Arnold's final acerbic 
injunction against the Romantics - is doing a disservice to those who have given up all pretensions: 
Not milder is the general lot 
Because our spirits have forgot. 
In action's dizzying eddy whirled. 
The something that infects the world. (275-279) 
It seems from this poem that in the years since "Alaric at Rome"'*^ Arnold has decided to solve the 
question of man's relationship to Nature in favour of a stoic fatalism. Man appears to have none of the 
communion with nature that Wordsworth asserts in "The Prelude" and that we have seen Coleridge 
postulating in his theory of the Imagination in Biographia Literaria. "Resignation" sees Arnold denying (or 
ignoring) Coleridgean and Wordsworthian ideas of poetic creativity and consequently becoming lost in the 
isolation that follows from accepting the mechanistic world view. For many of Arnold's family and friends 
^'"Alaric" was written by May, 1840. "Resignation" was composed between the years 1843 and 1848. 
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this was no "solution" at all. His antagonist in the poem, Jane, wrote to their brother Tom saying that 
common men would "sink" unless they found "some mighty helper": 
surely language which tells them of a dumb unalterable order of the universe... will seem too unreal and too 
hopeless.'*^ 
Sceptical, too, of the reality of Arnold's vision is J.C. Shairp who wrote to Clough about their mutual 
friend; 
I do not feel that great background of fatalism or call it what you will which is behind all his thoughts. But 
he thinks he sees his way. 
and, similarly, in another letter. 
Anything that so takes the life from out things must be false... Mat, as I told him, disowns man's natural 
feelings, and they will disown his poetry. If there's nothing else in the world but blank dejections, its not 
worth while setting them to music.'^^ 
It is true that Arnold disowns "man's feelings", though he would substitute "Romantic" for Shairp's 
"natural". What he is doing in "Resignation" is deliberately recanting ideas he has held - and even held in 
the same volume of poetry. The poets as "wise bards" who "become what they sing" in "The Strayed 
Reveller" are here denied their philosophy of "Romantic empathy and identification" in favour of a 
philosophy of "Olympian ("Classical") detachment".^® 
The sermon on detachment in "Resignation" is apparently written for the larger benefit of poetry. Of 
direct relevance here is Arnold's letter to Clough of February, 1849: 
The trying to go into and to the bottom of an object instead of grouping objects is as fatal to the 
sensuousness of poetry as the mere painting, (for, m Poetry this is not grouping) is to its airy and rapidly 
moving life. 
"Not deep the Poet sees, but wide": think of this as you gaze from the Cumner Hill toward Cirencester and 
Cheltenham.51 
The invocation of die line from "Resignation" indicates that Arnold saw his poem as pointing the way 
forward for other poets. Foreshadowed here is his insistence on the need for poets of an "Idea of the 
world", and echoes of his admiration for the detached, objective vision of Shakespeare. When we think, 
however, that such ideas produced the widely differing messages of "The Strayed Reveller" and 
"Resignation" we may begin to question the stridency of the latter's call for stoic detachment. Perhaps it 
may be that Arnold "protesteth too much"? 
If we are to take Jane Arnold's side in seeing the philosophy of "Resignation" as "too unreal and too 
hopeless" then the best place to go for support may well be Arnold himself. There is evidence from his 
letters that the demolition of Romantic beliefs was undertaken with more than one eye on Clough: 
- I have been at Oxford the last two days and hearing Sellar and the rest of that clique who know neither life 
^"Queued in Honan, p. 1T7. 
•"LC.p. IM. 
5<^VilliaIn A. Madden - Mallhew Arnold - A Study of the Aesthetic Tempernment in Victorian Fngl.nnd (Indiana University Press, 
1967) p. 127. We can find the reason for such a pronounced change in Arnold's reading lists and lelten. His reading of Spinoza, 
Epictetus, Senancour's "ObeHnann" and Goethe are all apparent from the poem, especially in the prevailing spirit of Stoicism. 
"LC, p. 99. 
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nor themselves rave about your poem gave me a strong almost bitter feeling with respject to them, the age, the 
poem, even you. Yes I said to myself something tells me I can, if need be, at last dispense with them all, 
even with him: better that, than be sucked for an hour even into the Time Stream in which they and he plunge 
and bellow. I... took up Obermann, and refuged myself with him in his forest against your Zeit Geist.^^ 
This leuer, written soon after the completion of "Resignation", suggests that there might be more behind 
the philosophy of the poem than a considered appraisal of Romantic and Stoic ideas on the nature of reality. 
The language of "taking refuge" suggests that Arnold might, in fact, be escaping from complex and 
conflicting ideas about poetry and life. Whilst the intention might have been to create a poem that explores 
ideas, the final effect is quite to the contrary. Arnold's resignation is in fact a resignation from creativity of 
any sort owing to a destructive withdrawal into himself. 
For the true empiricist, of course, the acceptance of the individual's isolation is at least an honest 
realisation. Significantly, however, Arnold was not satisfied with such a conclusion. Towards the end of 
the next year Arnold was hinting to Clough that such a philosophy led only to a poetic void as well as being 
an unsatisfactory "magister vitae": 
With me it is curious at present: I am getting to feel more independent and unaffectable as to all intellectual 
and poetical performance the impatience at being fausse in which drove me some time since so strongly into 
myself, and more snuffing after a moral atmosphere to respire in than ever before in my life.'^ 
In admitting he was driven into himself by what amounts to impatience with the intractable problems of 
writing poetry, Arnold himself denies the force and the truth of "Resignation". 
The question as to how he can avoid this isolation and, in particular, how he can write poetry that avoids 
the conclusions of "Resignation", seems to receive an equivocal answer. In the light of our concerns with 
Arnold's solution to the question of religion and spirituality this letter seems to me to indicate the reaching 
of a direshold in Arnold's life. Primarily the letter is an admission of guilL He admits to Clough that he 
has been withdrawn from his friends. The solution to this particular problem is a search for "a moral 
atmosphere". This is significant because for the first time Arnold is linking morality with life and 
literature. On the other hand we have to ask the question "is literature really of importance to Arnold 
here"? The leUer seems, in fact, to be saying that a moral aunosphere is needed in order to escape from 
intellectual and poetical performance. For a poet whose poems appear to have been written in order to find 
solutions for life, such a conclusion seems to be hinting at a termination of poetical performance. Perhaps 
the Romantic poet in Arnold saw, however, the possibility of another way out of isolation. Perhaps in 
another mood he may have admitted to himself that Wordsworth's "sense sublime / Of something far more 
deeply i n t e r f u s e d " , m i g h t resonate more with his nature than his own " ... something that infects the 
world". This would certainly have been the wish of J.A. Froude, one of Arnold's poetical mentors, who 
wrote to Clough after The Strayed Reveller volume's appearance: 
I admire Matt - to a very great extent. Only I don't see what business he has to parade his calmness and 
'\A3ndon, [Nov. 15,22or29] 1848. (Ibid., p. 95.) Arnold was writing against Qough's successful poem "The Boihie of Toper-na-Fuosich". 
'^ Tiun. Sept. 23, [1849]. (Ibid., p. 110.) 
^ Tintem Abbey", U. 95-96. 
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lecture us on resignation when he has never known what a storm is, and doesn't know what he has to resign 
himself to - 1 think he only knows the shady side of nature out of books - still ... There are some things like 
the Forsaken Merman that sound right out from the heart.^ ^ 
D.G. James' polemical Matthew Arnold and the Decline of English Rnmantici.sm sees Arnold's poetry as 
a failure owing to its "fluctuating, picturesque dismay". It could only have grown if he had committed 
himself to one particular cause: what James calls "the Extreme". Arnold, he says, should have tapped the 
"spiritual sources of Romanticism", going on to develop the high Romanticism of the earlier generation of 
English writers.^^ From what we know of Arnold's contemporaries, many of them had the same opinion. 
"The Forsaken Merman" that Froude saw "right out from the heart" is both the most original and the most 
Romantically influenced poem inThe Strayed Revellervolume. It was also the most generally admired 
poem of the collection. 
"The Forsaken Merman" finds Arnold's idealist side uppermost, realising the power of myth to symbolise 
the possibilides of a harmonious existence. In this poem, Arnold finds a positive harmony set in nature and 
standing in opposition to the confusion of human life - a profound change from the imposition of the 
nihilistic order onto nature in "Resignation". 
"The Forsaken Merman" was originally a Danish ballad, which may account for Arnold's creation of a 
free-flowing incantation. His sense of rhythm is often poor in other poems, but here the chief characteristic 
of the Merman's natural habitat is beautifully captured in the musical ebb and flow of the rhythm. The 
combination of the vision of untroubled calm enjoyed by all the sea creatures, as well as the sentiments 
necessarily called forth by the story, put us strongly on the side of the Merman and indignant at the 
collective sin of humanity that can set itself against the natural order. This opposition is played on 
throughout the poem, with life in the town busily unaware of anything outside itself. When Margaret is 
called to the church she moves from the "kind sea-caves" (1- 61) with their ceilings of "amber" and 
pavements of "pearl" (11. 118-119) to a "little grey church" where "Loud prays the priest; shut stands the 
door" (1. 82). In opposition to the descriptions of the mysterious deep, the faithless Margaret's life in the 
town is portrayed in terms of busy superficiality: 
She sits at her wheel in the humming town. 
Singing most joyfully. 
Hark what she sings: "O joy, O joy. 
For the humming street, and the child with its toy!" (87-90) 
In contrast the descriptions of marine life are slower, longer and richer, the repetition of words and rhythm 
suggesting a realm of contented co-existence: 
Sand-strewn caverns, cool and deep, 
Where the winds are all asleep; 
Where the spent lights quiver and gleam. 
"March 6, 1849. (LC,p. 127.) 
" (Oxford University Press, 1961) pp. 26-27. 
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Where the salt weed sways in the stream. 
Where the sea-beasts, ranged all round. 
Feed in the ooze of their pasture-ground; 
Where the sea-snakes coil and twine, 
Dry their mail and bask in the brine; (35-42) 
Although one can not say for certain, it seems possible, with Arnold's knowledge of Coleridge's poetry, 
that Arnold's inspiration for the "sea-snakes" came from Coleridge's "Ancient Mariner". Whether it is 
conscious or not, the above description does have contained within it the Mariner's joyful acceptance of his 
kinship with the natural order. It is as if the original revelation of the Mariner is here being quietly 
confirmed by Arnold. 
"The Forsaken Merman" is a significant admission by Arnold. In content it builds on what D.G. James 
calls "the spiritual sources of Romanticism" in the suggestion that humanity is poorer for denying the truths 
of existence set within nature. It builds too on the inheritance of Romanticism in its balladic, mesmeric 
form - a form so at odds with the majority of The Strayed Reveller collection. The overall effect of the 
poem is remarkable in that it fulfils none of the prescriptions we have seen Arnold making for poetry. 
There are no "sinews cracking" here because there is no effort to "unite matter". There is no desperate 
attempt to find a prevailing Idea, no poet imposing his "objective" vision on the poem and no desire, above 
all, to write poetry by which one can live. Instead, we have suggestions, intimations and hopes. "The 
Forsaken Merman" is a remarkable postscript to Arnold's fu-st volume of poetry. Put together with the 
unconscious allegiance to Romanticism in "The Strayed Reveller" we can see a radical disjunction in 
Arnold's system of beliefs as portrayed in his poetry at this time which undermines the prevailing message 
of the 1849 collection as well as putting large question-marks against Arnold's self-appointed role as a 
reformer of poetry 
The 1849 set of poems sees Arnold wavering between an allegiance to the Romantic, and particularly 
Wordsworthian, tradition in which he was raised and a new poetry that nevertheless rests heavily on the 
past and particularly the Classical tradition. Each of the poems is an attempt to come to terms with the 
epistemological vacuum left by the disappearance of traditional Christian faith, to find a philosophy that 
will overcome the isolation of the self that inevitably follows from the observations of philosophers and 
scientists such as Hume and Newton. The radical opposition of such poems as "The Forsaken Merman" 
and "Resignation" - their tone, imagery and content - suggests that Arnold is by no means sure in which 
direction he should go. 
^^From a letter to "K", probably of 1849, speaking of the reception of his volume: "At Oxford particularly many complain that the 
subjects treated do not interest them. But as I feel rather as a refomier in poetical matters, I am glad of this opposition." (Unpubl i shed 
t ptippi of Ma Ithew Arnold P- 15). 
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1.4. Poems: 1852 and Later 
The second volume of poems (1852) sees Arnold uncompromising towards those, like J.A. Froude, who 
found more pleasure (and honesty) in "The Forsaken Merman" than in "Resignation". Froude's doubts as 
to the reality of Arnold's experience as poeticised in "Resignation" can not, however, be repeated as a 
critique for die majority of the poems in the new volume. The title to Park Honan's chapter on this part of 
Arnold's life - "The Intensity of Love 1848-1849"^^ describes perfecdy the main impulse behind the poetry 
of Empedocles on Etna, and Other Poems. 
Honan offers new insights into what was previously considered to be a brief but intense passion for a 
stranger. Arnold, holidaying in Switzerland, wrote to Clough that he was planning to linger at the Hotel 
Bellevue in Thun "for the sake of the blue eyes of one of its inmates".^^ Following thorough research, 
Honan maintains that this woman was well known to Arnold, she apparendy being his holidaying 
neighbour at Ambleside, Mary Claude. That she was an old friend from family holidays in the Lake 
District certainly fits Arnold's diffident character. For a man who seems to have found most women 
uncongenial the idea of Arnold impetuously abandoning plans in order to steal glances at women not 
known to him becomes absurd.^ The point is an important one actually, because it sheds a new and very 
bright light on the poems of the 1852 collection, as well as qualifying further the comments on 
"Resignation" and adding to our understanding of Arnold's consequent poetical direction. 
Mary Claude, Honan tells us, was Arnold's "ally in the Clougho-Matthean set from 1847 to 1849. While 
he admired her authors he wrote his most successful poetry;"^^ Mary Claude wrote in the style of the 
continental version of England's Romanticism - the "Sentimental School" - that of Senancour, 
Chateaubriand, Richter and Foscolo. She it was who probably introduced Arnold to Senancour's 
"Obermann" - who, as we shall see, was a profound influence on his poetry during this period. 
What was previously not known about the meeting at Thun was that it never occurred. Mary Claude left 
early from Geneva for home. On his return to Oxford, Arnold was apparently ridiculed by his friends for his 
being jilted. The immediate result was the letter we have seen in relation to "Resignation" about Arnold's 
"refuging himself with Obermann in his forest". 
All this is significant because it demonstrates further the personal impulses behind what might be taken as 
definitive philosophical pronouncements in the poems. If it casts further doubts on the validity of 
^'Honan.pp. 144-167. 
5'29Sq)L.1848. (LC,p.91.) 
the same letter from Thun, Arnold writes the following: "More particularly is this my feeling with regard to (I hate the word) 
women. We know beforehand all they can teach us: yet we arc obliged to learn it directly from them." 
"Honan, p. 158. 
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"Resignation" as a rule for life, it also colours our vision of the other poems written around this time. 
Arnold returned to Thun the following year, in September 1849, but during this holiday the relationship 
between him and Mary was finally extinguished. The entire drama is recounted in the poems "Meeting", 
"Parting", "Isolation. To Marguerite", "To Marguerite - Continued", and "A F a r e w e l l " . ^ ^ 
Unsurprisingly we find most of these poems attempting to deal with the problem of feeling. Arnold is 
already suspicious of "feeling" as a source of motivation - such is the very clear message of "The New 
Sirens". However, as we saw in the same poem he is well aware of the strength of the emotions, even as he 
denies their efficacy as a rule of life. It is clear, for example, that the main legacy of Romanticism, as 
perceived by Arnold, is "feeling": 
Others will strengthen us to bear -
But who, ah! who, will make us feel? (66-67) 
he wrote in the "Memorial Verses" for the death of Wordsworth. 
In the "Marguerite" poems we can see this simultaneous movement of the desire and fear accompanying 
abandonment to the emotions. A typical example is "Meeting" where the opening describes Arnold's 
return to Thun in the style of a conventional love lyric: 
Again I see my bliss at hand. 
The town, the lake are here; 
My Marguerite smiles upon the strand. 
Unaltered with the year. (1-4) 
Love is not to come to fruition, however, as the poem portentously continues: 
Again I spring to make my choice; 
Again in tones of ire 
I hear a God's tremendous voice: 
"Be counselled, and retire." (9-12) 
"Parting" has a similar message: 
Forgive me! Forgive me! 
Ah, Marguerite, fain 
Would these arms reach to clasp thee! 
But see! 'tis in vain. (59-62) 
Throughout the "Marguerite" series the lover seems to have an intimation of his ultimate failure, as if, like 
his own Gipsy Child, he has "foreknown the vanity of hope".^ ^ The remarkable thing, however, is the 
universalisation of these feelings. The idea that there is some cosmic decision against his love leads him, 
pessimistically, to conclude that universal isolation is inevitable: 
Yes! in the sea of life enisled. 
With echoing straits between us thrown. 
Dotting the shoreless watery wild. 
We mortal millions live alone. ("To Marguerite - Continued", 1. 1-4.) 
tides are those in CP and are not necessarily the original 1852 titles. "Marguerite" is Arnold's pseudonym for Mary Claude. 
®3"TO a Gipsy Child by the Sea-shore" (c. 1843-44) 1. 39. 
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Whilst not wishing to deny the intensity of Arnold's love for Mary Claude, one wonders whether the poet 
is really writing poems about specific occasions or whether he is not rather dramatising beyond the reality 
of the situation. Such large claims about the true nature of human communication do not, on the face of it, 
seem to be a direct consequence of fading amorous hopes for Mary Claude. Leon Gottfried's similar 
suspicion leads him to treat Arnold's "Marguerite" poems with severity. There is, he says, "a quality of 
posturing self-dramatisation, of shrillness and of insensitivity" in the poems. Of Arnold's sense of negative 
destiny he ironically comments: "This meddling deity takes so personal an interest in Matthew Arnold's 
love affairs..."^'* Such criticism has some truth, but its sarcastic force is obviously more successful when 
aimed at the hypothesis of Arnold's dalliance with a blue-eyed stranger. From what we know of Mary 
Claude, the whole question becomes more complex. 
What happens in the love poems is, I think, Arnold's familiar technique of displacement; the purgation of 
internal conflicts by universalising those conflicts or desU-oying them in the supposedly objective actions of 
Arnold's poetic protagonists. In the "Shakespeare" sonnet this took the form of exalting Shakespeare for 
supposedly displaying the detachment from the world Arnold himself was seeking. In "The Strayed 
Reveller", Arnold was able to deny the prevailing poetic spirit of the age by projecting Romantic ideas on 
to a Classical model. In "Resignation" he was, as we now see, able to overcome disappointment in love 
and further repel the Romantic side of his nature by attacking Romanticism under the guise of a 
reformation of poetic philosophy on Stoic lines. The "Marguerite" poems are an extended series of 
attempts to lay "feeling" or strong emotion to rest. Whilst the catalyst for writing the poems might be a 
disappointment in love, the philosophy of the series comes to embrace much more. When Leon Gottfried 
calls "Isolation. To Marguerite" "embarassing"^^ he is pointing out graphically an obvious problem with 
the love poems - that they can not contain the weighty conclusions they are forced to bear. The idea of the 
impossibility of meaningful human interaction is simply not justified by the fact of a failed love affair. 
Once again, in fact, Arnold is using poetry in order to discredit a philosophy of poetry (and therefore, by 
Arnold's own theory, a philosophy of life). It is a generally accepted psychoanalytical principle that a 
person who continually and vociferously denies something to himself is in reality attracted to whatever he 
is attacking. So it is here with Arnold. Awakened to the possibilities of being led by feelings through his 
love for Mary Claude, he tentatively embraced, as Honan says, "her authors", the Sentimental School, 
believing, at the same time, that this was dangerous territory. When the personal attempt to find fulfilment 
by emotions failed, Arnold then used the medium of poetry to destroy, with, I suspect, some relief, that type 
of poetry which celebrated "feeling" as a type of knowledge. Thus in "To Marguerite - Continued" he 
invokes motifs of the Sentimental School - nightingales and moonlit nights - only to deny their worth as 




poem, that our isolation is total is, as in the case of "Resignation", another attempt to overcome a divisive 
philosophy of life. 
"Stanzas in Memory of the Author of Obermann" (November 1849) is, like "Resignation", another of 
Arnold's self-definitions. It is a public summary of his flirtation with, and despatch of, the recent poetical 
incarnation and a statement of his future development The poem enables Arnold to pay his poetical debt to 
Senancour while at the same time claiming that the march of time makes it impossible to embrace his 
philosophy of life. In the process of this valediction to the Sentimental School Arnold further re-defines his 
past by officially denying any future involvement with two other previous heroes - Wordsworth and 
Goethe. 
The poem begins by admitting the force of Senancour's portrait of Obermann. Visiting the Alpine 
country in which Obermann took refuge from the world, Arnold associates the severity of the surroundings 
with the person whose desire to maintain integrity forces him to abandon the confusion of humanity's 
"hopeless tangle" (1. 83). It is an option to which Arnold is greatly attracted, the austerity of Obermann's 
search for Truth resonating with that Idealist side of Arnold which we saw aspiring after unity with the 
"One all-pure" in "In Utrumque Paratus". Only two others, Arnold muses, have managed in these times "to 
see their way" (1. 48) like Obermann. But these, although also attractive to Arnold, one cannot follow. 
Wordsworth, though still maintaining his special virtue of "sweet calm" (1. 79), has done so only by 
averting his eyes "From half of human fate" (1. 54). Goethe meanwhile, the possessor of the "wide / And 
luminous view" (11. 79-80), was raised "in a tranquil world" (1. 67). We, "brought forth and reared in hours 
/ Of change, alarm, surprise" (11. 69-70) can not hope to emulate him. 
Arnold muses further on Obermann's philosophy. In doing so he admits his fragmented self: 
Ah! two desires toss about 
The poet's feverish blood. 
One drives him to the world without. 
And one to solitude. (93-96) 
Obermann tries to tempt Arnold to his life of solitude with a message similar to that of "Resignation": 
He only lives with the world's life. 
Who hath renounced his own. (103-104) 
This time, however, Arnold waves away the proffered delights of self-absorption: 
Away the dreams that but deceive 
And thou, sad guide, adieu! 
I go, fate drives me; but I leave 
Half of my life with you. (129-132) 
Arnold's official reason for denying the possibility of resignation is that he "must" live in the world owing 
to the wiles of Destiny: 
We, in some unknown Power's employ. 
Move on a rigorous line; (133-134) 
but the letter to Clough about being "driven into himself indicates that it is because he is aware of the 
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damage done to himself and his friendships by the message and tone of "Resignation". His admitting to 
Clough that he is "snuffing after a moral atmosphere to respire in" is, as we have suggested, an apology for 
his damaging self-interest. 
"Stanzas in Memory of the Author of Obermann" is, then, an attempt to clear up misunderstandings 
within Arnold and between Arnold and his friends. His "adieu" is not only to Obermann. It is a more 
considered farewell to Mary Claude, another, more rational, attempt to bury Romanticism and a report to 
the world at large as to his intention to remodel his poetry and himself. In admitting his attraction to that 
which he is renouncing Arnold is, at least in this poem, able to find something like psychological 
wholeness. 
The problem of a poet in search of a poetic identity still remained, however. Even if the clear-headed 
reasoning of the "Stanzas" did make for psychological health, the idea of a poet leaving half of his poetic 
self behind is startling. The search for the "buried self is, in fact, the catalyst behind all of Arnold's 
remaining major poems. 
The search for a self by which to live and write poetry leads Arnold in a number of conflicting directions, 
none more contrary than in the two major poems of the 1852 and 1853 collections, "Empedocles on Etna" 
and "Sohrab and Rustum". "Empedocles on Etna" is Arnold's epic dramatisation of the problems faced by 
poets in the modem day. The Preface to the 1853 poems claims that Arnold "intended to delineate the 
feelings of one of the last Greek religious philosophers" come upon an age in which differing ideas had 
begun to prevail.^ As he goes on to say, however, there has entered into Empedocles' situation "much that 
we are accustomed to consider as exclusively modem", namely "the dialogue of the mind with itself. 
From what we know of Arnold's inheritance of his father's cyclical idea of history, it is quite clear that 
Empedocles is a poet and philosopher in Arnold's position, working through Arnold's own problems. 
The three characters of the poem bring together a number of familiar Amoldian tiiemes as well as 
presenting for the first time ideas which will provide much future pre-occupation. The vast majority of 
"Empedocles on Etna" is taken up by the central character's monologue on his life, philosophy and times. 
Previously feted as a healer and sage by the Sicilian people, he now lives under banishment and with the 
knowledge of the rejection of his Stoic philosophy by the Sophists. Pausanias, Empedocles' companion on 
the poem's journey (the ascent of Etna), is, as a physician, eager to discover the secret of Empedocles' 
miraculous powers of heaUng. The third character, Callicles, is an impressionable young harp-player who 
interjects from time to time in the hope of charming Empedocles back to good spirits. 
Empedocles' reply to Pausanias is not what the physician expected. Denying the idea of magic or 
®®Froni the reproduaion of the Preface in CP, pp. 652-671. 
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miracle, Empedocles delivers a characteristically Amoldian sermon on "reading thy own breast aright" (Act 
I, Sc. ii, 1. 142) in order to see one's way through the present troubles. The message's mixture of Stoicism 
and the Book of Common Prayer (as in "We do not what we ought, / What we ought not, we do," (I, ii, 
237-238)) is supposed to enable Pausanias to "bravelier front his life" (II, i, 9) by divesting him of 
extravagant hopes and teaching him to be satisfied with the simple joys that are left. 
There is a suggestion of Arnold's future as a self-styled religious educator in the exchange between 
Empedocles and Pausanias. Empedocles' declamation in the first part of the poem pin-points a number of 
problems to be overcome by those wishing to live honestly as well as fully. It is clear however, that, 
underlying the specific fears and difficulties, the all-embracing question is "how to live in a world devoid 
of any religious meaning". Empedocles' advice to "Sink in thyself!" (I, ii, 146) is all that is left after trust 
in God (or, for Empedocles, "Gods") has been removed on the grounds of "not proven". Although 
Empedocles' message is to be modified in Arnold's future religious writings, Pausanias' role scarcely 
changes. His credulous desire to understand the magic powers behind Empedocles' acts of healing makes 
him a prototype of the general public whose readiness to believe in supernatural occurrences Arnold desires 
so much to change. 
The difference between this poem and the future religious writings is that, at this stage, the Stoic message 
of Arnold's intellect is not the only, or even the pre-eminent, factor in his life. We saw in "Resignation" 
Arnold attempting to deny conflict within himself by denigrating the worth of feeling and the poetry that 
takes feeling into account. The second half of "Empedocles", however, states Arnold's predicament in full. 
Whilst he does not wish to deny the efficacy of the rule of life he has given to Pausanias, Empedocles 
himself cannot fulfil the injunction to be self-sufficient, to be true to his "only true, deep-buried" self (II, i, 
371), 
For something has impaired thy spirit's strength, 
And dried its self-sufficing fount of joy. 
Thou canst not live with men nor with thyself - (II, i, 21-23) 
The "something" is later identified as the tyranny of thought. Empedocles recalls a time when 
.... we received the shock of mighty thoughts 
On simple minds with a pure natural joy; (II, i, 242-243) 
Now, however, he has lost his "balance", having become a slave to thought "and dead to every natural joy" 
(II, i, 248-249). 
In an important passage later on, Arnold admits the evasive nature of previous incarnations of his 
philosophy of life, before laying bare his true "bounded" self: 
And who can say: I have been always free. 
Lived ever in the light of my own soul? -
I cannot; I have lived in wrath and gloom. 
Fierce, disputatious, ever at war with man, 
Far from my own soul, far from warmth and light, 
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But I have not grown easy in these bonds -
But I have not denied what bonds these were. (II, i, 392-398) 
The passage can be taken as a confession of previous concealments of the truth, whilst the last line gives us 
Arnold's state of mind in this poem - one of hopeless division. 
That it is not a state in which one can live comfortably is clear from the suicide of Empedocles. That it 
was too close to the truth of Arnold himself is clear from his withdrawal of the poem from the next volume, 
only a year later. The official reason for the omission, given in the 1853 Preface, is that the portrait of 
Empedocles is one of prolonged suffering which finds "no vent in action". Therefore, although the 
representation might have been accurate, it is also painful and, as such, it does not fulfil the rule that art 
must provide enjoyment. The argument is interesting because whereas Arnold had, previous to this 
passage, invoked the critical wisdom of Aristotle, Hesiod and Schiller in support of his use of the form of 
tragedy, the remainder is entirely his own thesis. What it suggests is that Arnold quickly came to see 
"Empedocles" as too subjective a portrait for public exhibition and the chief character's suicide as too 
suggestive a solution (albeit for him a symbolic one) to his own difficulties. If we look more closely at 
Empedocles' dialogue with himself in Act II, we see that the result of his honest admitting of failure is a 
resolve to cast aside his vocation as a poet-philosopher: 
And lie thou there. 
My laurel bough! 
Scornful Apollo's ensign, lie thou there! 
Though thou hast been my shade in the world's heat -
Though I have loved thee, lived in honouring thee -
Yet lie thou there. 
My laurel bough! 
I am weary of thee. (II, i, 191-198) 
Arnold's emphatic rejection of a future of poetic creation looks both back to and forwards from the 
conclusion reached in the "Obermann" poem. Once again he admits the divided self but here he denies the 
psychological solution as of any lasting significance. For a poet to create he must be unified and true to his 
buried self. 
Although "Empedocles on Etna" states the problem, it sees no resolution. The tyranny of thought is seen 
as inevitable for a man come upon an uncongenial time. That this is Arnold's own belief is clear from a 
letter to Clough written at this time about the volume: 
But woe upon me if I analysed not my situation: and Werter [,] Rene [,] and such like [,] none of them 
analyse the modem situation in its true blankness and barrenness, and unpoetrylessness.^^ 
However, the analysis of civilisation's failure to be true to its collective self which is seen as deceit in 
religious matters in Act I (via the example of Pausanias), can not, finally, act as an explanation for 
Empedocles' own malaise. General analysis turns to personal prognosis in Act II. What Empedocles is 
suffering from is the inability to He lacks "fulness of life" because he has lost the "power of feeling" 
^'December 14, 1852. (LC, pp. 125-126.) 
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(11, i, 258). The result, notably, of feeling life to the full, is "joy", a word repeated a number of times by 
Empedocles in his longing for the sensation. The associations with Wordsworth are, I think, quite clear. 
"The shock of mighty thoughts" received by "simple minds with a pure natural joy" are analysed as the 
communion of the mind with "outward things" (II, i, 241): 
The sports of the country-people, 
A flute-note from the woods. 
Sunset over the sea; (11, i, 251-253) 
So clearly does this fulfil the philosophy of the Lyrical Ballads about poetic subjects and the work of the 
"imagination" to bring about "the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings" that, unconsciously or not, it 
is clear that Arnold is hankering after the half of his poetic self left behind with the "Obermann" poem. 
The acceptance of the necessity for Arnold of at least part of the Coleridgean/Wordsworthian poetical 
philosophy is clear from two letters to Clough, one more general and the other particularly revealing. The 
letter of February 12,1853, repeats the analysis of "Empedocles": 
yes - congestion of the brain is what we suffer from -1 always feel it and say it - and cry for air like my own 
Empedocles."* 
This letter diagnoses the problem but, like the first part of "Empedocles", shirks personal responsibility in 
the claim that it is a general quandary. The second, however, mournfully admits some culpability: 
I feel immensely - more and more clearly - what I want - what I have (I believe) lost and choked by my 
treatment of myself and the studies to which I have addicted myself. But what ought I to have done in 
preference to what I have done? there is the question.^^ 
Arnold admits at least one reason - a mixture of unconscious and wilful neglect - for the loss of his ability 
to feel. Nevertheless, the inclusion of that heartfelt cry - "what ought I to have done" shows that Arnold 
still sees himself as a victim of the modem age. There has been no essential change in the eight years since 
the writing of "Stagirius". Arnold's addiction to his studies is simply a way of escaping from the 
conclusions he drew early on in his life - that his is the first age that lacks divine direction. 
Whilst such conclusions could only spell the end of poetic creation and the end of finding any solution for 
life Arnold could not, of course, rest with them. The third character in "Empedocles on Etna", Callicles the 
harp-player, points to Arnold's future poetic direction. His dramatic function is to provide relief (in the 
form of song) from the incessantly despondent thoughts of Empedocles. However his unquenchable 
optimism and his harmonising function (his thoughts both open and close the poem) suggest further that he, 
like Empedocles, is the embodiment of a philosophy. His introduction to the forest scene that opens 
"Empedocles" is a description of wide-eyed wonder and almost artless enthusiasm in its listing of the 
pleasures awaiting one at every glance. His function as opposition to Empedocles is clearly established: 
What mortal could be sick or sorry here? (I, i, 20) 
Although Callicles is a lover of nature he is, however, not so much a Romantic as a naturalist. It is 
Callicles who severely chides Pausanias over the doctor's belief in miracles: 
"Ibid. , p. 130. 
«»Ibid.,p. 136. 
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Bah! Thou a doctor! Thou art superstitious. 
Simple Pausanias,... (I, i, 133-134) 
Similarly rational is his refusal to see Empedocles' dilemma as in any way inevitable. There is no cosmic 
plot against Empedocles, simply 
.... some root of suffering in himself. 
Some secret and unfollowed vein of woe, 
Which makes the time look black and sad to him. (I, i, 151-153) 
His suggested cure is one of natural healing: 
.... lead him through the lovely mountain-paths, (I, i, 156) 
Callicles' songs are a mixture of delighted naturalistic description and the recital of Greek myths. 
Interspersed between Empedocles' anguished speeches, the songs are more, however, than simply light 
relief. The myths provide comment on the speeches of Empedocles and, in doing so, suggest that Callicles' 
philosophy may be an antidote to Empedocles' suicidal musings. The most obvious example is the myth of 
Apollo and Marsyas which precedes the decision of Empedocles to cast aside his role as a poet. The 
"triumph" of Apollo's "sweet persuasive lyre" (II, i, 126) whose music has the power to blow away "the 
clouds which wrap the soul" (II, i, 124) over the flute-playing faun Marsyas, is as the triumph of the 
musician Callicles over the poet Empedocles. Callicles' "The lyre's voice is lovely everywhere" (II, i, 37) 
is too painful a truth for a poet who realises his comparative inability to create harmonious art. It is this 
fact - the failure of the poet - which leads Empedocles to leap into Etna's crater. 
The implications for Arnold's poetry are obvious. If "Empedocles" states the problem - the paralysis of 
the creative faculty - and the letter to Clough sees as almost irreversible the results of his mistreatment of 
himself, then the harmonious vision of Callicles recommends itself with its potential for overcoming 
conflict. At the end of the poem Callicles anticipates the 1853 Preface by, in effect, expurgating 
Empedocles' vision: 
Not here, O Apollo! 
Are haunts meet for thee. (II, i, 421-422) 
The subjects for poetry are henceforth to be "moon-silvered inlets", shepherds "soft lulled by the rills" and 
pigeons roosting "deep in the rocks" (II, i, 425,433-4,431-2). Poetry under the influence of Apollo has the 
power to harmonise all things: 
The day in his hotness. 
The strife with the palm; 
The night in her silence. 
The stars in their calm. (II, i, 465-468) 
Callicles' prescription for poetry enabled Arnold to take pleasure in artistic creation for almost the first 
time. Letters to Clough and his mother in 1853 see him pronouncing as his "best work ever" the major 
poem of the 1853 collection, "Sohrab and Rustum". The only parallel with "Empedocles" is that "Sohrab 
and Rustum" is a dramatic epic. The handling of his sources on this occasion is, however, entirely 
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different. Whereas the characters of "Empedocles" are so clearly representations of certain sides of Arnold, 
in "Sohrab and Rustum" the poet seeks to remove himself from identity with characters and action. This, as 
explained in the 1853 Preface, is a deliberate attempt to prove critics wrong who claim that the proper aim 
of modem poetry is to produce "A true allegory of the state of one's own mind in a representative 
history".'^" Arnold's riposte sums up much of his past agonising over the problems of poetic creation in the 
modem age as well as providing the foundations for many of the critical dicta in his future prose writings. 
In particular it places the formal seal on the thoughts in the 1852 letter to Clough about poedy's need to be 
a complete magister vitae as was, supposedly, the poetry of the ancients. Thus he repeats his criticism of 
Keats as the producer of "happy expressions" who is unable to delineate the object of his poems. English 
literary history is seen as defective since the time of Shakespeare, whose great genius allowed him to create 
satisfying wholes even whilst possessing a "wonderful gift of expression". Unfortunately those poets 
following him have been seduced by the "exquisite bits and images" and have lost sight of the larger object. 
In modem times the great mischief has been a concentration on the poet's subjective expression rather than 
a seeking after great poetical actions. 
All this confusion is to be overcome, as we saw in the 1852 letter, by immersion in the poetry of the 
ancients. By fixing his attention on "excellent models" the poet may 
reproduce ... something of their excellence ... if he cannot be taught to produce what is excellent 
independently. 
This formal explanation enables Arnold to sacrifice "Empedocles on Etna" as a mistake and substitute 
"Sohrab and Rustum" in its place as a tragedy which, following the prescription of Callicles, can provide 
enjoyment through its distanced objectivity. 
Thus in "Sohrab and Rustum" we are placed firmly in an heroic, mythic past. In both subject and style 
Amold fulfils his new poetic criteria by handling a Persian myth in a Greek manner. In his desire to find a 
tragedy of universal rather than personal significance, Amold chooses the story of the death of a young 
hero (Sohrab) at the hands of his unwitting father (Rustum). The oriental subject has the benefit for the 
poet of removing the story far from his own experiences, an effect heightened for the reader by its 
reproduction in the form of Homeric narrative, replete with numerous Homeric similes. 
Arnold's attempt to overcome Romantic subjectivity has not generally met with critical acclaim. The 
greatest objection is that the removal of the subject from the poet's experience leads to a disastrous 
reduction in the vital empathy between poet and reader. As Park Honan says: 
His objective view of art kept him from seizing the "inward being" of any man, even from writing with full 
lyric freedom.'^ 
In a similar vein, Douglas Bush claims that Amold's withdrawal from the modem world has an artificial 
effect, heightened by the Homeric similes: 
'"From the reproduction of the Preface in CP, pp. 662-663. The phrase was taken by Amold from an essay that appeared in the 
North British Review xix (Aug. 1853) 338, entided "Theories of Poetry and a New Poet". 
^'Honan, p. 285. 
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each one comes in as a conscious toiir ^ force and gives us a shock of unreality from which it is not easy to 
recover. 
Conscious re-creation, as Bush says, is never as effective as the original it tries to re-createJ^ 
Other critics have claimed, furthermore, that the poem fails even in the poet's attempt to produce an 
objective action. Lionel Trilling claims "at least a shadowy personal significance" in the death of the son at 
the hands of the father, likening it to a psychical death of the failed Matthew at the hands of Thomas 
Amold.^3 Warren Anderson, meanwhile, sees the desired Classical unity being gradually consumed by an 
Amoldian unifying force -
the sense of hopeless unequal struggle that is Matthew Arnold's cri ^ coeur.''^ 
It is certainly true that the tragedy has a very Amoldian ring. Brought about not through "excellent 
human actions" but via cruel mischance, the story is handled in a tone of pathetic fatalism that is typically 
Amoldian. The vision, for example, of Rustum's horse caking the sand with "the big warm tears" from his 
"dark, compassionate eyes" (11. 735-736) would fit more happily in a satire on, rather than a homage to. 
Classical epic poetry. D.G. James, dismissing "Sohrab and Rustum" as having "a donnish air", refers to 
Amold's Classical manner as "only another escape".''^ The 1853 Preface and the poem for which it seeks 
to argue certainly do seem to be exercises designed to "unite matter" without the "sinews cracking" as they 
did in recording the painful truth of "Empedocles". Amold admits as much at the end of the Preface, where 
the bravado of the earlier part with its confident explanations and assertions, dissolves into wounded pleas 
for lenience: 
I am far indeed from making any claim for myself, that I possess this discipUne ... But I say, that in the 
sincere endeavour to learn and practice, ... I seemed to myself to find the only sure guidance, Ae only solid 
footing, among the ancients. They, at any rate, knew what they wanted in Art, and we do not. It is this 
uncertainty which is disheartening, and not hostile criticism ... 
D.G. James interestingly finds Amold's concem for the Classical 
in a perverse way, only a symptom or manifestation of the Romantic spirit ... a symbol for the inviolable 
thing, the other, the xmattainable, the transcendent.'® 
He is suggesting, in fact, that, once again by displacement, Amold is finding the spiritually synthesised 
vision in entirely the wrong place. That the poet was more pleased with "Sohrab and Rustum" than 
anything he had yet created, would seem to indicate that he had truly found his buried self and attained his 
unifying "Idea" of the world in the example of the ancients. However, compared with Amold's best hope 
for himself, whose possibility he could picture but not grasp, such academic poetry is really only a 
desperate "second best": 
•'^Bush, p. 68. 
"Trilling, pp. 134-135. 
"Anderson, p. 53. 
•''James, pp. 61 & 26. 
''Ibid., pp. 64-65. 
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Moderate tasks and moderate leisure, 
Quiet living, strict-kept measure 
Both in suffering and in pleasure -
'Tis for this thy nature yearns ... 
And (the world's so madly jangled. 
Human things so fast entangled) 
Nature's wish must now be strangled 
For that best which she discerns. 
So it must be!"^ 
The emphasis on "must" is a plea to Arnold's true buried self, his "fugitive delicate sense",''^ the half of his 
poetic self abandoned with the "Obermann" poem, to refrain from rebellion against the decision of the 
intellect 
The opposition of "Empedocles on Etna" and "Sohrab and Rustum" is really the most significant point to 
be noted in discussion of the 1852 and 1853 volumes. What the two poems suggest is that Arnold has got 
no further than in 1849 in coping with the problem of man's isolation from nature (including human 
nature). "Empedocles" is brutally honest - what the poet-philosopher is lacking is the ability to feel joy. 
The problem is man's isolation - "the dialogue of the mind with itself' - which Arnold correcdy analyses as 
the modem situation. Arnold's complaint that this situation makes poetic creation impossible (owing to its 
"unpoetrylessness") is important in our comparison of Arnold's "solution" to that of Coleridge. Coleridge's 
contemplation of Wordsworth's poetry led him to an assertion that the mind was not a passive "looker-on" 
on an "external world" but a partaker in creation itself. It is notable that Arnold seeks the joy that 
Wordsworth feels and indicates that his inability to find it leads to a lack of creativity. Whilst he diagnoses, 
as Coleridge does, the situation, he, unlike Coleridge, can not fmd such a dynamic answer. Instead he 
confirms his isolation witii a poem, "Sohrab and Rustum", that merely escapes from the modem situation in 
its return to a bygone age. 
1.5. The Triumph of the "Fugitive Delicate Sense" 
The 1853 Preface has more than a suggestion of the mistaken solution of "Resignation" behind it. The 
sacrifice of "Empedocles" in the name of "enjoyment" ratiier than truth, links it with the letter to Clough of 
1849 in which Arnold urges his friend to "group objects" rather than go "into and to tiie bottom of an 
object". The poet is to find his ruling Idea by seeing "wide", not "deep". Amold goes on to say Uiat 
Clough's poems are "not natural": 
... - but consider whether you attain the beautiful, and whether your product gives PLEASURE not excites 
curiosity and reflexion 
In this remarkable passage we see English poetic philosophy tumed completely on its head. The 
""From "The Second Best" (c. 1850-1851), U. 1-4,9-13. 
•'^From the Yale MS.: "We have a fugitive delicate sense thro': wch we know all things... but this delicate sense is not in our 
power..." The Yale Manuscript - ed. S.O.A. Ullmann (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor. 1989) p. 178. 
"LC. pp. 98-99. 
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Romantics' desire to penetrate to the depths of every subject by following a message set within nature is 
now claimed by Arnold to be natural". 
In another interesting part of the Preface we see Arnold claiming that the detached, objective poetic view 
can only be achieved through serenity of mind. This state is, notably, to be gained by fixing the attention 
on "some noble action of a heroic time", the poet thereby "banishing from his mind all feelings of 
contradiction, and irritation and impatience". This is akin to saying that the modem mind - the subject, 
according to Arnold, of modem poetry - is inevitably in a state of paralysis, the plaything of contradictory 
currents of thought. The contemplation of a noble action (such as is portrayed in "Sohrab and Rustum") is 
recommended as a means for clearing away all the doubts and confusions of the modem age - be they 
religious, social or political. This is to be the very basis of Amold's prose argumentation. 
There are a number of doubts that need to be raised about Amold's rejection of "contradiction" in poetry. 
Is it really desirable, for example, for a poet to achieve serenity of mind by simply ignoring the multitude of 
subjective voices suggesting altemative tmths? The Amoldian synthesis - the prevailing Idea - is surely 
weaker for not taking into account the discordant experience of others. It is certainly quite at odds with the 
Coleridgean reconciliation of "opposite or discordant qualities" - a poetic of creative tension that allows for 
the possibility of acquiring new and different kinds of knowledge. We may suspect, in any case, that 
Amold's making the objective view the "natural" one and his banishment of contradiction are facets of the 
same personal desire - to deny the conclusions of his own subjective poetic that growth in any direction is 
impossible. 
The vast majority of Amold's poetry, both before and after the writing of the Preface, rests uncomfortably 
in a state of confusion. As an antidote to such a poem as "Empedocles on Etna", then, the call for a more 
detached objectivity would seem to be important for a poet seeking to find a mle for life in poetry. 
"Empedocles" may state the case of a decline in religious faith but it does not include the positive spiritual 
direction Amold hopes poetry will provide. Is ranging over the periphery of objects, however, really going 
to provide spiritual direction either? Even leaving aside the evidence of "Sohrab and Rustum" that, at least 
for Amold, the creation of such a form of poetry seems impossible, it is arguable that "not deep the poet 
sees, but wide" is an entirely false prescription. If, as on the Coleridgean model, the ground of tme 
knowledge is to be found in the activity of the Imagination, then the organisation and systematisation of 
information - Amold's grouping of objects - is not part of the poetic office at all. The knowledge of 
comprehension is, according to Coleridge, the realm of the Reason. As D.G. James says, "The life of 
poetry consists in vision, not in comprehension". With support from Keats' "uncertainties, mysteries, 
doubts", and Wordsworth's "fallings from us, vanishings; Blank misgivings of a creature moving about in 
worlds not realised", James claims that poetry's true role is not one of philosophy and speculation. Instead 
it points us towards a world we cannot finally enter. Poetry brings us to the brink and leaves us there - "its 
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true end lies outside i tself - it is initiation only.®° Arnold's alternative of "comprehension" is a devaluing 
of the spiritual possibilities to be found in poetic creation. Ironically enough, Arnold's attempt to "include 
religion with poetry" has the unexpected effect of excluding it. 
The fascination of Arnold is that part of the poet in him knows all this. "Dover Beach" and "The 
Scholar-Gipsy", both believed to be amongst Arnold's most suggestive and successful works, build on and 
conclude the philosophic ideas and poetic forms of such poems as "The Forsaken Merman" and (despite 
himself) "The Strayed Reveller". Whilst taking their inspiration from nature, they provide a "criticism of 
life" not at all in accord with the "natural" philosophy of the 1853 Preface. 
Douglas Bush calls "Dover Beach" Arnold's "most perfect work of art" because of its simplicity, its clear 
crystallisation of a particular Amoldian theme, handled here without the "usual discursive analysis".^' The 
theme of the decline of religious faith, so central to the poet's perception of his lack of well-being, manages 
to attain to that "subjective objectivity" which characterises the best poetry, that potent communication by 
which one person manages to encapsulate a wider truth and thus overcome isolation. Arnold achieves it 
here through a terse economy of language within an unhindering poetic form - free, irregularly rhymed verse -
and the use of strongly evocative natural imagery to illustrate his central idea. 
"Dover Beach" is a moment of super-clear perception, Arnold's version of a Wordsworthian spot of time. 
The opening puts across the poet's state of heightened awareness by enticing the reader into the poet's 
company and vision. The highly pictorial nature of the poem is achieved through the appeal to sight, smell, 
feeling and sound, and is given further depth and colour in a subtle appeal to the intuitive (or Arnold's 
"fugitive, delicate") sense: 
The sea is calm to-night. 
The tide is full, the moon lies fair 
Upon the straits; on the French coast the light 
Gleams and is gone, the cliffs of England stand. 
Glimmering and vast, out in the tranquil bay. 
Come to the window, sweet is the night-air! (1-6) 
The liberal use of punctuation allows time for the senses to digest fully the information offered. Single 
syllable words, meanwhile, suggest quite as much the silence they break as an invitation to dwell on the 
words themselves. The underlying tone of "something left unsaid" prepares us for the moment of 
revelation to come. What does come is typically Amoldian in tone, but powerfully expressive. Its air of 
finality is quite unlike Arnold's usual doubtful wavering between contradictory ideas and, consequently, 
carries more conviction. The image of the "Sea of Faith" 
Retreating to the breath 
Of the night-wind, down the vast edges drear 
^ojames.pp. 42-46. 
«'Bush, p. 40. 
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And naked shingles of the world. (26-28) 
at last achieves for Arnold that detached objectivity for which he is seeking, summing up in such stark 
tones the widely-felt pessimism of mid-nineteenth century agnostics. 
Having made the wider observation, Arnold's personal response is equally direct and, strangely enough, 
certain in its uncertainty: 
Ah, love, let us be true 
To one another! for the world, which seems 
To lie before us like a land of dreams. 
So various, so beautiful, so new. 
Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor Ught, 
Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain; 
And we are here as on a darkUng plain 
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight. 
Where ignorant armies clash by night. (29-37) 
Arnold's usual intellectual wavering between options tends to lead, by Arnold's own admission in the 1853 
Preface, to a paralysis in activity. It seems almost paradoxical then, that such a lucid statement of muddy 
doubt should spur Arnold to action. For him it is a turn to the certain call of his emotions and a turn away 
from the possibility of knowing anything through the intellect. But he has left room for dissension. 
Somehow, in the depths of his struggle between faith and despair, he has transcended his rational attempts 
to understand it all and created one of those rare moments of profound heightened insight. The fact that the 
world "seems" to lie before him still leaves room for dissent, so that, while Arnold's suggestion is 
disharmonious for himself, he has created that special arena for debate, that tension between opposites, 
which poetry, at its best, can offer. Whatever the decision he has made, the world, which he himself has 
described with such dream-like wonder, still calls forth the poetic impulse. Furthermore, Arnold's 
conviction that love is in some way "true", leads one at least to question the poem's broader thesis. It may 
be in spite of the prevailing Amoldian philosophy of life and poetry, but here Arnold has built on 
Romanticism in order to, in D.G. James' phraseology, "take us to the brink and leave us there". Like the 
great Romantic poets, Arnold takes deep stock of his natural surroundings before asking his question, but 
he manages to combine this with his Classical heritage (the final Thucydidean image of the night-battle) in 
order to create, in Warren Anderson's words, the "universal modem symbol".^^ As Leon Gottfried says, it 
is the "deep honesty" with which Arnold expresses the conflicting messages of Romanticism and 
rationalism that makes such a poem as "Dover Beach" his "best" and most representative work: 
It was in this work, and not in his academic efforts to achieve classical serenity, that his poems truly 
represent, as in 1869 he said they did, "the main movement of mind of the last quarter of a century".^ ^ 
Arnold manages a somewhat similar blend in "The Scholar-Gipsy" where he combines a pastoral form 
with a "criticism of life" that again draws heavily on the philosophical insights of Romanticism. 
'^Anderson, p. 71. 
•'Gottfried, p. 209. 
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One of Arnold's late religious essays, "A Psychological Parallel" (1876), explores the attempt, by the 
seventeenth century "Cambridge Platonists", to revive a spiritualist and Platonic philosophy. "By this 
attempted revival", Arnold claims, "they could not and cannot live". It is interesting, then, that the story of 
the Scholar-Gipsy should come from a book by one of the group, Joseph Glanvill, and interesting, too, that 
Arnold should draw on the book, The Vanity of Dogmatizing, in order to encapsulate in the Scholar-Gipsy a 
true criticism of life in opposition to modem attempts. 
The portrait of the Scholar-Gipsy then, has its basis in the seventeenth century but, as Park Honan has 
stressed, it also draws on German Romanticism, and in particular Goethe and Herder's "expressivist 
anthropology". Herder's On the Origin of Language (1772) was one of the fore-runners of Coleridge's 
theory of language. Herder it is who first claims that man is a creator, not an imitator, in his use of 
language. Goethe, as Honan says, stresses a "purification" (Lauterung) that words effect, and sees the poet 
as a deific agent of nature. For him it is primarily the artist who is able to challenge the false ideals of the 
age. Arnold's Scholar-Gipsy takes on the theories of Herder and Goethe to become a symbol of the poet, 
seeking, through his artistry, for self-possession.^"* 
The Scholar-Gipsy, however, becomes a much greater and much more mysterious figure than merely a 
poet in search of his self. The effect of Arnold's use of Theocritan pastoral (carrying with it hints of 
Milton's harangue against religious deceit and self-deceit in "Lycidas") is to give the quest, and the 
criticism of modem life, a much broader base than it might otherwise have had. In appealing to the support 
of a long poetic tradition, the quest and the criticism are ranged alongside our knowledge of that tradition 
and, in consequence, gain in significance. The Amoldian pastoral is to be seen as the latest in a succession 
of poems whose aim is to sum up the spiritual crisis of an age and plead for the restoration of spiritual 
health. The Scholar-Gipsy himself thus takes on the nature of a symbol for every person's aspiration after 
existential fulness. 
It is precisely because the Scholar-Gipsy is such a richly significant symbol that he is portrayed as 
mysterious and elusive, to be glimpsed only by those prepared to follow their "fugitive delicate sense". The 
first stanza establishes the arcane, but vital, nature of the quest. Arnold makes a strident appeal to his 
"shepherd"^^ to "Go", 
No longer leave thy wistful flock unfed, (3) 
and "again begin the quest!" (1. 10). The quest is, notably, to take place beyond the knowledge of most 
people: 
... when the fields are still. 
And the tired men and dogs all gone to rest. (6-7) 
Honan, pp. 273-275. 
Allot sutes (CP. p. 357) that the "shepherd" is Qough, but it is surely a quite general appeal and includes the poet himself. 
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After the general introduction, Arnold sets the pastoral scene and sets himself for meditation on Glanvill's 
book. Rather as in "Dover Beach" our senses are asked to respond to the utmost to the description of the 
natural surroundings which, so fully and lovingly observed, are obviously the fruit of long and happy 
acquaintance by Arnold. It is clear that the dwelling on nature is not just pastoral convention. The "live 
murmur" (1. 20) of the summer's day and the rich landscape are the natural equivalent of what Arnold is 
seeking - fulness of being. It is the super-abundant energy of nature - he has to retreat to his nook in order 
to "bower him" from "the August sun" (1. 29) - that spurs Arnold to read "the oft-read tale" (1. 32) of the 
Scholar-Gipsy once again. 
The parallel between the Gipsy and Arnold here is obvious. Like the Gipsy, Arnold is seeking something 
other than intellectual fulfilment in the Cumnor Hills. He is, in fact, treading the same path as the Gipsy, 
who, 
... tired of knocking at preferment's door. 
One summer-mom forsook 
His friends, and went to learn the gipsy-lore, (35-37) 
The practical reason given by Glanvill for the Scholar's leaving Oxford is poverty, but Arnold chooses 
rather to emphasise the enticement offered by the gipsies' knowledge. That the Scholar leaves on a 
"summer-mom" suggests that Oxford - the place of intellectual fulness - is no equal to the intuitive truth to 
be leamed from those living close to nature. 
The nature of the gipsies' knowledge is interesting. Glanvill's original states that the gipsies "could do 
wonders by the power of the imagination, their fancy binding that of others".®^ Whilst there is no reason to 
suppose tiiat he equates Glanvill's with Coleridge's "Imagination", the word is still extremely suggestive 
for Arnold. In "The Scholar-Gipsy" Amold records the meeting between the Gipsy and two of his Oxford 
friends, paraphrasing Glanvill's original up to the point of giving the Gipsy's decision to impart to the 
world ""the secret of their art, / When fully learned" (11.48-49). Here, however, Amold makes him add 
But it needs heaven-sent moments for this skill." (50) 
The departure is significant. Allott, recording that the first (1853) version of the poem had "happy" for 
"heaven-sent", states that "On either reading the moments are those of poetic inspiration".®^ Whilst this 
might be part of the answer, the phrase "heaven-sent moments" has, I believe, a much broader significance. 
For a poet who claimed so often that the only knowledge we can have is that of our own inner selves (and 
that is difficult enough to attain), the suggestion of the possibility of knowledge acquired from without is an 
extraordinary admission. Whilst the "skill" itself is not specified it is, I think, the type of knowledge that is 
important. 
®®From Arnold's own note to the poem. 
•^'CP, p. 359. 
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The type of this knowledge is expanded upon in the next set of stanzas which deal with the Scholar-
Gipsy's wanderings in the Oxfordshire countryside. The most notable feature of the Gipsy is his flying of 
the world's ways in order to keep himself open to the possibility of receiving the knowledge of the 
"imagination". He is described in terms something akin to a nineteenth century Saint Francis; - although 
the philosophical wanderer Rousseau and the idea of the "noble savage" are also possible primogenitors. 
Wearing "outlandish garb" over his "figure spare" (1. 98) and having "dark vague eyes" and a "soft 
abstracted air" (1. 99) he wanders in all weathers, knowing that only by immersing himself in the natural 
order can he become truly one with himself. The time for the medieval St. Francis has departed, however. 
This modem wanderer after truth is "pensive and tongue-tied" (1. 54). 
That this is Arnold's own personal pre-requisite for the finding of spiritual health is clear from the poet's 
recognition of moments in which he has shared something of the Gipsy's experience. He dwells lovingly 
on the remembrances of past days in which, he imagines; the Gipsy may have been partaking: 
... I myself seem half to know thy looks. 
And put the shepherds, wanderer! on thy trace;... 
... in my boat I lie 
Moored to the cool bank in the summer-heats, 
'Mid wide grass meadows which the sunshine fills. 
And watch the warm, green-muffled Cumner Hills, 
And wonder if thou haunt'st their shy retreats. (62-63, 66-70) 
But, on the same pattern as the workings of his own "fugitive delicate sense", it is only a half recognition of 
the Gipsy. "Heaven-sent moments" are rare in Arnold's times. 
When the Gipsy is seen - and these are reported, not direct, sightings - it is only in "retired" (1. 71), quiet 
places, as far away as possible from the world's "routine hubbub". To emphasise the opposition of the 
Gipsy to the worid's ways he is sighted by people who make no attempt to blend (as the Gipsy does) into 
the natural surroundings. Thus he is seen by "Oxford riders blithe, / Returning home on summer-nights", 
who meet the Gipsy punting "in a pensive dream" (72-73, 77) or by "Maidens, who from the distant 
hamlets come / To dance around the Fyfield elm in May" (82-83). Notably he has no commerce with the 
world in the form of speech. Instead he gives the maidens flowers, symbols of a communication much deeper 
than the typical dialogue of May Day courting rituals. 
Like SL Francis, the Scholar-Gipsy holds no alarm for the creatures of the countryside. Thus 
The blackbird, picking food. 
Sees thee, nor stops his meal, nor fears at all; 
So often has he known thee past him stray, 
Rapt, twirling in thy hand a withered spray. 
And waiting for the spark from heaven to fall. (116-120) 
The final couplet here has provoked much critical discussion. A.E. Dyson, for example, claims that this is 
the point where Arnold dissociates himself from the Gipsy whose dream belongs to a pre-scientific age 
Arnold knew was impossible to re-enter. Because the spark never actually falls, Dyson believes that 
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Arnold sees the Scholar-Gipsy's life as an impossible dream.^® Now on this reading the poem would have 
to be seen in terms of fairy-tale rather than myth, which would, in the eyes of many people, be a de-
valuation. Dyson is suggesting, in fact, that Arnold sees no possibility of finding psychological wholeness 
in following the Gipsy's example. E.K. Brown, for one, disagrees: 
As books are the instrument of the intellect, natural objects are for him the instruments of intuition ... When 
he fades from our sight, the gipsy is still without a valid intuition; but he is still governing his life on the 
assumption that only so may such an intuition be attained; and unless it is attained, one has nothing fit for 
trust. 
What is more, even the discipline required of the Gipsy in his quest has led to the sort of psychological 
unity for which Arnold is seeking: 
The gipsy has had a precious incidental reward: he has become a disinterested being, in an eminent degree 
characterized by repose, dignity and inward clearness.^' 
The final stanza before the Gipsy's "fading from our sight" provides us with Arnold's only sighting: 
And once, in winter, on the causeway chill 
Where home through flooded fields foot-travellers go. 
Have I not passed thee on the wooden bridge. 
Wrapped in thy cloak and battling with the snow, 
Thy face tow'rd Hinksey and its wintry ridge? 
And thou hast climbed the hill. 
And gained the white brow of the Cumner range; 
Turned once to watch, while thick the snowflakes fall. 
The line of festal light in Christ-Church hall -
Then sought thy straw in some sequestered grange. (121-130) 
In a similar movement to the symbolic mountain ascent after Truth in "In Utrumque Paratus" the Scholar's 
quest involves strictness and severity and a clear rejection of the more comfortable compromise (the 
feasting intellectuals in Christ-Church). 
By lonely pureness to the all-pure fount 
(Only by this thou canst) the coloured dream 
Of life remount! 
as Arnold had written in the earlier poem. It is significant that it is in diis description of the Gipsy that 
Arnold himself partakes. In emphasising his knowledge of the pain as well as the joy of the Gipsy's quest, 
Arnold half-identifies with him, even if he knows that he is still unable to go beyond the "causeway chill" 
in his search. 
The sceptical, realist part of Arnold now asserts itself with a start: 
But what- I dream! (131) 
The pastoral is abandoned for a critique of modem life. Arnold gloomily decides, for a few lines, that the 
Gipsy is long-since dead. But then, with a strident cry, the idealist Arnold proclaims the continued 
existence of the Scholar-Gipsy: 
- No, no, thou hast not felt the lapse of hours! (141) 
' ' S e e rritics on Malthew Arnold - e d Jacqueline E.M. Lalham (Allen & Unwin, London, 1973) pp. 52-60. 
»»Mntlhew Arnold - A Snitly in Conflict rUniversity of Chicago. 1948) pp. 45-46. 
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It is only, the poet decides, who, like the protagonist of "The New Sirens", have worn out our life with 
"repeated shocks" (1. 144) which "numb the elastic powers" (1. 146). Arnold re-affirms the conclusion of 
"The New Sirens" but here claims that there is an alternative - the example of the Gipsy, who 
... hadst one aim, one business, one desire; (152) 
and is thus "exempt from age" (1. 158). Arnold, in comparison, "half-lives a hundred different lives" (1. 
169) and, whilst he similarly awaits the "spark from heaven", he knows that it is not likely to fall for those 
who "Light half-believers" of "casual creeds" (1. 172) and, consequently, "never deeply felt, nor clearly 
willed" (1.173). 
Even the best of his age is deemed inadequate. Those who would live by the intellect - and one thinks of 
Arnold's letter to Clough about his own addiction to studies - can only tell us about 
... misery's birth and growth and signs. 
And how the dying spark of hope was fed, (187-188) 
The rest of us, meanwhile, 
... waive all claim to bliss, and try to bear; 
With close-lipped patience for our only friend, (193-194) 
Arnold here sums up the philosophy of "Resignation" but now, set alongside the possibilities of hope 
engendered by the Scholar-Gipsy, he proclaims that patience is "sad" and 
.... too near neighbour to despair - (195) 
The horror of his own picture leads Arnold to plead with the Gipsy to fly all contact with the modem world, 
lest his 
... glad perennial youth would fade. 
Fade, and grow old at last, and die like ours. (229-230) 
As in the denial of "close-lipped patience" in "Resignation", Arnold's final plea to the Gipsy contains 
another reversal of the earlier poem's philosophy. He tells the Gipsy to 
... fly our paths ... 
For strong the infection of our mental strife, (221-222) 
thus denying the claim in "Resignation" that the glory of life is taken away by the "something that infects 
the world". Here the infection is man-made. 
At the end of the poem, Arnold leaves the Gipsy untainted, predicting that he will be forever 
Still nursing the unconquerable hope. 
Still clutching the inviolable shade, (211-212) 
Thus he affirms the continued existence of the embodiment of hope that is the Scholar-Gipsy and, in doing 
so, suggests that, even in the corrupt modern world, one might still cultivate the spiritual life to the point 
where the spark from heaven might fall to the greater glory of mankind. 
The final extended image of the poem has long been a subject of critical debate. Arnold represents the 
flight of the Gipsy from modernity with an image from Herodotus of a "grave Tyrian trader" (1. 232) who. 
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spying an intruding "Grecian coaster ... / Freighted with amber grapes, and Chian wine" (11. 237-238), 
indignantly sails off in the opposite direction in search of the more congenial company of the shy and 
honourable Iberian "traffickers" (1. 249). E.K. Brown claims "at the least a general relevance to the 
character of the gipsy in the elaborate simile" whilst G. Saintsbury states the opposite, that no "ingenuity 
can work out the parallel" between the Gipsy and the Tyrian.^® Certainly the need for such an elaborate 
piece of artifice seems doubtful in a poem whose central opposition - that of the Scholar-Gipsy's way of 
life compared with modem ways of life - is so clearly and deeply drawn. Arnold, no doubt looking for a 
grand summary to his poem was, I think, forced into such elaboration simply because the Scholar-Gipsy 
stands for so much that is important to the poet I believe, however, that the simile does not succeed in 
summing-up the Gipsy. The effect is, instead, rather like that of the Homeric similes on the form of 
"Sohrab and Rustum" - an artificial construction that causes us to suspend our belief through its 
incompatibility with the rest of the poem. The failure, however, itself carries much significance. We may 
suppose that Arnold turned to Herodotus as a related Classical adjunct to the tone of Theocritan pastoral in 
the poem. In theory such an idea would be reasonable enough. In practice, however, Arnold has 
misjudged the effect that his conscious archaism has on the rest of the poem. The truth is that Arnold has 
not merely created a memento mori in "The Scholar-Gipsy". His use of the pastoral is not regressive, 
suggesting a golden age about which we can dream but which we can have no possibility of entering. In 
the figure of the Scholar-Gipsy Arnold has created a potent combination of the "expressivist anthropology" 
of Herder and Goethe and the English Romantics' philosophy of "inspirational" knowledge.^^ The 
Oxfordshire countryside, the immersion in which is a pre-requisite to die Gipsy's finding any knowledge, is 
therefore not symbolic of a lost Arcadia, or even the Roman campagna. It contains, in fact, Arnold's most 
original answer to the question of "how to live". As Douglas Bush says, such pastoral "escapism" 
is not necessar i ly w e a k evasion, it m a y be, l ike the pastoral tradition as a whole , an integral e lement in the 
cr i t ic i sm of l i f e . ^ 
Thus the scholarly Classical treatment in the final simile jars rather than blends with what is undoubtedly 
the modem, not antique, pastoral of the rest of the poem. 
The simile has, in the end, an entirely unanticipated effect, providing comment not on the Scholar-Gipsy 
but on Arnold. The action of the Tyrian to escape the tyranny of the Greeks does indeed have a parallel -
that of the "Amoldian Romantic" pastoral idyll attempting to escape from the imposition of an academic 
Classical model. Whilst Arnold does force the academic model onto the unwilling Romantic, it is 
undeniable that the "indignant" (1. 243) poet from another, gentler, land and literary form overcomes such 
' "Brown - Revue nnglo^nmericaine xii (1934-35) pp. 224-5 and Saintsbury - Matthew Arnold (Russel and Russel, New York, 1967) 
p. 42. 
' ^The "spark from heaven" has its primary source, AUot believes, in Arnold's "recollection of the descent of the Holy Ghost on the 
Apostles at Pentecost" (p. 362). Coleridge saw all creative perception in the same way - "In short, whatever finds me, bears witness 
for itself that it has proceeded from a Holy Spirit". (See note no. 12, p. 10.) Even if Arnold was making no direct reference to the 
English Romantics, this is the philosophy to which the Scholar-Gipsy adheres. 
"Bush, p. 73. 
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an imposition and remains, at the end, aloof in the "quiet places" of the earlier part of the poem. It is not, 
despite its position, the final simile that remains in the mind. 
We are left, then, with a modem pastoral criticism of life which, like "Dover Beach", embodies a 
dialectical tension and fulfils D.G. James' wish for Arnold to develop further the insights of the previous 
generation of English poets. The Gipsy's "one aim" is placed alongside modernity's many sided vision 
(our "hundred different lives") and consequent frittering away of aim and purpose. The choice is not 
simple - "The Scholar-Gipsy" remains a shadowy set of hints and suggestions rather than a well defined 
model for instant happiness; but while for Arnold the dominant mood may be one of melancholy he knows, 
too, that the spark from heaven can only come to those who desire to attain to the sort of hope embodied in 
the Gipsy. And what should be good news for Arnold is the fact that he does "seem half to know" the 
Gipsy's "looks". 
The reality of Arnold's knowledge of the symbolic Scholar-Gypsy's person and therefore aspirations is 
clear from a letter of May 1857 to his brother, Tom Arnold: 
You alone of my brothers are associated with that life at Oxford, the freest and most delightful part, 
perhaps, of my life, when with you and Clough and Wabond I shook off all the bonds and formalities of the 
place, and enjoyed the spring of life and that unforgotten Oxfordshire and Berkshire country. Do you 
remember a poem of mine called 'The Scholar Gipsy"? It was meant to fix the remembrance of those 
delightful wanderings of ours in the Cumner Hills 
This is a richly significant letter and not least because its description of the poem as an embodiment of 
delight, freedom and enjoyment emphasises that the prime purpose of "The Scholar-Gipsy" is to attain to 
beauty and give pleasure - effects which, we remember, were to be achieved in a far different manner 
according to the 1853 Preface. It is not, however, the final word. The overwhelming evidence is that it is 
in spite of himself (as we have seen before in "The Strayed Reveller" and "The Forsaken Merman") that 
Arnold manages to attain in his poetry to what D.G. James calls "vision". A letter to Clough of November 
1853, shows that, even soon after the completion of the poem, Arnold is emphasising once more 
"comprehension" over "vision", the practical over the hopeful: 
I am glad you like the Gipsy Scholar - but what does it ^ for you? Homer animates - Shakespeare 
animates - in its poor way I think Sohrab and Rustum animates - the Gipsy Scholar at best awakens a pleasing 
melancholy. But this is not what we want. 
The complaining millions of men 
Darken in labour and in pain -
What they want is something to animate and ermoble them - not merely to add zest to their melancholy or 
grace to their dreams -1 believe a feeling of this kind is the basis of my nature - and of my poetics.^'* 
Arnold proclaims his poetics to be practical, and the simile of the Tyrian trader now becomes clearer. For 
the Arnold bound by the principles of the 1853 Preface, the Classical imposition does serve his purpose. It 
sums up the poem as an artificial escape from unpleasant reality. His later classification of the poem as an 
"elegy" indicates how Arnold was able to regard "The Scholar-Gipsy" as a pretty lament for a lost age 
"Quoted in CP, p. 356. 
'^LC.p. 146 
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("pleasing melancholy") whilst distancing himself from too close an involvement with its message. Again, 
as with the "Stanzas in Memory of the Author of Obermann", Arnold is able temporarily to become a 
psychological whole by releasing his "fugitive delicate sense" for a purely limited time. 
That he does not finally commit himself to the furthering of his intuitive, spiritual self is evidence of 
Arnold's recognition that his phrase, the "criticism of life", is one more applicable to the practical field of 
prose writing than to that of poetry. The phrase itself occurs late in Arnold's work.^^ Whilst he applies it 
there to poetry, however, his own poetic fount has long run dry. We may suggest, then, that from about the 
time Arnold was entering into hard and serious work as a school-inspector (1851 onwards), he came to 
perceive his private work as more and more an adjunct to his practical job of improving society. That "The 
Scholar-Gipsy" (1853) is one of his last major poetic achievements suggests that Arnold's belief in poetry 
as being in itself a criticism of life was gradually eroded over the years. In fact, the triumph of the "fugitive 
delicate sense" is short-lived. It is finally the "modem situation" in its "unpoetrylessness" which conquers 
and Arnold, understanding this, makes a virtue of necessity by, in effect, denying the philosophical 
conclusions of England's recent poetic tradition and divesting poetry of any claim it might have to offer 
"inspirational" knowledge: 
I am more and more convinced that the world tends to become more comfortable for die mass, and more 
uncomfortable for those of any natural gift or distinction - and it is perhaps well that it should be so - for 
hitherto the gifted have astonished and delighted the world, but not trained or inspired or in any real way 
changed it - and the world might do worse than to dismiss too high pretensions, and settle down on what it 
can see and handle and appreciate.^^ 
In his remaining poetry Arnold largely re-iterates the themes of the divided and the buried self. Owing, 
however, to the implication, in the above letter, that psychological and spiritual wholeness is not to be 
found by working in areas such as the writing of poetry, the themes are coldly stated, with no attempt made 
at resolution. As Michael Thorpe says of Arnold's elegy for his lost youth and Marguerite, "The Terrace at 
Berne" (1863): 
Cold now is the romance, cold the inspiration; the great Amoldian themes now seem perfunctorily 
recapitulated;^' 
There are also the escapes from his renegade Scholar-Gipsy persona - grand schemes like his attempt at 
Greek tragedy "Merope" which seeks, ironically enough, to produce the "lofty sense of the mastery of the 
human spirit over its own stormiest agitations".^^ The effect, as Thorpe observes, is of a "dead imitation, 
devoid of ... living "affinity" between the past and the present ..." Arnold commits the crime of 
suppressing his true poetic impulse in the interests of a restrictive t h e o r y T h e n there is the equally 
evasive "Thyrsis" which attempts to re-produce the tone and message of hope of "The Scholar-Gipsy" 
whilst admitting that such a hope is unattainable: 
'^In the "Wordsworth" essay of 1879. 
"June?, 1852. (LC,pp. 122-123.) 
"Thorpe, p. 37. 
9®From the Preface to "Merope" (1858). 
'^Thorpe, pp. 64 & 66. 
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Too rare, too rare, grow now my visits here, (31) 
he says of the Cumnor Hills. And, as a result, 
Ah me! this many a year 
My pipe is lost... (36-37) 
But this time around Arnold is able to rationalise away his loss: 
Needs must I lose them, needs with heavy heart 
Into the world and wave of men depart; (38-39) 
Arnold invokes the symbol of a tree beloved of Clough and himself which, even on this re-visit two 
decades later stands still and stands, supposedly, to assert the continued possibility of receiving the spark 
from heaven: 
Roam on! The light we sought is shining still. 
Dost thou ask proof? Our tree yet crowns the hill, 
Our Scholar travels yet the loved hill-side. (238-240) 
Whilst the Scholar still searches, however, Arnold is still only visiting and will depart for the world 
following the poem's end. Whilst "Thyrsis" does attain to a "pleasing melancholy" in its elegiac beauty, 
there is none of the dialectical tension between possibilities that we saw in "The Scholar-Gipsy". The final 
effect is of the earlier pastoral recapitulated with diminished idealism. 
Arnold's last major poem, "Obermann Once More", is a farewell to poetry, marking a new stage in 
Arnold's work - that of a total commitment to critical prose writing. In many ways it is his first personally 
satisfactory answer to the need, as he told Clough more than a decade earlier, to include religion with 
poetry, to find some way of coping with the nineteenth century crisis of faith. That he bids farewell for 
good to the creative half of his poetic self uneasily abandoned at the end of the last "Obermann" poem, 
indicates that "Obermann Once More" is not itself a fulfilment of that earlier wish - its dominantly prosaic 
content and pedestrian rhythm are far from Arnold's best poetry - but it does have the incidental effect of 
marking out religious prose as Arnold's major future concern. Thus the poem is, for the most part, a 
resum€ of Arnold's present intellectual position on Christianity and the history of civilisation. The poet 
hears Obermann telling him to 
help attain: 
One common wave of thought and joy 
Lifting mankind again! (322-324) 
This is essential given the picture of modem religious belief painted by Obermann. Proclaiming startlingly 
the death of the resurrected Christ owing to man's dead creeds, dead rites and dead social order, 
Obermann's direction for the future summarises completely Arnold's forthcoming religious argumentation: 
"Unduped of fancy, henceforth man 
Must labour! - must resign 
His all too human creeds, and scan 
Simply the way divine!" (185-188)'°" 
^""The stanza was, significantly, italicised in 1885. 
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If Arnold was inclined to regret the passing of personal salvation through the writing of inspired poetry, 
then Obermann conveniently dismisses the objection: 
And who can be alone elate, 
While the world lies forlorn? (247-248) 
The dream of universal human happiness is not for Obermann to help bring to fruition. For him "It was not 
yet the appointed hour" (1. 253). But Obermann appoints his one-time disciple Arnold to the task of 
helping to "tell / Hope to a world new-made!" (11. 311-312). 
The way is open, then, for the major pre-occupation of Arnold's life - the loss of Christian faith - to be 
approached through the medium of prose rather than of poetry. The practical side of Arnold might put this 
down to the force of his own personal circumstances, or an uneasy perception that journalism was now a 
more useful medium for communicating his message to large numbers of people. But the side of him 
which hoped for a glorious transformation of the world through the ideals fostered in such poems as "The 
Scholar-Gipsy" remained, colouring his prose and, occasionally, making disquieting admissions: 
Though the Muse be gone away. 
Though she move not earth today. 
Souls, erewhile who caught her word. 
Ah! still harp on what they heard.^^^ 




Criticisms of Life (The 1850s and 1860s) 
At the end of our discussion of his poetry we have reached the conclusion that Arnold is very much back 
where he started. The abandonment of his attempt to find spiritual wholeness in poetry comes through his 
failure to fulfil his own injunction to include "religion with poetry". Whilst we have put this failure down 
to a misunderstanding by Arnold as to what is the true role of poetry, Arnold himself simply decides that it 
is the age itself that has overcome the ability of anyone to write poetry. This attitude only reinforces, 
however, the situation of hopelessness that we saw being proclaimed by Arnold in "Stagirius". He is still 
faced by the loss of spiritual meaning and hence a purpose and direction in life and he is still faced with a 
divided self (what we might call the "present" and "buried" selves). He is no nearer to finding solutions to 
those epistemological problems that lie behind his feelings of isolation and of his inability to feel. Whilst 
he has rejected Coleridge's attempts to deal with the same problems he still, however, attempts to 
overcome them. Whilst writing poetry is more or less abandoned in his search for something to fulfil 
religious needs, Arnold's criticism of life continues unabated. Beginning in the 1850s and 1860s Arnold 
starts to deal direcdy with the religious question itself rather than approaching it obliquely via the means of 
melancholy subjective visions. The poem "Stanzas from the Grande Chartreuse" indicates the way in 
which Arnold's thought is moving during the 1850s and 60s. 
I behold 
The House, the Brotherhood austere! 
- And what am I, that I am here?^ 
Arnold visited the Carthusian monastery, the Grande Chartreuse, on his honeymoon in September 1851. 
The poem, "Stanzas from the Grande Chartreuse", was first published in Eraser's Magazine in 1855, 
appearing again, with significant changes, in Arnold's 1867 collection of poems. The differences between 
the two versions are revealing in that they state, quite unequivocally, large changes in Arnold's personal 
vision of Christianity and hence in his sense of vocation during the 1850s and 1860s. In fact the firm 
decisions reached in "Obermann Once More" can be seen as a direct result of the deliberations being 
worked over between the two versions of the "Stanzas". 
'"Sunzas from the Grande Chartreuse", II. 64-66. 
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The first version of the "Stanzas" has a movement very similar to that of the "Stanzas in Memory of the 
Author of Obermann". Both use the method of defining the self in relation to a place of pilgrimage. In the 
"Obermann" poem the evocation of his pilgrimage to the isolation of Senancour's Alpine country enables 
Arnold to admit the importance to him of the idea of withdrawal from society whilst at the same time 
laying the vision to rest in the realisation that, for him, such isolation is ulUmately damaging. As we saw in 
considering the poem, however, Arnold remains spiritually hungry with his idealist "buried self still 
yearning for communion with the other, active side of his nature, driven "to the world without". 
Unsurprisingly then, the "Stanzas from the Grande Chartreuse" finds Arnold's neglected half attempting 
to exact revenge for its dismissal. Once more we find a pilgrimage to a place of spiritual importance - "the 
Carthusians' world-famed home" (1. 30). This journey, however, seems to have no clearly defined motive: 
- And what am I, that I am here? (66) 
Allottsuggests that it might have been a stop-off on the poets' "Grand Tour".^ But Arnold's enquiry seems 
to be double-edged - is he there as a tourist or because he is drawn (against his will) to what is celebrated 
there? The 1855 version of the poem is deeply equivocal. An internal dialogue is set up between Arnold's 
present self and the self moulded by the "masters" of his "mind" (1.73); the intellectual, primarily Stoic, 
teachers of his past. Lest they should fear Arnold's defection to a creed of Pausanian credulity he assures 
his "rigorous teachers" (1. 67) that 
I come not here to be your foe! 
I seek these anchorites, not in ruth. 
To curse and to deny your truth; 
Not as their friend, or child, I speak! 
But as, on some far northern strand. 
Thinking of his own Gods, a Greek 
In pity and mournful awe might stand 
Before some fallen Runic stone -
For both were faiths, and both are gone. (76-84) 
Whilst assuring his conscience Arnold has to admit, however, that he feels a deep affinity with the monks: 
Wandering between two worlds, one dead. 
The other powerless to be bom. 
With nowhere yet to rest my head. 
Like these, on earth I wait forlorn. (85-88) 
In these four lines Arnold sums up and re-states the negative conclusions of "Stanzas in Memory of the 
Author of Obermann", "Resignation" and "Empedocles on Etna". With a desperate plea for psychological 
(and the suggestion of primal) wholeness Arnold admits the need for escape: 
Oh, hide me in your gloom profound. 
Ye solemn seats of holy pain! 
Invest me, steep me, fold me round. 
Till I possess my soul again; 
Till free my thoughts before me roll, 
Not chafed by hourly false control! (91-96) 
^"Arnold's interest in the Grande Chartreuse may have been stimulated by Wordsworth's account in "The Prelude" (1850) vi 
416-88 of his visit to the monastery in 1790." (CP, p. 303.) 
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As David DeLaura says, this is the main concern of the "Stanzas" - the impotence to which his withdrawn 
Stoicism has reduced him.^ Whilst their faith may be "dead", the monks have more affinity for Arnold in 
their aspiration after spiritual wholeness than Arnold's own "rigorous teachers". The 1855 version has 
Arnold recounting his loss of traditional faith with some bitterness: 
For rigorous teachers seized my youth. 
And prun'd its faith, and quench'd its fire, 
Showed me the pale cold star of Truth, 
There bade me gaze, and there aspire. (67-70) 
But Arnold really aspires after the wholistic view of the medieval world: 
We are like children reared in shade 
Beneath some old-world abbey wall. 
Forgotten in a forest-glade. 
And secret from the eyes of all. (169-172) 
At the end of the poem the poet asks to be left alone "Fenced ... in this cloistral round" (1. 205). 
The 1855 "Stanzas" represents the lowest point in Arnold's search for self-unity. Significantly, from the 
point of view of this thesis, it is centred on the loss of traditional Christian faith - there are loud echoes of 
"Stagirius" in this poem. The belief, in "Stanzas in Memory of the Author of Obermann", in the reality of 
the poet's divided self is here re-defined in terms akin to the theme of "Empedocles" - the division of 
thought and feeling. But here the problem which really governs those poems is made more explicit - how 
can Arnold live to the full when he feels the truth "Of reverie, of shade, of prayer" (1. 206) and yet has to 
deny the old ways under instruction from the "pale cold star of Truth" brought into view by the Zeitgeist? 
By 1867 Arnold has found an answer to all this - the answer, as we have seen, of the dominant side of his 
post-1853 Preface philosophy - the practical necessity of doing something. The 1867 version of the 
"Stanzas" finds a unity of a sort for Arnold by coming to the same conclusion as "Obermann Once More". 
What is important in poetry is the stressing of comprehension over vision; and the same is now true for 
Arnold's religious position. Whilst the regret for the passing medieval world-view remains, it has been 
transmuted, for the now socially minded Arnold, into a matter of purely nostalgic interest. Arnold rejects 
the monks' idealism just as surely as he rejects the dreams of the Scholar-Gipsy. His decision, in 
"Obermann Once More", to concentrate in his religious didacticism on what can be known: 
"Unduped of fancy, henceforth man 
Must labour! - must resign 
His all too human creeds, and scan 
Simply the way divine!" (185-188) 
allows him to dismiss the visions of the Carthusians as impractical for future religious needs. Thus in the 
1867 "Stanzas" we find Arnold distancing himself from the austere idealism of the monks in worldly 
compromise. The bitterness against his "rigorous teachers" has gone. Instead of "pruning" the faith of his 
youth and "quenching" its fire, Arnold now claims that they "purged its faith, and trimmed its fire" and 
^D.J. DeLaura - Hebrew and Hellene in Victorian England (University of Texas Press, 1969) pp. 20-21. 
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showed him the "high, white" rather than "pale cold" star of Truth. Where before Arnold had asked the 
worldly activists to leave him in the "forest" of the monks' "cloistral round", he now changes dramatically 
the whole tone of the poem, pronouncing an ironic final judgment on their way of life: 
- Pass, banners, pass, and bugles, cease. 
And leave our desert to its peace! (209-210) 
Arnold would not, I believe, have seen this as a diminution of his idealism. It is rather a decision to 
search for it in another place. We can find the clue to this change of emphasis in the letter to Clough 
already quoted: 
I am glad you like the Gipsy Scholar - but what does it ^ for you? ... 
You certainly do not seem to me sufficiently to desire and earnestly strive towards - assured knowledge -
activity - happiness. You are too content to fluctuate - to be ever learning, never coming to the knowledge of 
the truth. This is why, with you, I feel it necessary to stiffen myself - and hold fast my rudder. 
My poems, however, viewed absolutely, are certainly little or nothing.^ 
Arnold often appears to use Clough as his alter ego, in order to criticise the side of himself which 
identifies with his friend. Here his criticism of Clough is really an impatience with his own idealist poetic 
side, the side that leaves the activist impotent by appealing so strongly to the Gipsy within him. The 
"pleasing melancholy" that the Scholar-Gipsy awakes is that of any enquirer after truth who is content to 
wander and to fluctuate in his desire to accept nothing but perfection. At the time of this letter (1853) it is 
the same melancholy as that awakened by contemplation of the monastery of the Grande Chartreuse. 
As we have seen before, however, Arnold only names a problem to his confessor in order to dismiss it. 
Here he is able to displace onto Clough his own propensity to "never come to the knowledge of the truth" in 
questioning anj^ truth which does not produce "assured knowledge - activity - happiness". In dismissing his 
poems as "litde or nothing" when viewed absolutely, Arnold is saying two things. On a simple level he is 
claiming that they are, when viewed as a whole, of little interest. He is also saying, however, that in the 
search for absolute knowledge they are of little or no help. This absolute knowledge is not the partial 
glimpse of the Scholar-Gipsy or the dreadful doubt of the poet in "Dover Beach", or even the hankering 
after something lost of the Carthusians. It is rather that knowledge that "animates" and "ennobles" and 
brings happiness by following the prescription of the 1853 Preface. It is, in fact, a knowledge simply not 
available to a poet, like himself, so inclined to melancholy subjective visions on the Romantic model. 
Absolute knowledge must be sought in another way. 
The 1867 version of "Stanzas from the Grande Chartreuse" finds Arnold fulfilling his own dictum of 
writing poetry by which to live. In giving up on what he sees as impossible ideals, Arnold accepts 
unequivocally the Stoicism of his "masters of the mind". But it is not the disabling Stoicism of 1855. 
"Coleby, Nov. 30th (1853). (LC, p. 146.) 
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Instead it is the rational, mediative approach of a faith "purged" of impossibilities and "trimmed" in order to 
bum more brightly. Arnold now sees his task as one of attempting to help a new society to birth rather than 
accepting for ever his hopeless wandering between the old and new worlds. 
Together with his school inspectorship, there was one other major change in circumstances during the 
1850s which helped Arnold towards this assessment of his future role. On 5th May 1857 Arnold was 
elected Professor of Poetry at Oxford. This was as much a recognition of the Arnold family's services to 
education as a display of admiration towards Matthew's poetical achievements. As a representative of 
something begun by his father it must have given Arnold a relieved sense of having found a public niche 
somewhere and must have thereby diminished any sense of impotence felt in his failure as a poet. 
Certainly, as a critic talking about poetry he was able to pursue actively the role he had hopefully cast for 
himself in his first volume of poems - that of the poetical "reformer". 
As well as mitigating substantially Arnold's personal despair at failing to produce an "adequate" type of 
poetry, it must also have caused him to retain his hopes for poetry to be in some way a criticism of life. 
Although he might have been unable to produce such a "criticism" himself, he must have felt that this was 
more than compensated for by being given a position that held the possibility, potentially, of influencing 
people in a far greater way. Having been given the specific task of judging England's poetic past and 
helping to determine its future, Arnold therefore accepted the role with relish and a high sense of honour. 
His literary criticism, which begins in 1857 with his inaugural Oxford lecture, "On the Modem Element in 
Literature", betrays a sense of priestly vocation. Arnold is given the chance, by his public recognition, to 
act as the godfather to a new literary sensibihty. Thus is accounted for Amold's prose style which, in 
marked contrast to the introspective self-questioning of his poetry, has a self-confident mark about it; the 
mark of the teacher rather than that of the questioner. 
The gap between the uncertain, contradictory probings of Arnold the poet and the fluid, witty and 
persuasive outpourings of Amold the critic has generally produced a curious effect on Amold's own critics. 
The majority have tended to concentrate on either the poetry or the criticism, as if there was no connection 
between the two. Of those that have taken Amold as a whole, fewer still have sought to make any explicit 
connection between Amold the poet and Amold the religious controversialist - possibly because the latter 
preoccupation has been seen as an historical curiosity. Yet the remarkable feature about Amold is his 
consistency. The catalyst, or shaping spirit, behind his prose writings is very similar to that which govems 
his poetry. Thus an assertion such as that of Douglas Bush that Amold tumed to literary criticism because 
the main reason for his writing poetry - his "spiritual malaise" - had dissolved,^ is quite simply wrong. The 
difference in style, supposed by some critics to reflect a change of interest or heart, merely reflects a 
^Bush, p. 85. 
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tailoring of emphasis. It is tiie audience that has changed, not Arnold's interests. In fact, if Arnold's poems 
could be said to be arguments, as we have seen from the letters, with Clough, then the prose can be seen as 
an attempt to transport the same mode of argumentation onto a larger stage. Clough's death in 1861 and 
his own failure to come to a satisfactory self-definition through poetry both help Arnold towards the new 
exercise of self-definition through prose. The tools have changed but the task remains the same. 
To return to Douglas Bush's suggestion that Arnold's "spiritual malaise" had gone, I would suggest that 
the truth is quite the contrary. Arnold's rejection of the Scholar-Gipsy is rather the most potent sign that 
the spiritual malaise has conquered. What Arnold does lose in the 1850s is his faith in the ability of any 
individual to spiritually transcend the age. This is an entirely intellectual decision showing a distrust of any 
knowledge that might take intuition into account. As Park Honan says, Arnold deliberately turned against 
subjective feeling from 1853-7. He failed to continue as a poet owing to a "revolt against intuition" and a 
"belief in a more rational outlook"® The prose version of Arnold is therefore weighted heavily in favour of 
a clinical, rational and supposedly more objective outlook. 
The picture we are given of the monks in the "Stanzas from the Grande Chartreuse" provides us with an 
accurate portrait of the state of Arnold's mind at this time. In his identification with the monks' 
temperament but his rejection of their way of life we see Arnold's desire for an age where people are united 
in a common faith. At the same time, however, he perceives that it is no longer possible to hold fast to a 
solution which relies so heavily on intuitive knowledge. Arnold's outburst in a letter to Clough that these 
are "damned times" owing to "the height to which knowledge is come" is his perception that the basis for 
knowledge of any sort is in question.^ 
"On the Modem Element in Literature" is, then, the first of his critical attempts to lay to rest the spectre of 
complete relativity. That Arnold realises himself that he is undertaking such an attempt is clear from the 
original purpose behind the essay. It was supposed to be the first in a series of lectures on the subject of 
what constitutes "modernity" in literature. This clearly, I think, connects it with such comments as that in 
the 1853 Preface about the "modem problems" of the character of Empedocles. Interestingly enough, 
however, the series was discontinued owing to a self-confessed "insufficient" knowledge. The short 
®Honan p. 279. This is not to say that all poetry is by necessity unable to encompass a more or less objective vision. It is simply 
that Arnold is attempting to overcome the "dialogue of the mind with itself' which he perceives to have been the hallmark of 
Romantic poetry. In his frustration at his own tendency to write such poetry he deliberately turns against any manifestation of 
Post-Enlightenment subjectivity. 
7 
My dearest Clough these arc damned times - everything is against one - the height to which knowledge is come, the spread of luxury, our 
physical enervation ... and the sickening consciousness of our difficulties. 
Sept. 23rd 1849. (LC, p. 111.) I take "intuitive" knowledge to be, to quote Coleridge, "a direct and immediate beholding or 
presentation o f an object to the mind through the senses or the imagination". (Biographia Literaria, vol. 2, p. 230). Coleridge's 
suggestion that the intuitive is a particular apprehension of the "imagination" implies that such knowledge can involve a mystical 
rapport with the numinous. This is the sense in which I am using the word "intuitive" when I say that the monks' faith rests on 
"intuitive knowledge". 
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preface to the published essay® also begs forgiveness for an "imperfection" of style - that of the "doctor 
rather than the explorer". The confession should, I think, be taken at face value. Arnold's first foray into 
critical prose is of particular importance in any attempt to discover continuity in Arnold's work. His 
dissatisfaction here stems from his realisation that the impasse reached in his poetry is leaving its mark on 
his criticism - work which, by its nature and according to his position, should display a surer authority. As 
it is the lecture pretends to such an authority, but it is the authority of the frightened despot rather than the 
enlightened ruler. As Wordsworth's grandson William complained, on writing to Crabb Robinson a few 
weeks after the lecture: 
... he seems to lust after a system of his own: and systems are not made in a day: 
As its title suggests, "On the Modem Element in Literature" is based on a realisation about the reality of 
historical change. At this stage in his career Arnold is reviewing his life against the broad ebbs and flows 
of history in order to find "guidance" (as he says in the 1853 Preface) for life in the modem age. Amold's 
solution to his own spiritual malaise - the soul in isolation in a universe without God - is to look for support 
from human history. Having rejected the medieval solution of history controlled by God, Arnold looks for 
guidance anthropologically - by interpreting human history as an expression of die spirit of man. This is 
the "expressivist anthropology" which we first saw informing the portrait of the Scholar-Gipsy. There, 
however, the philosophy collapsed into the English Romantic model of poet as prophet inspired by God. In 
this essay the inspiration for the man of literature is more obviously humanist in expression. 
Wordsworth the younger's complaint that Arnold seems to "lust after a system" is a criticism that might 
be repeated by many a twentieth century student of literature. It is quite clear, from the very beginning of 
the lecture, that Amold's concem is not to examine literature in a reductive manner - this lecture is not 
merely about modem style, language or modes of expression. It is instead a treatment of literature as an 
expression of nothing less than "the truth about life". Amold's concem is spiritual. By the end of the third 
paragraph we are told that there are two types of "deliverance" demanded of the human race and that "in the 
enjoyment of both united consists man's true freedom". "Moral deliverance" is demanded of all ages and 
all individuals whilst "intellectual deliverance" is "the peculiar demand of those ages which are called 
modem". By the end of his introduction to the subject Amold has proclaimed that "it is to the poetical 
literature of an age that we must.. . look for the most perfect, the most adequate interpretation of that age". 
Amold's concem in this lecture is to make a comparative survey of past epochs and their bodies of 
literature in order to seek guidance for the future from past "modem" ages. 
Amold's historicism and anthropological concems are immediately apparent. We saw how, in "Alaric at 
Rome", the poet briefly touches on his father's cyclical view of history. In "On the Modem Element in 
^The preface was appended to the lecture on its first publication as an essay in MacMiUan's Magazine in 1868. 
'QuoUtion from CPW 1:225. 
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Literature" we find Arnold using the idea as the basis of his argument. Ruth apRoberts' useful book, 
Arnold and God,'® shows how important such ideas became for Arnold in his attempts to interpret his own 
age. As she says, the new theory of historicism, first articulated by the Italian philosopher Gianbattista 
Vico, was "standard historical teaching at Matthew Arnold's Rugby". ' ' In "Alaric at Rome" Arnold 
appropriated the cyclical paradigm for a fatalistic end - to suggest that England was in a state analogous to 
the failing Roman Empire. Now Arnold decides on the more optimistic parallel of ancient Greece. The 
change probably reflects Arnold's developing knowledge of, and adherence to, the ideas of J.G. von 
Herder. Herder's Ideas Towards the Philosophy of History of Mankind (the Ideen)'^ was first read by 
Arnold from 1867-9, but, as apRoberts says, he knew of Herder through Carlyle much earlier. Herder gives 
a developmental twist to Vico's original ideas by suggesting that, although there are parallels within 
history, the general movement is one of "progress", a progress that is seen in anthropological terms through 
man's capacity for language, society and religion. The importance of this for Arnold is that it provides an 
alternative humanist gospel onto which his own disenfranchised spirituality can cling. Herder talks of a 
"chain of development" through which the human spirit develops although individuals pass away, whilst in 
the individual himself a state of perfection can be aimed for - Bildung - "the willed harmonious 
development in the individual of all aspects of the human - as distinct from animal - potential..."'^ 
It is important to note the last part of that definition of Bildung. The idea of a constantly evolving human 
potential as an escape from animality has a strong appeal to those wishing to deny the conclusions of the 
Newtonian reductionist world view. It is useful, too, as an alternative to transcendental philosophy. 
Herder's Metakritik of 1799 is a deliberate refutation of Kant's Critique, denouncing Kant's work as 
abstract and unreal, a "linguistic monstrosity, an unparalleled word jugglery". The Metakritik seeks for a 
scientific, verifiable basis for knowledge; it attempts to bring all the sciences of man and his environment 
into an integrated w h o l e . T h e religious implications of this are complex. Whilst Herder himself was a 
Christian - religion being a specific area of man's Humanitat - others who followed him felt the need for a 
rejection of the traditional models. Goethe's Wilhelm Meister, which had a great impact on Arnold, treats 
Herder's idea of Bildung as, according to apRoberts, "a sort of secular salvation".'^ Goethe, seeing the 
truly spiritual expression of mankind as manifested through his use of language, displaces the traditional 
mantle of "Creator" from God onto man. 
^"University of California Press, Berkely, L.A., 1983. 
62-63. 
l^First published 1784-91. 
"apRoberts, p. 43. 
' ^ e comparison between Herder and Kant is discussed in Isaiah Berlin's Vico and Herder: Two Studies in the History rf Ideas 
(London: Hogarth Press, 1976). (Quoted by apRoberts, p. 41.) 
l^apRoberts, p. 47. 
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It is important to have some understanding of what we may call the "historicist gospel" in relation to 
Coleridge's attempts to retain the traditional models of God and his creation. It seems to me that the 
assumptions behind the historicists' theory of human progress do not sufficiendy take into account the 
problems Coleridge saw being created by empiricism. We explored in the last chapter Coleridge's 
"tensional" theory of language - his view of language as the expression of man's ambiguous relationship 
with God and the universe. From what we have discovered in this chapter we can now see Coleridge's 
ideas in historical perspective. In 1801 we find Coleridge denouncing the Newtonian world view in a letter 
to his friend Thomas Poole. Most particularly he attacks the idea of the mind as "a lazy looker-on on an 
external universe".^^ What Coleridge is reacting against is that division of man from his surroundings we 
have already observed. The dominant empiricist philosophy had solidified such a division by assuming 
that the constitution of "reality" was an objective world of facts as observed through man's sense data. 
Correspondingly, empiricist philosophers of language such as Home Tooke and the Lockeian, David 
Hartley, came to see the history of language as a process of gradual desynonymisation in which man came 
to understand more fully the universe around him. Words, which had previously described reality as man 
interacting with his surroundings,'^ were now seen as evolving into purer forms as befits the new 
knowledge of man: words now denote things. As Coleridge came to see, this is a false clarity which leads 
to a lack of balance between the individual mind and the world "out there". The "lazy looker-on" does not 
participate in the world outside, he simply views it as a kaleidoscope of images. Meanwhile, his 
assumption that his objectifying of reality somehow "solidifies" reality breaks down on closer inspection. 
The observer is left observing only his own senses and any "meaning" in the world is lost through the 
resulting isolation. What Coleridge sees and reacts against in the empiricist philosophy is, in effect, the 
evacuation of God. As the description of reality becomes progressively more internalised, so the idea of 
meaning retreats. The loss of balance between reader and text leads, interestingly enough, right back to 
pre-Creation chaos. 
The study of the process of desynonymisation leads Coleridge to different conclusions. He refuses to see 
changes in language in terms of a monolithic development in man's understanding of the universe. Rather 
he observes the constant change and flux as a corollary of our changing relationship with nature and God. 
As Stephen Prickett says in Words and ^ Word, Coleridge came to see words as related not so much to 
things as to "changes in human consciousness i tself . '^ Such a view denies that language evolves into a 
"purer" form or becomes somehow "better" at describing reality. What it does do is hold those changes in 
consciousness in tension. Coleridge allows for the possibility of further creation in human consciousness -
and thus further changes in language - by retaining the dualistic idea of the logos as both within and outside 
nature. 
^betters, vol. 2, no. 709. 
l^For example, "wind" as both a physical entity and as an expression of the Spirit of God. 
'^Words and "The Word" - Language, poetics and biblical interpretation (Cambridge University Press. 1986) p. 147. 
62 
If we relate this back to Coleridge's theory of the Imagination we can see how the change in 
consciousness - the progressive intemahsation of man's experience - affects Coleridge's aesthetics. The 
Imagination is, in fact, needed to bridge the gap between God and man. In its origins the word "nature" 
included man, and the whole was understood as the workings of God. With the intemahsation of God's 
revelation, our experience becomes more mysterious and more ambiguous. With the idea of the 
"Imagination" Coleridge tries to understand man's new relationship with God. God is both inside man -
hence man's semi-divine creative ability - and yet outside him. Thus is created the modem human 
condition we explored in Chapter One. As Stephen Prickett observes, Coleridge's sense of human 
perception rests in ambiguity: 
[Coleridge's] semi-mystical Platonic vision that could make him write confidently of the time when "the 
other great Bible of God, the Book of Nature, shall become transparent to us, when we regard the forms of 
matter as words, as symbols, valuable only as being the expression, an uru^olled but yet a glorious fragment of 
the Supreme Being" (Philosophical Lectures - ed. K.Cobum (Routledge, 1949) p. 367) is incomplete without 
the counter-inmition: "We understand nature just as if, at a distance, we looked at the image of a person in a 
looking-glass, plainly and fervently discoursing, yet what he uttered we could decipher only by the motion of 
his lips or by his mien." (Anima Poetae - ed. E.H.Coleridge (1895) p. 232.)^^ 
Coleridge's attitude allows for the possibility of knowledge from without as well as within. His belief 
that the theories of empiricist philosophy are inadequate to describe the whole of experience leads him to 
an interesting semantic usage in his description of reality. Whereas the empiricist vainly asserts a world of 
facts independent of the observer, Coleridge balances the discordant qualities of intemal and extemal 
observation with his assertion of the existence of "facts of the mind". As Stephen Prickett points out, this is 
being tme to the original root meaning of the word "fact" (from the Latin factum), which meant "a thing 
done or performed". A fact was something participated in - the product was made by human agency. By 
Amold's time "fact" has come to mean what is scientifically observable; it has lost that human creative 
potential - man has become a "lazy looker-on" 
It should be no surprise then, when looking back at Amold's poetic pronouncements, to see his confusion 
over these differing world views at the root of his feelings of isolation. With such a poem as "The 
Scholar-Gipsy" we find an almost Coleridgean balancing of discordant quahties - the intemal spiritual 
joumey of the Gipsy coupled with an attitude of expectation towards the possibility of knowledge breaking 
in from without (the "spark from heaven"). Altematively, we find Amold searching for a self which has 
been "buried" by the general change in human consciousness from extemal and participatory to intemal and 
isolated. 
With this general feeling of isolation in mind we can now understand better the new epistemological 
theories of Herder and Goethe and their appeal for Amold. The perception that God can no longer be 
understood in terms of participation in man's extemal surroundings leads Herder to suggest that God is 
"Ibid., p. 148 
20See Prickett, pp. 192-93. 
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concomitant with purely human development. The Romantics' idea of man's felt unity with "Nature" is 
thus rejected, as Herder's idea of Humanitat states that "man, and only man, is organised, biologically, with 
a capacity for reason, for art, for language - and for religion".^' People such as Goethe, Carlyle and, 
following them, Arnold, are consequently led to expect a future Kingdom of God on human developmental 
lines. Man will have escaped from his sense of isolation when he has become fully human. Thus we find 
Arnold marking a passage, (on his first reading of the Ideen from 1867-9), on man failing to reach the "pure 
image of man that lies in him" and, written on the inside front cover, we find a new optimistic resolution to 
change this state of affairs in himself, in order "to be able to arrive at a firm view concerning the course of 
human life".^^ 
The suggestion of ways in which man is to develop is, of course, Arnold's task. By the mid 1860s he is 
producing subtle comparative studies in literature, education and religion on the Herderian historicist 
model, shifting the fragments of "truth" from the past and moulding them together with his own insights to 
form broad prescriptive models on mankind's future development. "On the Modem Element in Literature" 
is, however, far from subtle. What we see is Arnold's attempt, and failure, to escape from the conclusions 
of human history and the conclusions of his own poetry. Whilst we find Arnold embracing the theory of 
historicism, we also see him shying away from some of its implications. 
Arnold's unhappiness with historicism can be illustrated by juxtaposing the 1857 lecture with a letter 
from 1852, a letter which uses a significant simile in order to describe his state of mind: 
... I am sure however that in the air of the present times 11 nous manque d'aliment, & that we deteriorate in 
spite of our struggles - like a gifted Roman falling on the uninvigorating atmosphere of the decline of the 
Empire. Still nothing can absolve us from the duty of doing all we can to keep alive our courage and 
activity.^^ 
This is, of course, an echo of the fatalism of "Alaric at Rome", but we find a different use of history in "On 
the Modem Element in Literature". 
Arnold's search for spiritual nourishment from the past leads him to a comparative survey of the 
literatures of ancient Greece, the Elizabethan age and the late Roman Empire. All these ages are deemed 
"modem" because, in a conscious echo of the historicists we have discussed, they were ages of "advanced 
civilisation". They therefore have instmction for the inevitable development of Arnold's own age. 
It is no surprise to find that Arnold comes out in favour of ancient Greece as the best model for future 
development. As Ruth apRoberts says, students at Rugby were taught to think of Periclean Greece as the 
supreme example of human civilisation. Moreover, it corresponded well to the social situation of modem 
Europe. The heroic age which passed into the first major modem experiment in democracy (Greece in the 
^'See apRoberts, p. 54. 
^^uotation from apRoberts, p. 44. Original source for quotation was unavailable. 
^^Edgbaslon, June 7th, 1852. (LC.pp. 122-123.) 
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fifth century B.C.) had particular significance for those observing the parallel movement from aristocracy 
to democracy in nineteenth century Europe.^"^ And yet Arnold's analysis is surely uncritical. Not only is 
his field of study impossibly large, but his critical method of drawing general conclusions from the works 
of single "representatives" of each age raises all sorts of questions. In the comparison of Periclean Greece 
and Elizabethan England the latter age is found wanting. In Greece the people do not wear arms, dress 
simply but elegandy and have tolerance for others' opinions. Sixteenth century England is the opposite. 
And what of the historians of each age? Sir Walter Raleigh sums up the Elizabethan age in his "wholly 
obsolete and unfamiliar language" and his lack of control over the "facts" of the time. Thucydides, in 
comparison, speaks as the "thoughtful philosophic man of our own days": 
He represents, at its best indeed, but he represents, the general intelligence of his age and nation; of a nation 
the meanest citizens of which could follow with comprehension the profoundly thoughtful speeches of 
Pericles. 
The faults with such an analysis are manifold. How can Arnold know, for example, the thoughts of 
Athens' "meanest citizens" and how, anyway, can one man's testimony sum up an age? Arnold's 
comparison of historians is equally suspect; it is not, in fact, a true comparison at all. Sir Walter Raleigh's 
History of the World is compared with Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War and Raleigh's is 
castigated for its speculative opinions on the physical characteristics of the universe. Raleigh has not a 
"rational appreciation and control of his facts". Remarkably enough, Arnold does not seem to have realised 
that the subject matter of the two historians is entirely different. 
The literary critical judgments in this essay are on much the same lines as those in the 1853 Preface. The 
poets of Periclean Greece - Pindar, Aeschylus and Sophocles - are praised for being as "interesting" and 
"adequate" as the age itself. There is also a new note, however. Arnold compares the disappearance of the 
work of Menander with the survival of that of the comic, Aristophanes and asks "to what is this to be 
attributed?" The answer springs from Arnold's new optimistic view of history. Menander has "perished" 
because the age in which he lived saw Greece in decline. His work had to be sacrificed because in his 
poetry was "the seed of death" and it was thus at odds with the ongoing developmental pattern of human 
history: 
The human race has the strongest, the most invincible tendency to live, to develop itself. It retains, it clings 
to what fosters its life, what fosters its development, to the literature which exhibits it in its vigour, it rejects, 
it abandons what does not foster its development. 
Given this belief it is strange, then, that Arnold should dwell for so long, when he comes to study Roman 
poetry, on Lucretius. Lucretius, he says, is a "great poet" and, moreover, as "modem" as Thucydides. His 
modernity is, however, marked out by his exhibition of a "feeling" of "ennui" and "depression" which is a 
characteristic "stamped on ... many of the representative works of modem times". After some time Amold 
dismisses Lucretius as inadequate to describe his age because he is not "in sympathy" with it; he is 
"overstrained, gloom-weighted, morbid". 
apRoberts, pp. 62-3. 
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One wonders why Lucretius has not "perished" like Menander? The developmental theory seems to 
collapse here, so Arnold unceremoniously bundles Lucretius out of the way in the same way as he later 
rejects Senancour in "Obermann Once More". Lucretius was not "in sympathy" with the "energy" of the 
Roman life of his day because he "withdraws himself in an attempt "to learn the nature of things". He 
attempts to "rivet his eyes on the elementary reality" of the world. He finds it "terrifying and alluring; and 
to deliver himself from it he has to keep perpetually repeating his formula of disenchantment and 
annihilation". Arnold rejects him because he is "morbid" - "and he who is morbid is no adequate 
interpreter of his age". 
There is clearly a two-fold movement in "On the Modem Element in Literature". Arnold's wish in 
searching history is to find that fixity which he sought, and failed to find, in writing his own poetry. His 
broad, comparative method is his attempt to overcome the isolationist conclusions of his poetic self. Not 
deep the true poet sees, but wide. Arnold ranges over as broad a field as possible in the hope that true 
comprehension of "how to live" will come through objectively studying the poetry of other ages. He 
understands, through his reading of Herder, that the history of the human spirit is one of gradual 
advancement; his hope is that it will be the nobility of Greece's heroic age that will prevail. This is the 
optimistic estimate behind the word "modem" in the essay's title. The other movement is, however, 
pessimistic. Arnold simultaneously feels the objective vision sliding away into subjectivity under the laws 
of complete relativity that is the inevitable conclusion of the observation of the "facts" of human history. 
Where is the justification for beheving that Greece will prevail? Why should it not be the "gifted Roman 
falling on the uninvigorating atmosphere of the decline of the Empire" who is the real parallel with the 
future? Arnold's portrait of Lucretius resembles the self-character sketches in "Resignation" and 
"Empedocles on Etna". Furthermore, the animation with which he describes Lucretius' "modem" 
complaint of "disenchantment and annihilation" seems to suggest that Amold fears the pessimistic outcome 
more than he hopes for the retum of the golden age. 
The reason why Amold cannot comfortably embrace the developmental historicist theory is implicit in 
the essay itself. Without actually realising it, Arnold pin-points the problematic implications inherent in the 
empiricist world-view - the epistemological basis on which the theory of historicism rests. In his search for 
fixity of purpose and solidity of vision Amold asks for "deliverance" (from the lack of such fixity and 
solidity) in two ways - in the "moral" and "intellectual" spheres. The division is significant. "Moral 
deliverance" is taken to be a demand that is absolute and enduring. "Intellectual deliverance" is specifically 
"modem" however, and it is a deliverance that a poet such as Lucretius (and Amold himselO lacks. The 
demand for such a deliverance exists 
... because the present age exhibits to the individual man who contemplates it the spectacle of a vast 
multitude of facts awaiting and inviting his comprehension. 
This deliverance begins 
... when our mind begins to enter into possession of the general ideas which are the law of this vast 
multitude of facts. It is perfect when we have acquired that harmonious acquiescence of mind which we feel 
in contemplating a grand spectacle that is intelligible to us;... 
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The demand is essentially the same as that enunciated in the 1853 Preface where the contemplation of 
noble actions from a heroic time is recommended as a means of banishing all feelings of contradiction, 
impatience and irritation. The problem we discussed then is equally present here - a "law" that governs all 
perception and that leads to a state of "harmonious acquiescence" might easily mean an ordering of reality 
that does not allow for the possibility of disconfirmation and growth. This is certainly the case in "On the 
Modem Element in Literature" where the "objective" view leads to obviously subjective and sometimes 
very questionable opinions as to what is "adequate". What is apparent, anyway, is that Arnold's wish for 
"comprehension" is impossible. In his division of "what can be known" into two types - moral and 
intellectual- Arnold has fallen prey to the empiricist perception that knowledge is separable from the 
knower. His obvious discomfort in speaking of the "vast multitude of facts" awaiting comprehension stems 
from the reality that these "facts" are, quite simply, unknowable. By empiricist epistemological definition 
he has no connection with them. 
That knowledge of the moral sphere is taken for granted as a pre-requisite to being human shows that 
such knowledge is, for Arnold, intuitive and universally available. This is an interesting twist in his 
otherwise conventionally empiricist theory of knowledge. His dismissal of Lucretius is, in fact, a moral 
judgment - an absolutism in the face of the tyranny of facts which does not seem to be justified by his 
simultaneous embrace of the relativity of historicism. What it shows is that Arnold recognises the 
limitations of the Newtonian world view - as Rene Wellek says: 
Arnold genuinely desires to escape his own historicism and that of his time with its danger of falling into a 
complete relativism of values.^ 
At the same time, however, he is unable to rest in that state of uncomfortable, but creative, tension we saw 
being embraced by Coleridge. Where Coleridge attempts to balance his moral awareness ("I am") and the 
world of things ("it is"), thereby forging a unity out of discordant qualities, Arnold, in this essay at least, 
unsatisfactorily imposes a unity by erring on one side of die dialectic - the moral. In doing so he satisfies 
neither himself nor the historicists. 
His uncertainty over types of knowledge is a recurring theme in Arnold's prose criticism. The relative 
failure to pin down, in "On the Modem Element in Literature", what might be "tme" in history does not, 
however, in any way shake his resolve to continue with "the sincere endeavour to leam and practice"^ 
from the past. By the time he pubhshes the 1857 lecture, over ten years later, he has finely honed his 
method and he can pass off his early attempt as one that is suggestive in its principles even if it is defective 
in some of its material. By the time we come to Amold's next published work on literature, his 1861 "On 
Translating Homer" Arnold has apparently reduced the scope of his aims. His judgments are more nearly 
literary. The personal prescriptive note has gone owing to his simpler aim - "to give practical advice to a 
" A History of Modem Criticism: 1750-1950 - Volume 4 - The Later Nineteenth Centuiy (Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1965) p. 
159." 
2®From the 1853 Preface. 
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translator" - and with its removal comes a more objective appreciation of the critic's role. Thus we find 
Arnold advising a translator 
not to try "to rear on the basis of the Iliad, a poem that shall affect our countrymen as the original may be 
conceived to have affected its natural hearers"; and for this simple reason, that we cannot possibly tell how 
the Ihad "affected its natural" hearers. 
Whilst the book is, for the most part, uncontroversial, there is, however, one point at which the Amoldian 
manifesto makes its appearance. We may recognise certain resonances from the letters to Clough in the 
following pronouncement on the "great blemish of [modem] English literature": 
English Uterature ... regarded ... as a living intellectual instrument... ranks after the Uteratures of France and 
Germany. Of these two literatures, as of the intellect of Europe in general, the main effort, for now many 
years, has been a critical effort; the endeavour, in all branches of knowledge, - theology, philosophy, history, 
art, science, - to see the object as in itself it really is. 
As in "On the Modem Element in Literature" Amold embraces European historicism at the expense of what 
he sees as the defect of "eccentricity" and "arbitrariness" in English literature. Once again we have the 
assertion that there is a particular branch of knowledge - the intellectual - which requires for its acquisition 
a peculiarly modem endeavour - a "critical effort". Once again we have the implication that such an 
"effort" will lead to a complete understanding of what it is to be human. But once again we have the 
absolutist desire for complete objectivity (seeing objects as they really are) simultaneously allied with an 
obviously subjective opinion as to what these "objects" should be. Amold is no further, in this essay, in 
coming to a satisfactory resolution of the epistemological problem. 
Amold's first major collection of criticism was published in 1865. Essays in Criticism continues the 
European theme as Amold ranges comparatively across the field of European literature in searching for his 
"law" of human life. The essays as a whole are confident and purposeful, drawing from all areas of human 
endeavour in testimony to his will to believe, following people such as Herder and Humboldt, that the 
human spirit connects all branches of knowledge. Thus we find Amold delving into the lives of poets and 
statesmen, becoming involved in theological disputes and, once more, interpreting history. Perhaps the 
best way to approach the essays is to look at the philosophy that underlies them all, since it is a solidifying 
of his philosophical opinions and a consequent reduction in his "spiritual malaise" that leads to Amold's 
prolific spate of writing. 
It is the two essays on Spinoza that are the clue to the whole collection. Amold's first recorded mention 
of Spinoza is in a letter to Clough of 1850 in which he tells his friend that he has been reading the 
philosopher "with profit". Amold goes on to say the following: 
I go to read Locke on the Conduct of the Understanding: my r e ^ c t for the reason as the rock of refuge to 
this poor exaggerated surexcited humanity increases & increases.^' 
Both before and after the time of this letter Amold uses Spinoza in conjunction with Stoics such as 
Epictetus to posit an order of the universe based on reason rather than on intuitive knowledge. Whilst there 
" R u g b y , October 23id. (LC,p . 116.) 
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was, in the 1850s, enough doubt remaining to enable Arnold to write poems such as "Dover Beach" and 
"The Scholar-Gipsy", Spinoza's rationalism has become much more ingrained in Arnold's thought by the 
time of the Essays in Criticism. As I suggested before, however, the change from the fluctuating ideas that 
inform the poems of the '50s to the confident "certainty" behind the prose of the '60s does not indicate a 
consequent settlement of the debate. Arnold's increased reliance on Spinoza during the '60s stems from a 
wish to convince himself and his audience that he can find "intellectual deliverance". Spinoza's philosophy 
fits very happily into the gospel of people such as Herder because, while he stresses the immanence of God 
in all things, Spinoza also claims that everything exists independently. He is thus at odds with Coleridgean 
philosophy, since man has no semi-divine creative status and therefore no "Imagination" on the 
Coleridgean model. Spinoza is useful for Arnold because his philosophy gives Arnold a rationale for faith. 
Arnold's discomfort with the idea of a transcendental God is catered for - there is no problem with 
miraculous breaks in nature- whilst his belief in the indwelling spirit of God in man (on the Herderian 
model) is sanctioned by Spinoza's claim that God is "co-existent with the universe" and "concerned fca; all 
things".28 
This particular type of religious debate is not undertaken in order to satisfy a personal spiritual hunger. 
The descriptions of such a need in "Stagirius" and "The Scholar-Gypsy" are - for the moment - the last 
words on that topic. Arnold undertakes prose writing in order to pin down objects and it is the object of 
religion as a manifestation of the human spirit amongst other manifestations that he undertakes to define in 
the Spinoza essays. Thus his thinking on the subject of religion here is quite as comparative and 
"objective" as it is in studying any other area of human endeavour. It is not religion as the "truth about life" 
in any absolute sense that interests Arnold in the '60s. 
A letter of 1863 to his mother describes Arnold's object in writing about Spinoza. Whilst, he says, 
Spinoza's doctrines are not his, he does wish to "modify" opinion about the philosopher: 
... what the English public cannot understand is that a man is a just and fruitful object of contemplation 
much more by virtue of what spirit he is of than by virtue of what system of doctrine he elaborates.^' 
Thus, although he is obviously in agreement with many of Spinoza's ideas on the proper interpretation of 
Scripture, it is not finally the philosophy as a set of propositions which interests Arnold. As he says in the 
essay "Spinoza and the Bible": 
A philosopher's real power over mankind resides not in his metaphysical formulas, but in the spirit and 
tendencies which have led him to adopt those formulas. 
Whilst Arnold cites a number of examples - such as his dismissal of miracles and his speaking of the 
inaccuracies of Scripture - wherein he believes Spinoza's criticism of the Bible is useful, he cites an equal 
number where the philosopher, to Arnold's mind, errs. This is not because Arnold is formulating his own 
theology - that is not an interest at this time. In fact in this essay Arnold makes it clear that theology is not 
about intellectual ideas at all: 
^Honan, p. 322. Honan describes fully the importance of Spinoza to Arnold in chapter 14, pp. 312-337. 
^'January 7th, 1863. QuoUtion from CPW 3:446. 
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Theology demands perfect obedience, philosophy perfect knowledge: ... 
The fundamentals of faith are 
... the belief that God is, that he is a reward of them that seek him, and that the proof of seeking him is a 
good life. 
This is unquestionable to Arnold - it is in the area of that "moral deliverance" that is an absolute demand for 
all ages. Spinoza's usefulness for Arnold is rather in his critical spirit - that shaping force behind history 
which leads to mankind's general advancement. Spinoza's appeal is in his attitude towards the Bible and 
religion - a specifically modem attitude in which the Bible is treated largely metaphorically and rehgion is 
taken as a self-evident (because, supposedly, empirically provable) need. 
I said earlier that the Spinoza essays reveal a reduction in Arnold's "spiritual malaise" and lead to an 
increased tone of self-confidence in his other critical writings. Arnold's assent to a religious system based 
on Spinoza is, however, to use Newman's terms, notional rather than real. If we take "notional" to mean a 
merely intellectual assent to a proposition then such a term describes well Arnold's position. Spinoza is an 
agent of "intellectual deliverance" - an ally in Arnold's search for a properly "critical" view of human life. 
Such an estimate of Arnold's religious interests at this time is confirmed by the "Spinoza and the Bible" 
essay itself - Spinoza's main appeal for Christians is, as Arnold repeats a number of times, his "power of 
edification". "Unction", he admits, is absent from Spinoza's writings, but unction is not the quality which 
Arnold wishes to champion. In fact Arnold almost replaces unction with edification as the peculiar quality 
he believes to be bestowed by God. 
Quite as telling a guide to Arnold's religious position at this time is provided by a number of the 
companion Essays in Criticism. If Spinoza's religion aids Arnold's intellectual deliverance, then that of 
Marcus Aurelius provides a focal point for Arnold's need of "moral deliverance". Arnold's comparativism 
is again in evidence in "Marcus Aurelius" (1863); he calls the second century Roman Emperor a "truly 
modem striver". Meanwhile his thoughts and moral axioms Amold wishes to be as popular as the great 
Christian bible of morahty, the Imitation. 
For all that the "Marcus Aurelius" essay appears to be an unexceptional exposition of the other side of the 
Amoldian dialectic there is detectable a different note to that which govems the Spinoza essays - a note 
more personal and more revealing. Early on we find an interesting assertion: 
The paramount virtue of religion is, that it has lighted up morality; that it has supplied the emotion and 
inspiration needful for carrying the sage along the narrow way perfectly, for carrying the ordinary man along 
it at all. 
Arnold goes on to say that this "emotion" is manifested with most splendour in the Christian religion and 
that the greatness of Marcus Aurelius is that his emotion "suffuses" his morality to such an extent that he 
approximates to that special character inherent in Christian morality. Not that it finally does: 
... the emotion of Marcus Aurelius does not quite light up his morality - it has not power to melt the clouds 
of effort and austerity quite away,... 
Two things need to be said about this. Firstly there has entered into Amold's two-fold definition of true 
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humanity a third term. "Moral deliverance" can not be attained merely by studying the maxims of 
Epictetus; for such advice to become real rather than notional one must be emotionally transformed. 
"Emotional deliverance", although not named as such by Arnold, is quite as important as intellectual and 
moral deliverance. The other point is that Arnold finds this expression to be an exclusively Christian 
quality. This need not in itself be remarkable. In this essay Arnold quotes a number of sayings of Jesus 
and it may well be that these are of great inspiration to any age. The point is, though, that Arnold is writing 
not about Christianity, but about a second century persecutor of Christianity. Furthermore it is remarkable 
that, although this is an essay in which Arnold is seeking to recommend Marcus Aurelius as something of a 
spiritual guide, he is admitting equally that the Roman is missing that vital element which would make him 
whole. 
The last two paragraphs of the essay provide a clue to Arnold's purpose. In the penultimate paragraph 
Arnold recommends Marcus Aurelius from the point of view of the historicist critic: 
... he remaining the especial friend and comforter of all clear-headed and scrupulous, yet pure-hearted and 
upward striving men, in those ages most especially that walk by sight, not by faith, but yet have no open 
vision. 
He is thus a vital guide for "modem" man - for all those who live in an age where irrational "faith" has been 
replaced by clear-headed reason ("sight"). It might be expected that this would be the conclusion, but it is 
as if Arnold suddenly remembers that Marcus Aurelius' "vision" is not enough: 
Yet no, it is not for what he thus gives them that such souls love him most! it is rather because of the 
emotion which lends to his voice so touching an accent, it is because he too yearns as they do for something 
unattained by him. 
He knows not the Sermon on the Mount and therefore 
We see him wise, just, self-governed, tender, thankful, blameless; yet, with all this, agitated, stretching out 
his arms for something beyond,-... 
Arnold's affinity for Marcus Aurelius rests, I think, in his uneasy perception that second century Rome 
and nineteenth century Europe are parallel ages. The personal note which we saw informing Arnold's 
portrait of Lucretius in "On the Modem Element in Literature" is present again in his study of Marcus 
Aurelius. The "clouds of effort and austerity" of Marcus Aurelius sound remarkably similar to the "over-
strained morbidity" of Lucretius and both figures are seen by Amold to be not "in sympathy" with the spirit 
of die age. Lucretius is deemed "modern" but is "inadequate" owing to his morbid subjectivity. Marcus 
Aurelius is "modem" but is finally in despair for that "something" which he lacks. And Amold himself? 
He finds Marcus Aurelius "touching" because he, too, lives in an age of "sight" rather than "faith". 
Christianity is, if we remember the conclusion of "Stanzas from the Grande Chartreuse", as remote for 
Amold as it was for Marcus Aurelius. Yet "emotion" - that which touches notional morality into religious 
deliverance (one might perhaps say into worship) - is the special preserve of the age of faith. Unattainable 
for Marcus Aurelius, one suspects that it is unattainable, too, for Amold. 
"Marcus Aurelius" is an important essay because it makes clear how artificial is Amold's division of 
"intellectual" and "moral" deliverance - especially when it is applied to religion. In Amold's comparative 
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religious scheme Spinoza supplies a largely intellectual deliverance and Marcus Aurelius a moral one. It is 
clear, however, that Marcus Aurelius' is quite as intellectual a deliverance as that of Spinoza. His morality 
is again a system of assent to a series of propositions. Religion, for Arnold, seems to be about something 
else - something that he lacks. When we talk about the reduction in Arnold's spiritual malaise, therefore, 
we are talking about an apparent rather than a real reduction. Even with knowledge of Spinoza and Marcus 
Aurelius, Arnold lacks an "open vision". 
Arnold's use of the words "vision" and "sight" are remarkably suggestive. In his assertion that the 
modem age is one in which people walk by sight, not by faith, he is describing the philosophy of 
empiricism perfectly. It is the objects that one sees that the empiricist claims are demonstrable "facts". But 
what of this lack of vision? When we remember D.G.James' assertion that Romantic poetry is about 
"vision" rather than comprehension and we think further of Arnold's own admission on Wordsworth's 
death that he was suddenly bereft of a guide who could teach him how to feel ("... who, ah! who, will make 
us feel?") one is inclined to see Arnold, quite unwittingly, pin-pointing the problem with the philosophy he 
is attempting to follow. Remarkably enough, the "Marcus Aurelius" essay, which begins as an objective 
attempt to recommend a morality based on "thought" alone, ends up by admitting that a morality so 
circumscribed is lacking in a quality only attainable by religious faith. "Emotional deliverance" seems to 
demand the presence of a "fugitive delicate sense". 
"Marcus Aurelius" is a typical example of what Arnold has been attempting in his criticism of the 1850s 
and 60s. Underlying all is the attempt to come to terms with modernity and, although his method has 
changed - his criticism is in the form of prose rather than poetry - the truth is that the problems remain the 
same as they did when they were announced in "Stagirius". Arnold's attempt to find a spiritual basis for 
life in his embrace of the "gospel" of historicism and the rationalism of Spinoza is remarkably similar to his 
attempt, in his poetry, to find the objective and comprehensive view. Both attempts eschew the 
uncomfortable partial knowledge that Coleridge realises is the human spiritual lot. Both attempt to find a 
rational ruling Idea which will provide an adequate basis for man's religious yearnings. As we see with the 
"Marcus Aurelius" essay, however, such an Idea leaves out of the equation the "feeling" or "emotion" that 
is part of religious faith. Whilst we see Arnold's need for such a "deliverance" we have also seen, however, 
his inability to find it owing to, as we have discovered, the loss of the tfaditional model of faith. Without 
the "knowledge" that is available in faith Arnold's attempt to criticise life in the 50s and 60s seems as 
incomplete as did the same attempt in his poetry. We shall see the effect of all this on his mature religious 
writings in the final chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
The Mature Religious Writings 
3.1. St. Paul and Protestantism 
By the time we come to Arnold's mature religious writings we can recognise a clear change in tone from 
the distanced objectivity of the Spinoza essays. This change can be related above all to deaths in the 
family. During 1868 Arnold's youngest and eldest sons died, the infant Basil in January and sixteen 
year-old Thomas in November. These events obviously focussed Arnold's mind on to religious questions 
in a new way. As we can see from the following letter to his sister the "notional assent" of the Arnold of 
the 1860s has been replaced by a more urgent and personal assessment of religion: 
And so this loss comes to me just after my forty-fifth birthday, with so much other "suffering in the flesh", 
the departure of youth, cares of many kinds, an almost painful anxiety about public matters - to remind me 
that the time past of our life may suffice us! - words which have haunted me for the last year or two, and that 
"we should no longer live the rest of our time in the flesh to the lusts of men, but to the will of God." 
However different the interpretation we put on much of the facts and history of Christianity, we may unite in 
the bond of this call, which is true for all of us, and for me above all, how fuU of meaning and warning.^ 
The last line of this letter no doubt refers to the fact that Arnold had known for some time that his father's 
heart defect was h e r e d i t a r y T h i s , accompanied by the knowledge of the deaths of some of his dearest 
friends, Clough included, in the 1860s, appears to have substantially affected his attitude to life during that 
decade. The deaths in his family were the necessary events needed to make this burgeoning attitude 
prevail. From the mid-1860s onwards the Note Books become gradually more filled with quotations from 
and comments upon the Bible, Thomas a Kempis and Bishop Wilson. In terms of the effect on Arnold's 
writing there is a distinct change from the rather abstract handling of religious matters in the 1860s to the 
more objective and critical commentator of St Paul and Protestantism. Arnold has, quite simply, become 
personally involved in the religious debate. 
Another reason for Arnold's attitudinal change is also bound up with his family. It seems likely that such 
meditations as the above on the frailty and impermanence of life caused Arnold to dwell increasingly on his 
place in the family heritage. Early on in Arnold's life this heritage had caused him some discomfort. 
'Letter to Jane firom l^tten of Matthew Arnold 1848-1888 - ed. G. W.E. RusseU. 2 voU. (MacMiUan & Co., I ^ d o n . 1895) vol 1, p. 382 
^Arnold was thus informed in 1847 or 1848. See Honan, p. 122. 
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According to Park Honan Arnold's reputation at Oxford as a dandy and poseur can best be seen as an 
attempt at liberation from his father's rigorous Christian morality.^ If this is true then it is equally likely 
that, on the Freudian model, the superego exacted its revenge. Even leaving aside Lionel Trilling's perhaps 
fanciful theory that "Sohrab and Rustuni' is about Thomas Arnold's psychical revenge on his son the 
evidence points strongly to a need in Matthew to satisfy the moral conscience implanted in him by his 
father. 
The best set of evidence is the letters written to his mother. The central purpose of these seems to be to 
console his mother for the early loss of her husband by, to some extent, taking Dr Arnold's place. Thus we 
find Matthew continually commenting about his father's life - about his irreproachability as a father and as 
a schoolmaster, his public successes and his hopes and intentions for the future. It seems to me that this 
over-deference to his father's memory can best be explained as a need for reconciliation. Certainly it is not 
just for his mother's benefit that Arnold writes so admiringly about his father. 
Certain of the poems suggest this paternal influence. "Obermann Once More", in the poet's desire to be 
at the vanguard of history, can be seen as Arnold consciously taking on his father's authoritative role in the 
"new" religious age (the "world's new hour"). "Rugby Chapel", similarly, finds Arnold drawing strength 
from the memory of his father's ability to 
... move through the ranks, recall 
The stragglers, refresh the outworn, 
Praise, re-inspire the brave! (198-200) 
Girded by his father's strength Arnold feels able to continue his "march" 
On, to the bound of the waste. 
On, to the city of God. (207-208) 
"Rugby Chapel" points, in fact, to the larger Amoldian thesis that we saw in the dismissal of "The 
Scholar-Gipsy". In the letter to Clough'^ Arnold's reference to the "complaining millions of men" who 
"darken in labour and pain" is made in order to support his decision to abandon what he sees as the 
subjective type of knowledge for which the Gipsy seeks. Salvation must, as we saw in "Obermann Once 
More" ("And who can be alone elate, / While the world Ues forlorn") be universally accessible. "Rugby 
Chapel" repeats this message with the added inference that the way of salvation is to be on Dr Arnold's 
lines: 
But thou would'st not alone 
Be saved, my father! alone 
Conquer and come to thy goal, 
Leaving the rest in the wild. (124-127) 
The vision of his father as the "faithful shepherd" coming "Bringing thy sheep in thy hand" is surely a 
model to which Arnold aspires. 
^Ibid., chapter one. 
"See above, p-t^ S. 
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Thus Arnold begins, in ^ Paul and Protestantism, a serious reconstruction of Christianity. The twin foci 
of the work are the wish that Dissenters might be included within the Church and the correct interpretation 
of Scripture. It is Arnold's concern that all constraints to the full comprehension of all sects within the 
Church should be removed. In order for this to happen he recognises that the most vital need is for a 
consistent theology. The search for such a common basis is at the heart of ^ Paul and Protestantism and 
consequently we find Arnold grappUng seriously for the first time with Biblical exegesis and questions of 
theology. 
In many ways the pursuit of these concerns is a direct continuation of his father's opinions and work. 
Thomas Arnold wished for a "Broad Church" which would influence the Dissenters for the better by 
including them.^ Dr Arnold felt that such a cause could be advanced by a better understanding of 
Scripture. Adopting the "Reason - Understanding" formula in Coleridge's Biographia Literaria, Arnold 
saw biblical scholarship as allowable in the realm of the "Understanding", although faith in a supernatural 
deity was directly instinctive and unquestionable (intuited by the "Reason"). Thus is accounted for Dr 
Arnold's seemingly contradictory position as both a zealous evangelical and a liberal theologian.^ 
The parallels between father and son are very striking indeed. Matthew was, however, unable to adhere 
to his father's traditional reliance on a transcendent deity. As a result for Matthew the same problems lead 
to significantly different solutions. 
Arnold's primary objective in the first part of ^ Paul and Protestantism is to further the removal of 
Protestantism's "schemes of doctrine, Calvinistic or Arminian" and their materialistic ideas on election and 
justification. Armed with Edouard Reuss's Histoire ^ la Theologie Chretienne ^ Siecle Apostolique 
which he had read in the summer preceding the first article's appearance, Arnold wishes to give a "true 
criticism of this great and misunderstood author" (St. Paul). Essentially Arnold wishes to put right the 
excesses of the Reformation and provide the future Church with the proper development it was denied. As 
he says in the Preface of 1887, Christianity must do without both the "Dissidence of Dissent" and 
"mankind's familiar fancies of miracle, blood, bargain and appeasement". The suggestion is that the 
Church has become lost in its split between materialistic Protestantism and the Catholic Church's 
"machinery of ... mythology".^ Arnold is to go back to the Bible itself in order to underiine the true 
grounds for modem belief. 
The 1887 Preface sums up Arnold's own view of the reasons behind his choosing St. Paul as the flag 
^See Coleridge and the Broad Church Movement; Studies in S.T.Coleridge, Dr. Arnold of Rugby, J.C.Hare, Thomas Carlyle, and 
F.D.Maurice - C.R.Sanders (Duke University Press, North Carolina, 1942) and Forbes - Op. cit.. 
®See apRoberts, pp. 61-2. 
''From "A "Friend of God"" - Review of J.R.Morell's translation of Tauler's Following of Christ. Published in Nineteenth Century, 
April 1887. CPW 11:180-187. 
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bearer of his new theology. According to Arnold, St. Paul showed a "prodigy of religious insight" by 
which he disengaged "the figure and influence of Jesus" from "mankind's familiar fancies of miracle, 
blood, bargain and appeasement". The implication is that Arnold is going to use Paul to further his own 
post-Enlightenment view of Christianity - an exercise which is obviously open to abuse in terms of 
maintaining the original message of Paul. Nevertheless when we come to the essay proper Arnold makes 
an early attempt to defuse such worries: 
... what St. Paul, a man so separated from us by time, race, training and circumstances, really thought, we 
cannot make sure of knowing exactly. All we can do is to get near it, reading him with ... critical tact ... 
reading him, also, without preconceived theories to which we want to make his thought fit themselves. 
Such a disclaimer is genuine enough and, when Arnold compares the language of Romans with the 
"market-place" language of Calvinism and the "licence of affirmation about God and his proceedings, in 
which the religious world indulge", it is clear that Arnold's criticism of the latter is valid. Such critical tact 
appears to fail, however, when Arnold comes to the character of Paul and the purpose of his writings. The 
crux comes when Arnold claims that Puritanism has adopted a false view of St. Paul "by an unintelligent 
adhesion to him and a blind adoption of his words, instead of being a true child to him". A distinction is set 
up in Paul's writing between what is "figure" and in the "sphere of feeling" and what is "thesis and 
intellectual reasoning". Puritanism, Arnold asserts, confounds the two sides of Paul, making what is 
primary in Paul into that which is secondary and vice versa. To be a "true child" to St. Paul is obviously to 
have a right construction as to what Arnold deems to be "primary" in Paul's epistles. That is to say that the 
primary sayings are more true than the secondary. Arnold makes it clear what is "true" for him in Paul: 
We mean, so far as truth is concerned, a greater or lesser agreement with facts which can be verified ... 
We have come here to the one central factor underlying all of Arnold's religious prose - the need for the 
claims of modem science to be allowed for in any question of religion and faith: 
The scientific sense in man never asserted its claims so strongly; the propensity of religion to neglect those 
claims, and the peril and loss to it from neglecting them, never were so manifest. 
At the time of writing ^ Paul and Protestantism Arnold felt a need, justifiable as theologians would now 
agree, to invoke the scientific sense in order to explode the idea of a God who is so obviously an 
anthropomorphic projection. Thus Arnold rails against Calvinism's talk of God "just as if he were a man in 
the next street", a "sort of magnified and non-natural man, who proceeds in the fashion laid down in the 
Calvinistic thesis". The invocation of the scientific sense in connection with a materialistic conception of 
the old pre-Christian myth of the three-storey universe is of course appropriate. When Arnold comes, 
however, to interpret St. Paul's character and thought it is a little like using a sledgehammer to pick a lock. 
Early on in the work Arnold tells us that Paul's is a "simple religion of the heart". This no doubt accounts 
for Paul's words of "figure" and "feeling". Now in discussing language about God, Arnold claims that the 
scientific sense does not deny "the rights of the poetic sense" to use "figured and imaginative language". 
However, the question as to whether such language is true when discussing facts which can be verified 
seems to receive an equivocal answer with the following: 
Neither is it that the scientific sense in us refuses to admit willingly and reverently the name of God, as a 
point in which the religious and the scientific sense may meet, as the least inadequate name for that universal 
order which the intellect feels after as a law and the heart feels after as a benefit. 
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This is a direct admission of that post-Enlightenment division between thought and feeling that we have 
been tracing in Arnold's work. The division between science (the realm of the intellect) and religion (the 
claims of the "heart") parallels the division that we saw being suggested in "Marcus Aurelius". There we 
saw Arnold oudining the need for "intellectual" and "moral" deliverance whilst still stretching out his arms 
for "something beyond" - that something that we called "emotional deliverance". I believe that Arnold 
comes up against the same problem in ^ Paul and Protestantism and that his inability to come to terms 
with it does great damage to his exegesis and his theology. 
It is quite clear in this work that Arnold is using St. Paul as a champion of Arnold's own, very nineteenth 
century, solutions to the epistemological problem. Paralleling the early distinction he sets up between 
"figure" and "feeling" and "thesis and intellectual reasoning", Arnold draws a distinction between two sides 
of Paul's thought - his ability to "Orientalise" as against his tendency to "Judaise". This enables Arnold to 
turn Paul into a sophisticated man of letters who, owing to the misfortunes of time and race, is prone to 
lapses in critical tact. Thus for an example of Paul's Orientalising Arnold takes Romans 9:32 - "God hath 
concluded them all in unbeUef that he might have mercy upon all" (Arnold's emphasis) to mean that Paul is 
describing the inevitable outcome of unbelief "by a vivid and striking figure" rather than that Paul was (as 
is clear from the argument of Romans) utilising a predestinarian theology for his own ends.^ Arnold states 
that when Paul Orientalises 
... the fault is not with him if he is misunderstood, but with the prosaic and unintelligent Western readers 
who have not enough tact for style to comprehend his mode of expression. 
He thus makes of Paul a master rhetorician. As an example of Paul's Judaising Arnold takes the tenth 
chapter of Romans. This, which Arnold says is written to make the point that "faith comes by hearing" is 
taken to be an example of Paul's tendency to "use the Jewish Scriptures in a Jew's arbitrary and uncritical 
fashion, as if they had a talismanic character". This, Amold claims, is an "interruption to the argument" 
and a "fault of style" as well as a "fault of reasoning". He claims that the argument "would stand much 
clearer" without its "scaffolding of Bible-quotation". 
Clearly Arnold's reconstruction of Pauline Christianity has become so far removed from the Apostle's 
original purpose as to have taken on the form of something quite unchristian. The problem is that Amold is 
firmly entrenched in a world-view that Paul would not recognise. He says of Paul that he 
uses within the sphere of religious emotion expressions which, in this sphere, have an eloquence and a 
propriety, but which are not to be taken out of it and made into formal scientific propositions. 
In this way Amold turns Paul into a divided personality like himself. The slightly dismissive attitude 
towards religious utterance shown in Arnold's use of the word "emotion" suggests that Paul, like Amold 
himself, is faced with a Cartesian dualism which makes his "Orientalising" not true in itself. "Within the 
Romans 11 Paul appears to be telling the Roman Jewish Christians that God has turned his back on the Jews so that they might 
be saved via the salvation of the Gentiles (11:11-12) for the greater "riches" of the world. His purpose is to unite the Gentile and 
Jewish Christians in Rome, a purpose that involves explaining to the Jews the reason for God's rejection of the idea of exclusively 
Jewish salvation. 
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sphere of religious emotion" means that such language is beautiful and useful but it is not actually true 
compared to "facts which can be verified". If we come back to Arnold's admission that the word "God" 
can be used "as the least inadequate name for that universal order which the intellect feels after as a law and 
the heart feels after as a benefit" then we may draw the conclusion that a law can be true or false whereas a 
benefit is merely a measure of greater or less emotional residue. Arnold accepts Paul's God as long as he is 
a God of the intellect. 
All of this is extremely ironic when we consider the real purpose of Paul in Romans. Theologically 
speaking the antithesis at the heart of the letter is that between law and grace, the argument being that God 
is a God of grace and that his mercy is not attainable by good works in the context of the Jewish Law. It is 
remarkable that Arnold seems to be looking for his God in quite the contrary direction. 
In a sense, of course, Paul is not "making theology" at all. As Gunther Bomkamm says in connection 
with the central question of the Epistle to the Romans - that is, "justification": 
For modem man the primary question overshadowing all others is whether there is a God at all. 
Justification seems stale, out of date, no longer "with it". It seems tied to a view of the world which we no 
longer share. True Paul never discusses the existence of God, but he would repudiate the suggestion that it is 
a question of world view. Paul's teaching about the law and justification by faith alone transcends the kind of 
questions raised by modem man and the way he thinks.^ 
For Paul the whole question of righteousness and justification only makes sense in the context of the 
cosmic plan of redemption. His "theology" presupposes that God has already acted in history in the Christ 
event and has thereby established a new covenant of faithfulness to which we must respond if we are to 
gain salvation. When Arnold effectively dismisses expressions within the sphere of "religious emotion" in 
Paul he is throwing out Paul's entire message since those expressions are usually assertions of God's grace 
in guaranteeing our salvation. 
Arnold seems to come somewhere near the truth in the second part of ^ Paul and Protestantism when he 
asserts that "the great central matter" of Paul's thought is "the righteousness of God, the non-fulfilment of it 
by man, the fulfilment of it by Christ". Furthermore he states that, in contradiction to the use of the Christ 
event by Protestant and Catholic dogmatisers, Paul's starting-point in connection with Jesus is "as the clue 
to righteousness, not as the clue to transcendental ontology". Paul was concerned with the directly 
practical, not the "sphere of abstract speculation". This, as we have said, is quite true. Paul is not writing 
theological treatises for the university lecture-hall. God's action in Christ does not need to be described in 
terms of subtle theory. Nevertheless when we come to the grounds for Paul's belief in Jesus as "the clue to 
righteousness" we begin to see the utter polarity in thought between Arnold and Paul. According to 
Arnold, the "sum and substance" of the "total impression" made by Jesus on Paul is of his being "without 
sin". This conviction, Arnold asserts, gradually dawned on Paul through contemplation. By studying 
Christ, Paul "got to know himself clearly" and thus he transformed his own "narrow conception of 
'The New Testament - A Guide to its Writings (Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1973) pp. 84-85. 
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righteousness". Thus Paul's conversion rests on "facts of experience and assert[s] nothing which science 
cannot verify". Taking Philippians 3:12 ("Not that I have already obtained this or am already perfect; but I 
press on to make it my own, because Christ Jesus has made me his own") Arnold says of Paul that he has 
been "apprehended" by Christ for 
the righteousness of God; a sense of conformity with the divine moral order, the will of God, a sense of 
harmony with this order, of acceptance with God. 
Now, as far as Arnold is concerned, God is "that stream of tendency by which all things seek to fulfil the 
law of their being". He says in ^ Paul and Protestantism tiiat this is as far as science will go in allowing 
for the idea of God. This is a completely humanistic statement since it deals only with man's aspirations. 
Although it purports to be cosmic ("all things"), the fact that to fulfil one's being amounts to "a sense of 
conformity with the divine moral order" actually leaves untouched the question of the divine aspirations for 
and of the rest of creation. The whole of that vital strand in Pauline thought in which he asserts that the 
entire creation "waits with eager longing for the revealing of the sons of God" (Romans 8:19) is put aside, 
presumably, as an example of "Judaising". Yet this example, small as it may seem, indicates how far away 
is Arnold from grasping the real convictions behind Paul's writing. The whole point is that Paul starts with 
belief in God as creator and redeemer and seeks to understand man's place within this scheme. Arnold, on 
the contrary, starts with himself and attempts to describe what, within the limits of empirical observation, 
can truly be known. Since, as we have observed, empiricist epistemology actually leaves everything in 
doubt, Arnold's theology is inevitably imprecise, obscure, contradictory and finally, as theology (talk about 
God rather than man) inadequate. 
For Paul the idea of righteousness or justification is simultaneous with the conviction that God has acted 
in Christ and that salvation is assured if one accepts this belief unreservedly. Hence 
... if you confess with your lips that Jesus is Lxard and believe in your heart that God raised him from the 
dead, you will be saved. For man believes with his heart and so is justified, and he confesses with his lips 
and so is saved.'® 
Thus his conversion can not be described in terms of a dawning "sense of conformity with the divine moral 
order". For Paul it was, we may assume with confidence, a sudden revelation of the unreserved grace of 
God. It was a release from the constant round of sinning and making recompense that was the practice of 
the Jewish Law. Essentially it meant a new understanding of God - a sense that God is universal and 
cosmic in both nature and purpose. 
For Paul justification is not something attainable by man in isolation, as it is in Arnold, from a 
transcendent God. Righteousness is actually the overwhelming attribute of God - it is never something that 
man himself can possess. As Wayne A. Meeks says, it is the "righteousness of God" that is the central 
argument of Romans.' ^ This can be summed up by Romans 3:26: "it was to prove at the present time that 
"Romans 10:9-10. 
"Wayne A. Meeks (ed.) - The Writings of St. Paul - A Norton Critical Edition (W.W.Norton & Co., New York, 1972) p. 74. 
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he himself is righteous and that he justifies him who has faith in Jesus". For Paul it is God's action towards 
man that is the central point of his whole experience. Righteousness is not something that man can actually 
attain to himself.^^ 
Arnold's attempt to resurrect Paul as a nineteenth century empiricist has the effect of turning around this 
essential relationship between God and man. According to his thesis that a "scientific criticism" of Paul's 
theology must lead to a division between that which is primary and that which is secondary, Arnold marks 
off Romans chapter four as an example of "secondary" importance, an example of Paul's Judaising. He 
says that the Apostle rests his doctrine of justification by faith upon the case of Abraham "by the thesis that 
Abraham in old age believed God's promise that his seed should yet be as the stars for multitude, and that 
this was counted to him for righteousness". Arnold concludes that the "sanction thus apparently given to 
the idea that faith is a mere belief, or opinion of the mind, has put thousands of Paul's readers on a false 
track". The words "mere belief here are astonishing, because this "mere belief is the very basis of Pauline 
theology. What Paul does in Romans is to contrast Abraham's profound faith that the promise of God will 
be fulfilled with that of Moses in the context of the law. Despite his and his wife's oldness and barrenness, 
Abraham believes that God will overcome such barriers in the promise that he will become "father of many 
nations" (Genesis 17:5, Romans 4:17). Paul uses Abraham as a prototype of Christian faith. In the context 
of the God who has raised Jesus from the dead the old reliance on the Law and on man's fulfilment of it has 
been removed by the God to whom all things are possible. The original promise to Abraham ("go forth, 
multiply and be fruitful") has become transmuted into the new promise of life in Christ. As Jurgen 
Moltmann says, however, this new promise is only available to those who, like Abraham, submit 
themselves to dependence on the power of God. Taking Paul's statement in Galatians 3:18 ("If the 
inheritance be of the law, it is no more of promise") Moltmann explains that "if the promise of God is 
bound to the law, then the promise is invalidated: it then depends no longer on the powers of the God who 
has promised, but on the power of the man who obeys". As Moltmann says, the whole contrast for Paul 
between righteousness and law is that between dependence on the power of God in contrast to man's 
self-sufficiency.'^ For Arnold, on the contrary, righteousness has once again become something like that 
of the Law. Righteousness is seen as a tendency to which we must aspire. 
Arnold's personal insistence that righteousness is all leads him to deny Paul's real message that this only 
made sense in the context of the death, resurrection and eschatological future of Christ. Thus Arnold 
attempts to trace a spiritualising tendency in Paul - an attempt, in his "later theology", to "find a moral side 
and significance for all the processes, however mystical, of the religious life". The important side of Paul's 
^^As Wayne Meeks says, Paul utilises the cognate relationship between the Greek words dikaios ("righteous") and dikaiounta 
("justifies") to explain his understanding of God's righteousness as both an inherent quality of God and God's characteristic action 
towards man: "The verb is drawn from the field of law, where it may mean "to pass sentence," but also "to acquit," "to declare 
righteous". For Paul it clearly means this and more:'to put into a right relationship" with God." (Ibid., p. 74, n. 6.) 
^^Jurgen Moltmann - Theology of Hope (SCM Press Ltd., London. 1967) p. 145. 
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belief in resurrection, for example, is that faith in Christ means a rising "with him to that harmonious 
conformity with the real and eternal order". The idea of a spiritualising tendency has been exploded by 
modem theology. As a result of doubts in the chronology and authorship of the episdes attributed, in the 
Bible, to Paul, the idea of theological development in Paul's "work" no longer has cur rency .Fur ther ,as 
Moma Hooker says. 
In the course of his mission and in his letters the apostle to the Gentiles developed his distinctive 
understanding of the Christian message in many different ways ... Thus his epistles offer a broad spectrum of 
theological thought which refuses to be fitted into a neat and tidy system.'^ 
This is indicative of the realisation that the different epistles were written to fulfil different needs. The 
letters to the Corinthian Christians, for example, are concerned with that particular group's tendency 
towards gnosticism. Paul's wish to counter this tendency leads to an entirely different message from that 
given in Romans. According to F.C.Baur, one of Arnold's protagonists in 1875's God and the Bible, the 
purpose of Romans was "to do away with the last remaining portions of the Jewish exclusiveness by taking 
up and representing it as the mere introduction to the Christian universalism which extended to all 
nations".^^ Thus, although there is some truth in Arnold's claim that there is, in Romans, a diminution in 
the importance of the idea of Jesus as the Messiah, this is not an example of Paul's increasing 
spiritualisation. In fact, Paul's purpose is to seek to remove the Jewish belief in their exclusivity. Whilst 
his own belief in Jesus as the Messiah remains as strong as ever, he is concentrating, in this message, on the 
universalisation of this Messiahship. 
Arnold's belief in Paul's purpose leads him to a theory that nothing in Paul's theology is so important to 
the Apostle as the character of Jesus. According to Arnold "the Jesus of the Bible follows the universal 
moral order and the will of God". This, he says, is the "scientific result" of "any criticism of the Gospel-
history" and, furthermore, "this is the result which pre-eminently occupies Paul". Paul's conversion from a 
Jew "struggling" in the "stream of duty" owed itself to a "wonder-working power of attachment" which he 
identified through Jesus and appropriated. To this "new and potent influence Paul gave the name of faith". 
Faith, claims Arnold, is "holding fast to an unseen power of goodness" and Paul, he maintains, added to 
this his own "through identification with Christ". 
At this point, remarkably enough, Arnold seems to come close to what Christianity claims about Christ. 
Faith certainly is holding fast to something unseen and the figure of Christ is vital to the working out of 
what that "unseen" is and what He/She/It purposes. Yet the truth is that Paul and Arnold are really worlds 
apart. The difference can be seen in the word "identification". Paul's sense of faith, says Arnold, is that of 
^^Reuss's inaccurate chronology of the epistles (aU attributed to Paul) was accepted by Arnold and used as the basis for his theory 
of a development in Paul's thought. Arnold jotted down the chronology in his pocket diary for September 1st, 1869, at the time he 
was writing the second part of ^ Paul and Protestantism. See CPW 6:42. 
"Hooker, p. 87. 
' ^ a u l the Apostle of Jesus Christ vol. 1 (1873) p. 322. Quoted by F.Watson - Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles: A Sociological 
Approach (Cambridge University Press, 1986) p. 11. 
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"identification with Christ through the emotion of attachment to him". Arnold really sees Jesus as the 
moral exemplum excellence who inspires waves of emotion when we consider his character. Thus 
the surpassing religious grandeur of Paul's conception of faith is that it seizes a real salutary emotional 
force of incalculable magnitude and reinforces moral effort with it. 
Jesus becomes, in fact, the most perfect human being, whilst identification means seeing this perfection in 
Christ's character and hankering after it ourselves. 
The "emotional force of incalculable magnitude" is interesting. Arnold is describing here, successfully I 
think, the results of contemplation of a religious object. He describes it earlier, too, in ^ Paul and 
Protestantism, where he seems to be talking about the overwhelming joy which comes from contemplating 
the fulness of the love of God. In Paul, he says, the rational and moral world is combined with "the 
necessary, mystical and divine world, of influence, sympathy and emotion". The combination "produces 
results transcending all our expectations and calculations". In seeking to explain this sense further, Arnold 
turns to analogy. He compares the power to that we feel in being in love. He concludes that this is why 
being in love is so popular with the human race - because it is "irresistable" and "delightful". Arnold 
touches here on the method used by Rudolf Otto in his "scientific" attempt to describe the category of the 
holy, or "numinous".^^ For Otto the "numinous" is the unique original "feeling-response" common to 
religions. It was originally devoid of ethical meaning and completely non-rational. The same is true, he 
asserts, of the category of beauty. Both states are "perfectly ^ generis and irreducible to any other" -
therefore they can not be strictly defined, only evoked or awakened in another person. Since we are 
necessarily limited in our description of such indefinables, the best method is that of using "illustrative 
substitute[s]" for "intellectual concept[s]", whilst knowing that they are merely illustrative.^^ If we look 
more closely at Arnold's sense of a "necessary, mystical and divine world, of influence, sympathy and 
emotion", we may say that it accords closely with Otto's description of the "element of fascination" in our 
apprehension of the numinous.^^ This is the "desire for communion with the numen" expressed by a 
"feeling of longing fascination". This element has ideas on the rational side to describe it - love, mercy, 
pity and comfort - but these do not exhaust "the profound wonderfulness and rapture" in the beatific 
experience of deity. "Grace" is the best word of all to describe this sense of an objective attraction, ta. 
Otto warns, it describes not only "gracious intent" but also "something more". At its highest point of stress. 
Otto concludes, the fascinating becomes the "overabounding", the "exuberant", as in the great experiences 
of grace, conversion and second birth 
in which the religious experience appears in its pure intrinsic nature and in heightened activity, so as to be 
more clearly grasped than in the less typical form of piety instilled by education. 
There is an unutterableness in such experience, Otto says, as has been vouched for by the autobiographical 
accounts of the converted from St. Paul onwards. 
"The Idea of the Holy (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 1950). 
i«Ibid..pp. 1-19. 
l»rbid.. pp. 31-40. 
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It is the "something more" described by Otto in his account of the experience of grace that Arnold so 
clearly lacks. The "something more" he misses is the objective correlative on which to centre his feelings 
of "influence, sympathy and emotion". Where Otto describes the "numinous" as a "feeling-response", 
Arnold can only claim a feeling as the residue left after the objective correlative (God) has been exploded 
by empiricism. It is remarkable that Arnold himself, in our identification of him with Marcus Aurelius, 
agreed that he was left, despite intellectual and moral deliverance, "agitated, stretching out his arms for 
something beyond ...". Whilst he claimed there that Marcus Aurelius was missing the emotional 
deliverance of the person of Jesus and his Sermon on the Mount, it is clear that there is no real difference 
between Arnold (who does know the person of Jesus) and Marcus Aurelius (who did not). Both, as we said 
before, live in an age in which people walk by sight not by faith. 
Thus we come back to Paul. Undoubtedly it is the Christ who is the centre of Paul's theology. But this is 
not because Jesus so perfectly follows "the universal moral order". Paul, in fact, has no interest in the 
character of Jesus^° - his whole concern with Jesus is as the (universal) Messiah. His interest in ethics is 
incidental and only as they bear relation to the redemptive scheme. Arnold's anthropocentric interest can 
lead him to conclude only that Jesus is an extraordinarily inspirational figure. His wish, however, for the 
"salutary emotional force of incalculable magnitude" to be "real", to actually mean something objective, 
causes him continual difficulties. What, he asks, is the difference between Jesus and Socrates? The answer 
is that a "penetrating enthusiasm of love, sympathy, pity, adoration, reinforcing the inspiration of reason 
and duty, does not belong to Socrates". Whilst such an approach might personally be held in the context of 
Arnold's post-Enlightenment world view, the question has to be put as to whether this is really the basis for 
the resurrection in Christianity that Arnold was seeking. What really is the difference between Jesus and 
Socrates? Or, to put the question in a twentieth century light, why should people follow Jesus rather than 
Ghandi or Mother Theresa or some equally inspiring figure? Arnold's decision to accept the wisdom of the 
age and negate the idea of a God who stands over against his creation strikes at the very heart of Christian 
belief. Faith in a "salutary emotional force" is hardly an adequate basis for acceptance of the Bible or any 
of the rest of the Christian tradition. 
Arnold's religious reconstruction in ^ Paul and Protestantism is largely deficient in its attempt to 
resurrect Christianity on a "true" reading of the Bible. That which is true is merely that which can be 
scientifically verified - a test of truth that is utterly at variance with the basis on which the Bible rests. 
Owing once again to an inability to systematise emotion as anything other than a residual feeling that 
accompanies correct intellectual decision-making, Arnold is left, as he was in his poetry and criticism, with 
a division between thought and feeling that is fatal to his theology. 
^ t hardly needs saying that the "evidence" of the character of Jesus - the four Gospels of Arnold's Authorised Bible - was not 
available to Paul. 
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3.2. Arnold's Religious Prose -1873-1888 
3.2.1.Liferafiirp nnd pnppi^ and God and the Bible 
The epistemological presuppositions that inform ^ Paul and Protestantism also lie behind the remainder 
of Arnold's religious prose. There is a difference in the handling of his ideas, however, evidence for which 
can be found in the relative interest which the later works, particularly Literature and Dogma and God and 
the Bible, have held for Arnold's critics. As R.H.Super has observed: 
There has been very little modem scholarship upon St. Paul and Protestantism, which has been ratlier lost 
sight of in the shadow of Literature and Dogma.^' 
I believe this myopia in Arnold's critics to be far from accidental. A good example is Ruth apRoberts 
who begins by dismissing ^ Paul and Protestantism as something inchoate, unsubtle and not a little 
self-righteous: 
Arnold rather high-handedly cancels certain aspects of Paul for the convenience of his argument. At times 
we can hear a tone of Thomas Arnold in the Chapel, taking advantage of a captive audience: if Paul's 
language "is to be turned into positive language, then it is the language into which we have translated it that 
translates it truly." I am right, in short.^^ 
apRoberts calls Arnold "overingenious" in his desire to rehabilitate Paul. Having concluded thus, however, 
apRoberts adds that the most interesting aspect of ^ Paul and Protestantism is that of Arnold "drawing 
close to a theory of the centrality of figure or metaphor in matters of religion". apRoberts implies, 
therefore, that the central ideas of the book are unimportant to criticism of Arnold since they show his 
relatively immature handling of theology. What is important for the critic is the embryonic appearance of 
Arnold's mature method discernible within the uneven theological argument of his formative work. This 
is, I believe, poor critical practice on apRoberts' part. In passing off Arnold's handling of Paul as an 
inadequate first attempt at theology she has failed to perceive the larger underlying reasons behind Arnold's 
shortcomings in ^ Paul and Protestantism. The truth is that the problems are not simply overcome in his 
later religious prose. The presuppositions that inform his theology in ^ Paul and Protestantism are quite 
as present in his later work. What is different is the way Arnold has tried, in a subtle and sophisticated 
way, to find an answer to the divisions in his epistemology. Those critics, apRoberts included, who 
concentrate exclusively on Literature and Dogma do so, I believe, primarily because they share Arnold's 
post-Enlightenment world view and they accept the solutions offered therein.^^ To such critics St. Paul and 
Protestantism has the (unintended, of course, on Arnold's part) disadvantage of fundamentally calling in to 
question any attempt at marriage between such opposed world views as those of Arnold and the early 
Christians. Literature and Dogma, on the other hand, hides these oppositions rather more successfully. 
2'CPW 6:421. 
^^apRoberts, p. 183. 
^ A reading of any of the more devoted Amoldians will reveal the extraordinarily crusading nature of their criticism. See, for 
example, any of the work of A.O.J.Cockshul, Basil Willey, James C. Livingston and apRoberts. 
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Ruth apRoberts is correct in discerning that ^ Paul and Protestantism sees Arnold approaching to a 
"theory of the centrality of figure or metaphor" in religious matters. His tentative definition of God as a 
"stream of tendency" - made with a view to combatting the gross materialism of the God of the Protestant 
sects - is an early foreshadowing of the central purpose and method of Literature and Dogma. Arnold 
himself summarised his major work thus: 
to people disposed to throw the Bible aside Literature and Dogma sought to restore the use of it by two 
considerations: one, that the Bible requires for its basis nothing but what they can verify; the other that the 
language of the Bible is not scientific, but literary. 
Arnold's primary consideration here is, as ever, a social one. He recognises that "the masses" are losing the 
Bible, the results of which are much to be feared owing to the "all-importance" the Bible carries in matters 
of conduct. His concern, therefore, is to show that what he perceives to be the main reason for this mass 
rejection - the "discredit befalling miracles and the supernatural" - is, in fact, no reason for foregoing the 
Bible. The language of the Bible is, he avers, not scientific. It should not, therefore, be rejected as "bad 
science". It is literary and fluid and should be treated as such. Following true criticism by the agents of 
culture the Bible can once again be used by the masses. 
The impulses behind these efforts came from events that followed after the publication of ^ Paul and 
Protestantism. Whilst, as we shall see, the former work's concerns are continued in Literature and Dogma, 
these events led to the attempted handling of much larger questions than we saw being approached in St. 
Paul and Protestantism. First, Arnold the educator was made aware of the prominence of the question of 
religious education in the parliamentary debate over W.E.Forster's 1870 education bill. The question as to 
how much and what sort of religious education should be included in the syllabi of the new state Board 
schools led to a debate over the place of the Bible in school curricula. One of the figures in the debate was 
Arnold's friend T.H.Huxley. Huxley was a champion of the natural sciences and a confirmed agnostic.^'^ 
His part in the debate was to attempt to further the cause of agnosticism by questioning the idea of any 
sectarian religious instruction. In addition to Roman Catholic and Protestant bodies 
there was a third party growing up and daily increasing in significance, which has nothing to do with either, 
but which has its own religion and morality that rests in no way whatever on the foundation of the other two. 
The particular foundation that this third party eschewed was the Bible. It was reported in TTie Times of 
Huxley that 
if these islands had no religion at all, it would not enter into his mind to introduce the religious idea by the 
agency of the Bible.^ ® 
This challenge must have been felt as a rebuff to Arnold's programme, begun in ^ Paul and Protestantism, 
of re-establishing Christianity on the basis of a correctly interpreted Bible. Inheriting as he did his father's 
strong liberal Anglican adherence to the Bible as indispensable to both private and public education, 
Arnold would have felt the life and aims of his father and the whole liberal Anglican tradition to be at 
^For a good portrait of Huxley, see A.O.J. Cockshut - The Unbelievers; English Agnostic Thought 1840-1890 (Collins, London, 
1964). 
^ ^ e Times (London), February 23rd, 187L Quoted by William Blackburn - "The Background of Arnold's Literature and Dogma", Modem 
P h i l ^ y November, 1945: p. 133. 
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stake. Arnold's position was precarious, however. Huxley's opposition to the Bible owed its existence to a 
perception that the onward march of science had rendered the Bbile anachronistic - that morality was taught 
falsely if it was based on the sanction of miracles and a supernatural God. The problem for Arnold was that 
^ Paul and Protestantism had been dedicated (minus the rejection of the Bible) to this very thesis. The 
dilemma can be illustrated by a letter from Huxley to Arnold after the publication of ^ Paul and 
Protestantism. Huxley wrote that he had found "many good things": "One of the best is what you say ... 
about science conquering the materialism of popular religion."^^ Arnold's reaction to such praise must 
have been guarded - particularly so when considering Huxley's position in the Forster education bill 
debate. It no doubt led him to conceive of Literature and Dogma as essentially a defence of the Bible, a 
defence to be based on the true literary value of its contents. 
Arnold's resolve to be the "honest broker" between religion and science was further strenghthened by an 
ominous event at the heartland of culture itself - Oxford. The inauguration of Keble College in June 1870 
gave the chancellor of the university, Lord Salisbury, the occasion to deliver a speech which determined, 
for Arnold, the central issue of Literature and Dogma. A college dedicated to the name of Keble gave 
Salisbury the chance to futher the interests of the Anglo-Catholic party at Oxford. Pledging die college to a 
religion "thoroughly Catholic", Salisbury proclaimed the hope that 
there shall be no more within these walls the idea of severing religion and dogma than there is an idea of 
severing the daylight from the sun.^ 
Arnold's idea of "catholic" was precisely the opposite to Salisbury's; that much he had made clear in St. 
Paul and Protestantism. Dogma of any sort, be it "Catholic", Protestant or Comtist Positivist, was divisive 
and furthermore, in the case of the Church, based on the false premises of "miracle, blood, bargain and 
appeasement". Arnold makes his reactions clear in a letter to his mother four days after the ceremony. 
Salisbury, he says, is a "dangerous man" who, alongside his need for dogma, proclaims that the future 
course of Oxford studies should be along scientific rather than literary lines: 
Religion he knows, and physical science he knows, but the immense work between the two, which is for 
literature to accomplish, he knows nothing of, and all his speeches at Oxford pointed this way. On the one 
hand, he was full of the great future for physical science, and begging the University to make up her mind to 
it, and to resign much of her literary studies; on the other hand, he was full, almost defiantly full, of counsels 
and resolves for retaining and upholding the old ecclesiastical and dogmatic form of religion. From a 
juxtaposition of this kind nothing but shocks and collisions can come.^ 
Arnold is determined to be a "healing and reconciling influence" - which leads him to a solution typical of 
the former Professor of Poetry resolved to exert an influence on both Oxford studies and the culture of the 
nation. Arnold determines to save the future of religion (and hence the right conduct of England) by 
undermining the dogmatic basis of Christianity and re-constituting it on the basis of its broadly literary 
appeal. 
^Life and Letters ^ Thomas Henry Huxley - ed. Leonard Huxley, 2 vols. (London, 1900) vol. 1, p. 329. 
"Guardian. June 29th, 1870. Quoted by Blackburn, p. 131. 
^'June 25th, 1870. Letters 2: 35. 
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Arnold took his task of educating the "masses" on this basis seriously. In the Preface to the First Edition 
(1873) he makes it clear at the beginning that he is concerned for the future of the working classes. He 
quotes from a pamphlet sent to him by William Steward, a Bedford worker, who claims that "the 
speculations of the day" are working on the mind of the people in such a way as to lead them to reject the 
infallibility of the Bible as a priestly imposition. This is relayed by Arnold for the benefit of both the 
imposers and those imposed upon. To both parties he wishes to point out that the truth of Christianity does 
not rest on a belief in the necessity of miraculous divine intervention or a system of metaphysical 
speculation based on it. Arnold insists on the "natural truth" of Christianity. This is not to say of course 
that Arnold accepts "natural religion" on the Paley "watch-maker principle". Such distinctions as those 
between "natural" and "revealed" religion are, he asserts, false, arising from the metaphysicians' unhappy 
speculations. As he says in Literature and Dogma: "that in us which is really natural, is, in truth, revealed." 
Arnold is attempting to find a true ground for unity by asserting that the "religious experience" is clearly 
verifiable and universally available. The structure of what he calls aberglaube (literally, "extra-belief), 
that suurounds this natural truth, is no longer necessary or desirable in the new scientific age. 
Arnold is trying to give voice here to the Zeitgeist's new basis for Christianity. He perceives that certain 
post-Enlightenment reconstructions have proved inadequate. Whether or not he had read Hume on 
miracles his reading of Kant (if no one else) would have led him to reject such half-way house 
reconstructions as deism. If the advent of Isaac Newton had dealt the death-knell to miracle as a 
providential suspension of the laws of nature, the deists still felt able to proclaim the existence of the 
infinitely perfect Creator who could be adduced from the perfection of the flawless machine that was his 
creation. In his poem "In Harmony with Nature: To a Preacher" (first published 1849) Arnold seems to be 
echoing Hume's criticism of deism that the existence of pain in nature is antithetical to the idea of a perfect 
creation: 
Know, man hath all which Nature hath, but more. 
And in that more lie all his hopes of good. 
Nature is cruel, man is sick of blood; 
Nature is stubborn, man would fain adore ... (5-8) 
Arnold recognises the fact that the Time-Spirit has created immense problems for a dogmatic theology 
based on such theories as those held by the deists. His solution is thus to reject the entire programme of 
"theology as speculative science" and reconstruct it, instead, on the grounds of "theology as experience". 
This is where Arnold comes back to the importance of language. When he says that "the language of the 
Bible is not scientific, but literary", Arnold is being both negative and positive. Firstly he is trying to refute 
the argument that the mythological basis of the Bible should be taken as scientific fact. This is his 
demolition of "theology as speculative science". On the other hand he is saying that the language of the 
Bible can and must be taken as conveying, with more force than in other literature, the truth about life. 
This is where Ruth apRoberts, with her thesis that Arnold is approaching to a "theory of the centrality of 
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figure or metaphor", is approximating towards the truth. Whether it is truly a theory or whether it is only a 
fortunate tendency is, however, a question that apRoberts does not raise but one that is vital to an 
understanding and evaluation of Arnold's religious reconstruction. Does his "theory" of language in the 
Bible really convey the truth about life for Arnold? And is it adequate as the new basis for Christianity and 
the education of the race? These are the questions that have to be raised concerning Literature and Dogma. 
From the beginning of Literature and Dogma it would appear that the second question at least must be 
answered in the negative. The fact is that Arnold's approach to language in the Bible is, as it was in ^ 
Paul and Protestantism, extremely questionable. Arnold's primary contention is that the Bible, as literature, 
should be immune from metaphysical or fundamentalist dogmatism. We may call this his "broadening 
programme". Unfortunately, however, this attack on dogmatism is not maintained owing to a concurrent 
programme which says that literature can only express truth if that truth is verifiable. Since, according to 
Arnold, the only rehgious truth is conduct then it is easy to see that Arnold will end up by instituting his 
own dogmatism. This "reductive programme" is the dominant one in his religious prose and it must raise 
substantial doubts as to whether any religious reconstruction so circumscribed could or should be 
recommended as a new basis for Christianity. 
Thus Arnold begins in Literature and Dogma where he ended in SL Paul and Protestantism - with the 
point that language about God is approximate, fluid and "literary", rather than scientific and precise. The 
word "God" is "a term thrown out... at a not fully grasped object of the speaker's consciousness, a literary 
term, in short". This fundamental premiss is always the starting-point for Arnold's talk about God-
language, and it contains within it the very important post-Enlightenment realisation that language about 
God is always also language about man. The simple truth as Arnold iterates and reiterates, is that any talk 
of God has to be undertaken within the parameters of man's experience of God. This enables Arnold to 
suggest two different but related conceptions. First he denigrates "metaphysics" or any esoteric or sectarian 
"knowledge" that is used to justify belief in God. Following on from this he also implies that, given the 
relativity of any and all language, talk about God or religion is not exclusive to Christianity or the Bible. 
To illustrate the second point he gives various examples of religious utterance in literature. Whilst he 
begins with examples from the Gospels, he then proceeds to give a more daring example from Sophocles, 
commenting that it "is from Sophocles, but it is as much religion as any of the things which we have quoted 
as religion". Ruth apRoberts uses these examples to lend weight to her behef that Arnold is coming to a 
complex and subtle understanding of what religious expression means. Her basic premiss is that religious 
language is metaphorical as opposed to literal, that "metaphor is of the essence in the religious mode": 
since, clearly, we are dealing in religious language with what she calls "heuristic" fictions, rather than 
concepts. In this particular language-game 
the pretense or approximation of metaphor carries more meaning than the literal ... metaphor ... differs in 
intensity from the scientific mode to such an enormous extent that it is not a difference in degree but in kind. 
In Literature and Dogma, apRoberts claims, Arnold broaches "the phenomenology of metaphor" and thus 
"demonstrates what he has claimed to be the relevance of literary criticism in matters of religion".^^ 
The modem understanding of metaphor as the essential mode of communication in religious matters is a 
vitally important issue in present-day theology and we shall examine it in more detail later. For the present 
it is necessary to evaluate apRoberts' contention that Arnold "anticipates" the modem literary critical 
approach to theology, that he "recognizes the great thundering arrogance of dogma and the terrible 
constriction of the literal".^® apRoberts' thesis is based in the first place on those phrases that Arnold uses 
in demonstrating the meaning of the word "religion". Now I would agree with apRoberts that Arnold, in 
utilising this technique, is appealing properly to experience and therefore to language as the expression of 
that experience; further, he implies that religion (being, as apRoberts would say, a heuristic fiction itself) is 
capable of stretching its meaning rather than being tied to a narrow or dogmatic definition. Thus, in his 
experimental way, he admits at first that it is possible to have a very wide definition of "religion": 
... some people, indeed, are for calling all high thought and feeling by the name of religion; according to 
that saying of Goethe: "He who has art and science, has also religion". 
The citing of Goethe, one of Arnold's favourite authors, is an indication that Arnold himself would wish to 
admit such a definition, especially when he adds, rather condescendingly I feel, that we must not use it at 
present as "men have not yet got to that stage". At present, he says, we should "limit ourselves in the use of 
the word religion as mankind do". Thus far apRoberts' contention that Arnold is in possession of an 
understanding of religious language would seem to be supported by the text. However as I have suggested 
I do not believe that this is the dominant reading of Literature and Dogma. The fact is that, despite 
Arnold's aforementioned implicit support of Goethe, the real meaning of religion for Arnold is that 
severely circumscribed one we have observed before - that definition that we have described as his 
"reductive programme". Arnold's message here, as in "Marcus Aurelius", is that "the true meaning of 
religion is thus, not simply morality, but morality touched ^ emotion". Given that Arnold says this before 
he talks about Goethe, such a statement as this that follows the Goethe quotation becomes quite ambiguous: 
When mankind speak of religion, they have before their mind an activity engaged, not with the whole of 
life, but with that three-fourths of life which is conduct. 
Now it is Arnold himself who has made this computation that conduct is "three-fourths of human life" and, 
indeed, he suggests further that the only doubt about this "is whether we ought not to make the range of 
conduct wider still, and to say it is four-fifths of human life, or five-sixths". It is, tiierefore, Arnold, not 
"mankind", who speaks in the above statement about "religion". Whilst it seems, then, that he has been 
leaving himself a quarter of life (the "high thought and feeling" of "art and science") to be integrated into 
the religious experience when mankind is ready for that stage, I would question the possibility of any such 
future inclusion in Arnold's religious scheme. 
^'apRoberts, i^ . 194 & 217. apRoberts takes "metaphor to overlap with symbol, and to subsume simile and metaphor proper, and 
synecdoche and metonymy". (Note, p. 216.) 
'"Ibid., p. 217. 
This all becomes clearer when we look at the examples that Arnold chooses to illustrate the idea of 
religion. What he does is to set up pairs of comparative quotations. The first part of the pair, he claims, 
illustrates morality whilst the second is an example of religion. One such pair is the following: 
"We all want to live honestly, but can not," says the Greek maxim-maker. That is morality. "O wretched 
man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death!" says St. Paul. That is religion. 
Or, to give another example: 
"Love not sleep, lest thou come to poverty," is morality. But: "My meat is to do the will of him that sent 
me, and to finish his work," is religion. 
This is all a reply to the objection Arnold anticipates that, according to his scheme, there is "no difference 
between what is ethical, or morality, and religion". Despite his attempt to refute this, however, the 
objection can still, I believe, be sustained. From a Bibhcal critical point of view, there is indeed a 
difference. In the first example above, St. Paul's cry is a rhetorical outburst made in the context of the 
complete certainty that the new covenant of grace has brought an end to the round of sin and repentance 
experienced under the Law. This faith of St. Paul is indeed religion. In the second quotation, from the 
Fourth Gospel, Jesus (or the author of the Gospel) is replying to the prosaic request of the disciples that he 
should eat. As always with Jesus, he turns the hteral into the symbolic. His nourishment is to work for the 
reaUsation of the Kingdom of God: 
Do you not say, "there are yet four months, then comes the harvest"? I tell you, hft up your eyes, and see 
how the fields are already white for harvest. (John 4:35.) 
The difference between this and the completely literalistic saying from the book of Proverbs which 
accompanies it is clearly that between a sophisticated religious belief and a purely moral injunction. Thus 
Ruth apRoberts concludes: 
Any of us in the least degree used to literary analyis will recognize in the morality column the more-or-less 
literal mode and in the religion column the metaphorical... He invites us to test on our psyches the effects of 
group A as compared to the effects of group B. And I think we are obliged to recognize the emotive power of 
B, in the latinate sense of emoveo, having the pwwer to dislodge, to move, to change men; 
Given apRoberts' belief in the power of metaphor to express religious truth, this paragraph can be taken to 
mean that Arnold's examples of reUgious language carry more meaning than the literal, that they differ "in 
intensity from the scientific mode to such an enormous extent that it is not a difference in degree but in 
kind". 
Now this is rather given the lie to by Arnold himself. Arnold's claim is that metaphysical propositions 
are different in kind from moral or religious ones. "They differ in kind from what is religious, while what 
is ethical agrees in kind with it" [the religious]. "But is there therefore", Arnold asks, "no difference 
between what is ethical, or morality, and religion? There is a difference, a difference of degree." So 
Arnold himself admits that religious language is the same as ethical. But what of this difference of degree? 
It seems to me that to call the difference in the pairs given above one of degree is for Arnold to 
misunderstand entirely what is being said by his "religious" spokesmen. To put it clearly, the statements or 
proclamations from the New Testament are not simply "morality touched by emotion". They are examples 
"Ibid., p. 193. 
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of language that is without meaning if the context in which they are uttered is withdrawn. They presuppose 
certain religious propositions that can not be reduced to mere moral schema. When apRoberts says that the 
metaphorical (religious) mode differs in kind from the scientific mode, she is analysing correctly the 
phenomenon of religious language. It is not, however true of Arnold's "religion". The quotation from 
Sophocles that Arnold claims is "as much religious as any of the things we have quoted as religious" is 
literal rather than metaphorical, morality rather than religion. Once again here, we come up against the fact 
that the only certain knowledge for Arnold is knowledge of morality or conduct. The other quarter, fifth or 
sixth of human life, the emotional residue, is not "true" in itself. The result is the equation of St. Paul, 
Christ and Sophocles which is far from being, as apRoberts suggests, a broadening of the religious idea in 
the name of literary criticism. It is, rather, a collapse of religious language and religious faith into "mere 
morality". 
This is all a primary example of the major fault we have underlined with respect to Literature and Dogma 
and God and ^ Bible. Even leaving aside the question, for now, as to whether this religious programme 
really conveys the truth about life for Arnold, it must certainly be clear that attempts by such critics as 
apRoberts to rehabilitate Arnold's scheme are, as she said of Arnold's handling of St. Paul, 
"overingenious". 
3.2.2. Arnold and God 
As an illustration of the conflict brought about in his religious reconstruction by the concurrent 
programme that we have identified we shall examine more closely a major problematic area - Arnold's 
speculation about God. Arnold has considerable difficulty with the concept of God owing to his desire to 
tread a delicate path between the demands of the scientists and the Biblical and dogmatic fundamentalists. 
In order to thwart the latter group he insists that language about God is poedc, not scientific. In order to 
please the friends of science he searches constantly for a scientifically verifiable description of God. 
Meanwhile Arnold's own religious needs and the needs of Christianity continually upset the whole scheme. 
In the first chapter of Literature and Dogma Arnold attempts to find a description for God that is not mere 
anthropomorphic projectionism but which is, nevertheless, scientifically acceptable. In order to frustrate 
false contemporary nodons about God he determines to search for origins, to find the one fundamental 
ground for belief in God. Here we immediately encounter the first problem, however. Arnold describes 
God as a "not ourselves" which "is in us and in the world around us". It has "almost everywhere", Arnold 
believes, "struck the minds of men as they awoke to consciousness, and has inspired them with awe". 
Arnold, happily enough at this point, displays an understanding of how this sense of otherness could only 
be expressed in connection with objects outside man: "everyone knows how the mighty natural objects 
which most took their regard became the objects to which this awe addressed i tse l f . Furthermore he 
shows a fine sense of the whole gamut of responses that this acknowledgement of a God or gods has called 
forth: 
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Everyone knows of what differences of operation men's dealing with this power has in different places and 
times shown itself capable; how here they have been moved by the not ourselves to a cruel terror, here to a 
tmud religiosity, there again to a play of imagination; almost always, however, connecting with it, by some 
string or other, conduct. 
This sentence could be taken as an objective examination, in the manner of Rudolf Otto, of man's 
experience of the holy; in which case the last part, die connection of the sense of the divine with man's 
conduct, would be no more dian a description of man's sense of responsibility (as in the neutral sense of 
how man conducts himself) in the face of an overseer. This is not, however, Arnold's point. Arnold's 
sense of conduct is not descriptive, it is prescriptive. That is to say that the idea of the holy can not 
truthfully be expressed in terms of man's many and varied responses of awe, imagination or terror in the 
face of the not ourselves. The idea of God is, for Arnold, only true in connection with man's sense of 
righteousness and conduct. Thus while such a statement as the following may be true on the surface - "we 
are not writing a history of religion; we are only tracing its effect on the language of the men from whom 
we get the Bible" - it also displays a wilful neglect of those other impulses to religion which Arnold has 
touched upon. Arnold's disclaimer here - that those other impulses are not to be examined further in the 
context of this present book - actually amounts to a claim that such impulses were of relative unimportance 
to the "men from whom we get the Bible". Further, having made this assumption, he then uses his notion 
of Israel's concept of God to deny the possibility of any other sort of knowledge about God. Arnold's 
argument here is, in fact, a petitio principii - it sets out to prove a conclusion that has already been taken for 
granted. Armed with the belief that religion is purely a system that makes for good conduct, Arnold sets 
out to prove that this was also the concern of Israel. What follows is some questionable criticism as to the 
origins of Old Testament faith. 
Arnold's basic contention is that Israel had a pecuhar understanding, not common to other nations, of 
right conduct. She came to understand her God as "a power which makes for righteousness". In order to 
show that Israel's belief was the great religious intuition common to all times and thus the correct intuition 
for the present, Arnold attempts to deny the idea of Israel having any other sort of belief about God: 
There are, indeed, many aspects of the not ourselves; but Israel regarded one aspect of it only, that by which 
it makes for righteousness. 
Israel was not, Arnold correctly asserts, a nation of metaphysicians who came to God by "abstruse 
reasoning": 
Israel, at this stage when The Eternal was revealed to him, inferred nothing, reasoned out nothing; he felt 
and experienced. 
Now there is no doubt that this is the case, if Arnold is talking only about a Hebrew version of St. Thomas 
Aquinas. However, he is actually making the much broader assumption that "feeling and experience" can 
have no cognitive content other than a post-Enlightenment acceptance of the universality of a tendency to 
right conduct. The evidence in the Old Testament suggests that things are otherwise. In his understanding 
of Israel's God Arnold is attempting to show how overwhelmingly true is the idea of the universal moral 
order as the basis of religion. To assert this, however, he has to turn the evidence his way. Thus he makes 
the idea of God as the giver of righteousness prior to the idea of God as creator: "That is the notion at the 
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bottom of the Hebrew's praise of a creator." Israel, therefore, miraculously foreshadows Arnold's own idea 
of God: 
Wisdom and understanding mean, for Israel, the love of order, of righteousness. Righteousness, order, 
conduct, is for Israel at once the source of all man's happiness and at the same time the very essence of The 
Eternal. The great work of The Eternal is the foundation of this order in man, the implanting in mankind of 
his own love of righteousness, his own spirit, his own wisdom and understanding; and it is only as a farther 
and rational working of this energy that Israel conceives the establishment of order in the world, or creation. 
That this is Israel speaking, rather than Arnold, is extremely questionable, especially when Arnold supports 
his thesis with quotations from the Books of Job and Proverbs. This is questionable exegesis. Both books 
are examples of what scholarship has termed "wisdom literature", composed in a sophisticated and literary 
way at a time far distant from texts, such as Genesis, that deal with God as creator. As has been shown in 
the work of J. Pritchard, creation myths are common to all, including Semitic, religions. The Genesis 
creation myth, whilst composed in its Biblical form around the ninth century B.C., is a conglomerate of a 
number of oral traditions, all testifying to the fact that the question of origins and purpose is the primary 
impulse to religion, rather than a recognition of Arnold's Old Testament trinity of "spirit ... wisdom and 
understanding".^^ 
It is to be admitted that "righteousness" comes to be the vital concern in Hebrew religion. This concept of 
righteousness, however, is not arrived at by observing scientifically the laws of human nature. One does 
not have to read far into the history of Israel in the Pentateuch to observe that "righteousness" is far from 
universally available. The God of this time is a national God, the God of "armies" (Psalm 24) who is 
jealous for Israel. Only in the prophetic literature, first and most notably in Amos, does God speak out 
against IsraeP^ and his concerns become something more than narrowly nationalistic. 
The problem is not simply that Arnold's exegesis is wrong; it is that he has ignored much of the evidence 
through following a falsely reductionist theory about the origins of belief in God. Furthermore, this 
reductionism actually clashes very seriously with his attempt to resurrect the Bible on the grounds of 
literature. This can be illustrated by quotations which summarise Arnold's contrary programmes: 
There is truth of science and truth of rehgion: truth of science does not become truth of religion until it is 
made to harmonise with it. 
Religion must be built on ideas about which there is no puzzle.^ '* 
The second principle is antagonistic to the first, as we can see in Arnold's thoughts on God in Literature 
and Dogma. First, Arnold recognises that God can only be spoken of in poetic, rather than scientifically 
precise, terms. The language of "figure and feeling" he says, rather than that of science and literal fact, is 
best employed with respect to God. The "language of science", he asserts, "will be below what we feel to 
^ ^ e e particularly The Ancient Near East (Princeton University Press, 1958). 
'^In Amos chapters 1 - 2 Amos unexpectedly prophesies against Israel (2:6) having fonnerly condemned other nations as might 
have been expected. This is one of the remarkable turning points in Old Testament literature - the point where the prophets start to 
proclaim the universality of God's judgment. 
'*rhe fust quotation is from Arnold's 1863 essay 'T)r Stanley's Lectures on the Jewish Church" in Essays in Criticism. The second is from the 1877 
opening essay to Last Essays on Church and Religion, "Bishop Butler and the Zeit-Geist". 
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be the truth". Having said this, however, Arnold then goes on to search for the scientific core of truth: 
"what was the scientific basis of fact for this consciousness?" His answer is his favourite "stream of 
tendency ^ which ^ things seek to fulfil the law of their being". Whilst he admits that this is "less 
proper" than Psalm 117's "Clouds and darkness are round about him, righteousness and judgment are the 
habitation of his seat", he claims that his own definition at least has the benefit of being "scientific". 
Interestingly enough there was a contemporary objection to this. A writer in the Spectator of July, 1871 
asked the following: 
^ y [is the "scientific" definition Mr. Arnold has proposed] less adequate, unless those poetic words, 
which go beyond science in Mr. Arnold's opinion, go l^yond it in the direction of filling up with more truth 
than error the suggestions and implications of science! Yet, if this be so, the suggestions and implications 
which lead the mind to use personal analogies are truer than tiiose which lead it away from those analogies.^^ 
This is precisely to the point. If language of figure and feeling is the correct mode in which to describe 
man's apprehension of God, then why search for a "true" scientific definition at all? Arnold himself felt it 
necessary to reply to his antagonist in a footnote in the first edition of Literature and Dogma: 
It has been urged that if the personifying mode of expression is more proper, it must, also, be more 
scientifically exact. But surely it will upon reflexion appear that this is by no means so. Wordsworth calls 
the earth "the mighty mother of mankind" and the geographers call her "an oblate spheroid;" Wordsworth's 
expression is more proper and adequate to convey what men feel about the earth, but it is not therefore the 
more scientifically exact. 
Disatisfied with Arnold's explanation the same reviewer replied in the February, 1873 number of the 
Spectator that Arnold's defence was "a pure evasion of the p o i n t " T h i s is a judgment with which I 
concur. Arnold's reply rests on the assumption that the argument is simply about categorisation. As in the 
1863 quotation above, Arnold is defending his belief that there is truth of science and truth of religion. The 
geographers' statement is true for science and therefore it is quite adequate. The reviewer, however, might 
well have retorted that "truth of science does not become truth of religion until it is made to harmonise with 
it". The point is that Arnold is implicitly making a statement of value - about which description of the 
world is more true for him. The metaphorical mode of description (Wordsworth's or the Psalmist's) is 
weaker in its "truth value" than the scientific definition. Arnold continually fails in his work to rest content 
finally with what he would call the "poetic" description of the world. The fact is that the Psalmist's paean 
to God needs no scientific alternative - to appropriate Ruth apRoberts' words, by this metaphor "something 
is said - or made - that could not be said or made otherwise".^^ The use of the verb "to make" here is 
important. It suggests that the words are themselves constitutive of the reality to which they refer. They 
have "truth value" in themselves. It is this that Arnold can not always grasp. 
The most sustained recent defence of Arnold's religious position - James C. Livingston's Matthew 
Arnold and Christianity - admits of some fault in Arnold's handling of the question of God. In talking 
' ' July 8th, 1871 (XLIV, 827). QuoUlion from CPW 6, note on p. 473. This was after the first appearance of the articles in the Comhill that later made 
up the first chapter of Literature and Dogma. 
^fipebfuary 22nd, 1873. Quoted in C P W , ibid.. 
37apRoberts, p. 218. 
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about Arnold's use of "concrete" language to describe God and our relations with God, Livingston 
acknowledges that 
he consistently reveals a crucial theological blind side in his persistent failure to appreciate the central role 
that the concrete language of personal relations plays in the biblical vision of man's encounter with God. 
In relation to the question of language about God, Livingston makes a similar admission two chapters later. 
Arnold was unwise, he says, 
in failing to recognise the significance of and to bring out more fully the crucial fact that Christians could 
rightfully ascribe to God attributes which it only made sense to speak of as belonging to personal agents. 
Later still, when touching on the use of myth in the Christian scheme, Livingston, stating that Arnold 
rejected the Old Testament myths and the myth of Christ's struggle with the devil as "no longer 
serviceable", admits that "Arnold's critical tact fails him".^ ® Despite all these provisos, however, 
Livingston still claims success for Arnold's programme: 
It is quite wrong to assert that Arnold the hermeneut undercuts Arnold the guardian of poetic truth. As 
Nathan Scott observes, "On the contrary, so paramount is the role that [Arnold] accords the poetic 
imagination in the religious enterprise that it may, indeed, be said to be for him the very means of 
transcendence, the vital agent whereby men first "hail" the numinous, the mysterium tremendum, the not 
ourselves".^^ 
This conclusion of Scott's (and Livingston in agreement with him) is extremely questionable. Livingston is 
saying that Arnold's failures are incidental to the overall success of his scheme, that the "crucial", unwise 
and tacdess falling short in his use of religious language has no lasting detrimental effect on his attempt to 
preserve Christianity. Two things are wrong with this assessment. First it suggests that Arnold has an idea 
of the Christian God which he does not, in fact, hold. Secondly and by extension Livingston believes (I am 
convinced wrongly) that Arnold makes a successful attempt to incarnate this God by his use of the "poetic 
imagination". 
Nathan Scott's equation of Arnold's "not ourselves" with Rudolf Otto's "mysterium tremendum" seems 
to me, again, to be questionable. As I have sought to show, the evidence points to the fact that Arnold's 
God is an anthropomorphic projection, a tendency towards right conduct that he believes is deducible from 
human affairs and is applicable only to human affairs. Indeed Arnold conclusively admits this himself in 
God and the Bible, where he says that the "not ourselves that makes for righteousness" is not God: "For this 
is really a law of nature, collected from experience, just as much as the law of gravitation is." This throws 
further into question Arnold's personal commitment to the "quarter", "fifth" or "sixth" of religion that is not 
to do with conduct. Perhaps it is some such unease that makes Livingston apologise for Arnold in the 
following way: 
If Arnold were writing a history of religions and not an essay on the Bible, he might well have traced out 
the multifarious ways in which men have represented the power which to them transcends "the Umits of their 
narrow selves, and by which they lived and moved and had their being. 
This, I feel, is rather uncritical. One should surely concentrate on the evidence that there is, rather than that 
'^Livingston, pp. 90, 157 and 165. 
"ibid p 137- Nathan Scott's work is entitled "Arnold's Vision of Transcendence - the Vis Poetica", from the July, 1979 edition of TTie Journal of 
Religion. 
""Ibid., p. 152. 
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which might have been. The fact is that Arnold does not write about God in this way because he does not 
hold ideas of God's transcendence. Consequently neither does Arnold use language about God as a "means 
of transcendence". In God and ^ Bible Arnold replies to criticisms of his views of personal language 
about God by defending his reductionist approach still further. He indulges, he says, in "a long philological 
disquisition" in order to show that words "make men their sport". To illustrate the basic truth that all 
abstract terms arise out of the concrete Arnold shows that "being" and "existence" can be reduced to mere 
sensuous words such as "breathing", "growing" and "standing". This is in common with the dominant 
eighteenth and nineteenth cennjry empiricist understanding of philology exemplified by Home Tooke's 
etymological programme of reducing all ideas to the root nouns from which they sprang.'" As Stephen 
Prickett observes in Words and ^ Word 
Tooke's ... etymological "proofs" were to dominate sections of English philology for almost fifty years, 
and to earn the approval of such men as Noah Webster, Ralph Waldo Emerson, James Mill, Hazlitt, and 
Archbishop Trench 
Arnold uses such a "science" because it is a method of reducing complex and sometimes intangible ideas to 
that which is really verifiable. Thus he seeks to demolish metaphysics by saying that "God is" can be 
reduced to "God breathes" and that we are therefore indulging "in gross creature-worship". 
This is not a failure of critical tact hiding Arnold's alleged commitment to a transcendent God. The 
whole empiricist philological programme is based on the premiss that that which is concrete possesses 
more descriptive power than its later figurative version. Although Arnold is using it here to deny the 
results of some of the more florid imaginations of the metaphysicians, his very acceptance of the method 
shows a lack of understanding as to the power of language to evolve in the attempt to reach more subtle 
explanations of things. 
3.2 J . Arnold and the Christian Mythos 
The contrary tendencies that we have been investigating - the "broadening" and "reductive" programmes -
actually come to cancel each other out in Literature and Dogma. Arnold begins with the thesis that 
language about God is fluid and literary. Then he attempts to find the scientifically verifiable ground for 
talk about God. As a result the literary or poetic language that is "of the essence" (to use apRoberts' words) 
in religion is left to refer to an emotional residue that has no cognitive content Hence the whole 
mythological and metaphorical basis on which the Bible and Christianity is built is, to quote Livingston, 
"no longer serviceable". Thus we see the whole of the Christian mythos being described by Arnold as an 
accretion - as Aberglaube. Whilst this accretion has been useful because it has attracted "emotion to the 
ideas of conduct and morality" it must not be taken as an end in itself. Arnold decides that Aberglaube -
although a development from the supposedly original ground of consciousness about God - must be pruned 
out in the new scientific age: 
•*'See John Home Tooke - The Diversions of Purley, 2 vola. (1798-1805), reprinted Menston, Scolar Press, London 1968. 
"Prickctt. pp. 135-136. 
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Extra-belief, that which we hope, augur, imagine, is the poetry of hfe, and has the rights of poetry. But it is 
not science; and yet it tends always to imagine itself science, to substitute itself for science ... 
And so we must lose as a part of religion "that which we hope, augur" and "imagine". This is a strange 
outcome for religion which, according to many other thinkers, appears to have had its origins in what 
mankind hoped for, augured and imagined. As numerous twentieth century studies have suggested,"^^ the 
myths which Arnold is so anxious to discard appear to be the very constituent elements of religion itself. 
As Mircea Eliade maintains, a myth is something by which the religious person lives: "The more religious 
man is, the more paradigmatic models does he possess to guide his attitudes and actions." The myth is 
therefore constitutive of reaUty itself, since, according to religious thought, reality is that which is sacred. 
Thus "the myth reveals absolute sacrality, because it relates the creative activity of the gods, unveils the 
sacredness of their work". The role of the myth is "to "fix" the paradigmatic models for all rites and all 
significant human activities" - it actually creates the sacred itself and provides the "meaning" which the 
religious person seeks: 
It is the irruption of the sacred into the world, an irruption narrated in the myths, that establishes the world 
as a reality.^ 
To conclude, myths have an indispensable function in religion. Their presence in the history of religions 
suggests that the religious impulse is to an explanation of the "how?" and the "why?" of existence, a 
question of origins and purpose. In giving an answer to these questions they are indeed an end in 
themselves: "they are determinative for man and his existence, and adumbrate the conditions under which 
man lives."''^ To remove myth from religion is to remove the sacred as an explanation of reality. 
There is one obvious way in which the notion of myth can be abused and it is this which Arnold has, on 
the face of it, uppermost in his mind in his religious reconstruction. This is the literalistic handling of 
myth, by which profound mystery is reduced, to quote Arnold, to "mere machinery". In one of his latest 
essays, "A "Friend of God"","^^ Arnold seeks to recommend mysticism (following his reading of the work 
of Tauler, a Reformation mystic) as an antidote to the Salvation Army who, at that time, were "trifling" 
with religion "via the old mythological means". Arnold believes that the time of the Salvation Army is 
coming to an end: 
The immense, the epoch-making change of our own day is that a stage in our intellectual development is 
now declaring itself when mythology, whether moral or immoral, as a basis for religion is no longer 
receivable, is no longer an aid to religion but an obstacle. 
This attack on mythology can be seen as part of Arnold's long-running campaign against all forms of 
religious fundamentalism. It has the same basis, in essence, as his argument against the Puritans twenty 
years earlier. He is seeking, justifiably enough, to discredit those "religious" people who attempt to coerce 
^^For example. Otto's Idea rf ^ Holy, any of Mircea Eliade's work, and particularly The Sacred and Profane ; The Nature rf 
Religion (Harcou'rt, Bruce and World Inc., New York, 1959). Also Myths in ite Old Testament - Benedict Otzen7 Hans Gottlieb, 
Knud Jeppesen, (SCM Press Ltd., London, 1980.) 
-^Eliade, p. 97. 
" 'Otzen, Gottlieb and Jeppesen, p. 12. 
^®Published in the Nineteenth Century, April 1887. 
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others into belief via literalistic interpretations of Judgment and Grace. Arnold's proferred alternative of 
mysticism should be explored a little more closely, however. He recommends the mystics because they 
rest religion "on natural truth rather than mythology". "Let me be candid", he says: "I love the mystics", 
though in their "golden single sentences" rather than in the whole conduct and argument of their work. 
Arnold's grounds for supporting mysticism are, I feel, rather suspect. The overall picture one gains from 
reading "A "Friend of God"" is tiiat Arnold is using the mystics purely to discredit the fundamentalism of 
the Salvation Army. His own empiricist viewpoint is, meanwhile, continually playing down the real 
grounds of belief on which mysticism rests. Thus, following a particularly mystical passage about 
identification with Christ's actions, (and it should be remembered that mystery can not be defined 
conceptually or prosaically) Arnold comments in a manner which reveals his lack of commitment to the 
mystic world view: 
The reader will recognise the strain of homage which from age to age successive generations of mystics 
have ever loved to uplift to "the eternal word". I will not say it is entirely satisfying, but at least it is always 
refreshing, consoling and ennobling. 
Arnold concludes the essay by saying that the reader will find "plenty in this strain to give him 
refreshment". There will, however, be found even more than this: 
... isolated sentences fitted to abide in the memory, to be a possession for the mind and soul; to form the 
character. "Sin killeth nature, but nature is abhorrent of death; therefore sin is against nature, therefore 
sinners can never have a joy". 
This really betrays Arnold's intention in the essay - to extract moral syllogisms in a way that reduces 
Tauler's mystical adhesion to the religious Ufe to something like the asceticism of the majority of Thomas a 
Kempis's Imitation of Christ. This rather throws into relief Arnold's declaration against mythology, in that 
we realise it is not simply the fundamentalist understanding of myth that Arnold is rejecting. His object is 
much more wide-ranging than simply an attack on the Salvation Army. Once again Arnold is implying that 
the only religious language allowable is the "scientifically verifiable" language of morality or conduct. 
Any language that refers, as Tauler's does, to a mystical communion with the Godhead, is rejected by 
Arnold as unverifiable. Moral advice is once again the only true, because scientifically verifiable, religious 
object. 
James C. Livingston tries to see Arnold's handling of myth in a different light. Arnold, he says, would 
have agreed with the twentieth century critic Paul Ricoeur that one must go beyond a literal understanding 
of myth. As Ricoeur says, "the dissolution of the myth as explanation is the necessary way to the 
restoration of the myth as symbol".'^^ By "myth as explanation" Ricoeur means precisely the same thing as 
Arnold does in his critique of the Salvation Army. If myth is reduced to fairy-tale and the faithful are told 
that religion rests upon acceptance of these fairy-tales, then there will come the time, as Arnold says in a 
number of places, when they will reject them as wanting "intellectual seriousness". The latter part of the 
sentence, the idea of the "restoration of the myth as symbol", is most important; particularly since 
'•"'The Symbolism of EvU (New York, 1967) p. 350. 
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Livingston is applying this explanation of myth to Arnold's own method. Remarkably enough, Arnold can 
himself directly answer the question as to whether he restores myth as symbol. In his 1885 essay "A 
Comment on Christmas'"^® Arnold explores the legend of the Incarnation.'*^ The fact, he says, is the birth 
of Jesus. Isaiah's prophecy and the miracle of the incarnate God are purely legend. "Yet even the legend 
and miracle investing the fact", he says, "have, moreover, their virtue of symbol". "Symbol", continues 
Arnold, "is a dangerous word". People use it, he says, in order to give credit to something that is 
unhistorical, as if the narrator of the Gospel meant his description of the Incarnation to be symbolic. "They 
save it, however, at the expense of truth." Nevertheless, Arnold continues, "a thing may have important 
value as symbol, although its utterer never told or meant it symbolically". Thus far, Arnold's criticism is 
good. The hermeneutical procedure is designed to come to the truth of what the original really means, not 
to give an alternative explanation that has no root whatsoever in the original text. But what does Arnold 
mean by symbol? If we explore further, we can see that Arnold's idea of symbol is very much conditioned: 
the symbol's virtue 
will depend on these two things further: the worth of the idea to which it does homage, and the extent to 
which its recipients have succeeded in penetrating through the form of the legend to this idea. 
The "worth of the idea" is a very ambiguous phrase, but Arnold makes his evaluative procedure somewhat 
clearer with his assumption that die Incarnation is about "Christ's birth of a Virgin". The question then 
becomes one of "the innate worth of the idea of pureness". 
At this point, interestingly enough from the point of view of this thesis, Arnold looks for support from 
S.T.Coleridge. He notes the appearance of a recent book by H.D.Traill on Coleridge wherein Traill talks 
about 
the great Coleridgean position "that Christianity, rightly understood, is identical with the highest 
philosophy, and that, apart from all questions of historical evidence, the essential doctrines of Christianity are 
necessary and eternal truths of reason - truths which man, by the vouchsafed light of nature and without aid 
from docimients or tradition, may always and everywhere discover for himself. 
Of this Arnold proclaims that 
it is true: it is deeply important; and by virtue of it Coleridge takes rank, so far as English thought is 
concerned, as an initiator and founder. The "great Coleridgean position" that apart from all question of the 
evidence for miracles and of the historical quality of the gospel narratives, the essential matters of 
Christianity are necessary and eternal facts of nature or truths of reason, is henceforth the key to the whole 
defence of Christianity. When a Christian virtue is presented to us as obligatory, the first thing, therefore, to 
be asked, is whether the need of it is a fact of nature. 
This is a remarkable example of words, to quote Arnold, making "men their sport", here because the critic 
who appropriates them does so without a proper knowledge of his source. There may be some wilful 
misunderstanding in Arnold's expurgation of Traill's point that Coleridge's Christianity must be "identical 
with the highest philosophy". Nevertheless it is quite clear that Arnold believes he has found a true ally in 
"'^Published in The Contemporary Review, April 1885. 
^'Arnold designates the Incarnation as "legend". Legend, as Otzen, Gottlieb and Jeppesen say, is "usually historically and 
geographically localised" (op. cit. p. 7) compared to myth, which "lakes place" outside space and time. Both legend and myth, 
however, have in common the search for meaning and purpose. Despite their different forms they are both fictive games expressive of 
a deeply felt and widely attested tnith. 
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Coleridge for his own brand of experiential Christianity. Arnold's translation of the "great Coleridgean 
position" says that "facts of nature" are scientifically verifiable qualities of nature and that "truths of 
reason" are the conclusions reached following logical analysis of the scientific evidence. Thus Arnold 
concludes that Coleridge instituted the novel view of Christianity of which he (Arnold) is the heir that even 
if we remove unverifiable miraculous evidence and even if we are faced with the confusions arising from 
conflicting Biblical witnesses, nevertheless Christianity is a clearly verifiable fact of nature. The fact that 
Arnold chooses to think of the Incarnation as a symbol doing homage to the idea of purity shows that "facts 
of nature" can actually be reduced to "facts of human conduct". The end result of all this is that symbol is 
true only if it is symbolic of morality. 
Coleridge's actual ideas are, of course, far different. Coleridge, in fact, has vastly differing beliefs as to 
what can be "experiential". As we have already seen,^° Coleridge appropriates Kant's "Reason" as a 
faculty of perception by which we can know the real or noumenal world. For Coleridge "facts of nature" 
are a product of the interaction between the perception of the world governed by the senses and the 
"reconciling and mediating power" of the Imagination. A symbol is the result in human language of the 
"imaginative fact" proclaiming itself. Whilst Coleridge would say that this "imaginative fact" can 
genuinely be experienced, Arnold would not. For Coleridge, the Scriptures and the "Book of Nature" are 
themselves a sort of "living metaphor", untainted by the empiricist world view. They are alive with a 
noumenal reality that Arnold would not accept. Whereas a symbol, for Arnold, can not be real in itself (it 
can only refer to something else, something empirically verifiable) for Coleridge a symbol is itself 
constitutive and productive of the reality to which it refers - it "always partakes of the reality it renders 
intelligible". The problem with Arnold's use of Coleridge is that he does not understand Coleridge's 
starting point for his enquiries. Coleridge already accepts the truth of Platonist/Christian ideas about the 
universe. Thus his phenomenology is a working out of an already accepted theological world view. This is 
why he can believe that Christianity is commensurate with "the highest philosophy". It is within these 
parameters that he undertakes to find out what is being said in the Scriptures and what one can thereby infer 
from one's own perception of reality. 
Arnold's rather mischievous addition to Traill's description of Coleridge (Coleridge's supposed belief 
that for Christianity to be understood it is necessary to remove the reliance on miracles) is, in fact, far from 
the truth. In the Notebooks we see Coleridge approaching the problem of miracle in much the same way as 
he approaches symbolic language - that is, he regards miracles as explicative of the nature of reality; he 
believes that they have something to say about man's experience of the universe. This is the absolute 
opposite of Arnold's reductive method. Where Arnold seeks to reduce human language to its root to find 
its supposedly true and untainted objective reality, Coleridge's fascination is with what Arnold would call 
5°Seeabove, pp. tO'lS. 
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the "accretion" itself. This is not to say that Coleridge credulously accepts every development as more true 
than the root from which it sprang. As he shows with respect to miracle, his is still a critical method: 
What has hitherto been wanting and which if God grant me life, and the power of his grace I hope to supply 
is a Canon of Credibility a priori - a Code of Principles determining what Evidences are possible, what 
reasonable, and what desirable, as means to the assumed end - and in this Code I hope to set forth every 
possible sense in which the term, Miracle, c ^ be used - and not least to make men have a distinct knowledge 
of their own meaning and belief - which I am persuaded not one in a thousand does at present.^' 
This brings home the point that Coleridge's method is as experiential as Arnold's. What differs is not their 
relative levels of credulity but their criteria of experientiality. For Coleridge everything is related to the 
power of the Imagination to encapsulate spiritual truths. Whilst such marvels as the raising of Lazarus are 
clearly doubtful in both authenticity and purpose,^^ tiie phenomenon of the gift of tongues on Pentecost is 
explicative of the perceived reality of the Holy Spirit. As in his evaluation of symbolic language, the 
presented phenomenon is an end in itself: 
And first let it be understood that the solution of the Phaenomena, and their true character, are not the points 
in question. Let them be effects or results of the Imagination 
Questions of scientific authenticity - the very starting point for Arnold - do not apply in the attestation of 
such spiritual experiences: "May there not be a hidden contradiction in the Demand or Expectation, that a 
Miracle should be wholly objective? Instead of fruitiessly searching for objective standards by which to 
measure reality - and we saw that this search marred both Arnold's poetiy and criticism - Coleridge accepts 
the fragmented and partial nature of our perception of the universe and actually makes of it a virtue. In 
effect he is saying that the attestation of miracle is no less than we might expect from mankind's recorded 
experience of life. As Stephen Prickett says, for Coleridge "religious belief involves living in a universe 
implicit with hidden meaning".^^ In this respect, miracle and symbol are both essential in themselves as 
explanation of the religious perception of life. 
To go back to Livingston's assertion that Arnold restores the "myth as symbol", we can now see that the 
appropriation of Ricoeur's quotation as an explanation of the Amoldian religious critical method is quite 
wrong. Arnold's bald rallying cry in the 1883 Preface to Literature and Dogma that miracles ^ not happen 
lacks the sophistication of both Ricoeur and the authority Arnold himself chooses as a critical ally, 
Coleridge. Arnold's method is more iconoclastic than either of these two critics. On his model Christianity 
may shed itself of those people who credulously accept everything in the Bible, including its mythology, as 
an indispensable basis for belief. On the other hand it would also dangerously undercut what is left of the 
Christian reUgion after the "myth as explanation" has been removed. 
' 'Notebook no. 39 (B.M. Ms. 47,534) p. 49. Quoted in Prickett - Romanticism and ReUgion. pp. 52-53. I have had to rely here on Professor 
Prickett's research, the quotations from Coleridge's notebooks here reproduced being as yet unpublished in any other form. 
^^The raising of Lazarus appears only in John's Gospel and thus has no support for authenticity from the synoptic Gospels. It is 
quite clearly a foreshadowing of Jesus' own resurrection. In Note Book no. 37 (B.M. Ms. 47,532) p. 6 (quoted in Prickett, p. 52) 
Coleridge implies that this and other similar miracles are not in themselves necessary constituents of faith: 
Surely Common Sense might shew these Meuphysicians that the man who believes in [such miracles would] susuin no increase of Faith in 
the Supernatural character of our Saviour's Acts of Power and Mercy, tho' he had persuaded himself to believe all the additional wonders 
narrated in the Gospel of Nicodemus. - The opposite of Faith and its worst enemy is Credulity. 
"No. 38 (B.M. Ms. 47,533) p. 4. (Quoted in Prickett, p. 53.) 
^ N o . 39 (B.M. Ms. 47,534) p. 10. (Quoted in Prickett, p. 53.) 
^^Romanticism and Religion p.53. 
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3.2.4. Arnold and Jesus 
In order finally to settle the question as to the sucxess of the Amoldian religious reconstruction we shall 
examine more briefly Arnold's handling of the figure of Jesus. Given the virtual disappearance of God 
from the Amoldian scheme, the question of the character and status of Jesus carries a great deal of 
significance in our search for the "transcendence" that Livingston claims to find in Arnold's religious belief 
and work. 
The question obviously carries a great deal of significance, too, for Arnold. In fact the figure of Jesus is 
all-important in the Amoldian scheme. Whilst Literature and Dogma begins with discussion of God, God 
and the Bible concludes with a call to understand the "figure and influence of Jesus". This is indicative of 
the transformation in the religious focal point that Amold is seeking to bring about. The very importance 
of Jesus for Amold the nineteenth century empiricist is his perceived solidity; his verifiability. In Amold's 
wish to base religion on the truly "experiential" there could be no better spokesman than the Jesus of the 
Gospels in his supposed recognition of the universal moral order and the future kingdom based on its 
principles. 
The problem is, of course, the assumed verifiability of the man Jesus. It is interesting that Amold spends 
much of God and the Bible seeking to refute what he sees as the dangerously iconoclastic criticism of the 
theologians of Tubingen university. Early on in God and the Bible Arnold quotes David Friedrich Strauss, 
perhaps the most controversial of the nineteenth century proponents of German "Higher Criticism". Then, 
in chapters four and five, Amold refers directly and at length to F.C.Baur, the then leader of the Tiibingen 
school. He criticises the German critics for having pet theories that are unable to stand upon reflection 
owing to their being based on "absurd inferences". The Tubingen critics, Amold proclaims, lack "sound 
judgment and common sense" and have insufficient data and tact. His position here foreshadows the 
essentially defensive role that Amold explicitly casts for himself ten years later in a "A Comment on 
Christmas": 
I feel myself really in sympathy with the religious world far more than with its assailants - even with the 
religious world as it is at present.^^ 
This is something of a change from the attitude of the self-confident provocateur of his earlier criticism and 
it is, I believe, an unconscious acknowledgement that the foundation on which he has built his religious 
reconstruction is crumbling. It is difficult to tell how much Amold consciously believed this, but one can, I 
think, detect at least the beginnings of the note of a man under siege in his long and vigorous attack on the 
German critics in God and the Bible. There is something rather desperate in his critical appeal to national 
characteristics: 
Sooner or later, however, these theories will have to confront the practical English sense of evidence, the 
plain judgment as to what ^ proved matter of fact and what is not ... All theories, the old and the new, will 
have to stand the ordeal of the Englishman's strong and strict sense for fact. We are much mistaken if it does 
" A m o W 'o ll"® edilor of ihe Conlemporary Review on paymeni for "A Commenl on Christmas". Ciled in CPW 10:530. 
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not turn out that this ordeal makes great havoc among the vigorous and rigorous theories of German criticism 
concerning the Bible documents. 
Arnold's challenge arises directly from a consideration of Baur's position on the fourth Gospel. It is the 
opinion of Baur that the Gospel attributed to John is not the direct history that it claims to be; that it is 
intended as an anti-Jewish conception of Christianity; that it has a dogmatic design and is profoundly 
calculated art of a Gnostic sort. "No sayings of Jesus are authentic which are recorded in the Fourth Gospel 
only", Arnold quotes Baur as saying. Arnold undertakes to disprove this by employing the Englishman's 
innate sense of what is fact and what is not. 
Arnold's method in finding the original sayings or logia of Jesus is extremely questionable. As he had 
done with the Gospels in Literature and Dogma, he divides the sayings of Jesus from those of, in this 
instance, "John", under the assumption that those of Jesus are "over the head of his reporter". Whilst this 
may work on some occasions it does not on others. In the matter, for example, of the spiritualisation of the 
Resurrection in the fourth Gospel, Baur's interpretation - that "John" wrote this - causes Arnold some 
difficulty. Arnold wishes to attribute all spiritualising ideas to Jesus in contradistinction to the 
materialising ideas of his reporters. Baur is, in fact, much more likely to be correct. There is no evidence 
in the Old Testament that the Jews had ideas of a division between spirit and body. Thus the "internalised 
resurrection" appears to have arisen from Greek thought and can be attributed to "John" rather than Jesus. 
Somewhat later Arnold quotes "Paul" quoting Jesus in Acts on the belief that it is more blessed to give than 
to receive. Arnold suggests that it must be an original saying of Jesus because Paul's manner is so 
different. Paul, therefore, did not invent the saying. Again, this creates problems. The third Gospel writer, 
"Luke", is the writer of Acts. He therefore invented to some extent the sayings of Paul. Thus we have the 
supposed words of Paul quoting the supposed words of Jesus, words which, furthermore, are not found in 
the Gospels. 
The problem is not, as we said before in connection with myth, that Arnold's exegesis is incorrect. It is 
that he has the most subjective and arbitrary critical principles in decisions pertaining to the character of 
Jesus. "Where the logia are suited to the character of Jesus, they come from Jesus" is his basic principle. 
This is a decision based entirely on the character of Jesus that he has drawn for himself. This Jesus is an 
abstraction, an inevitable result of removing the Absolute from God onto Jesus. Thus Jesus himself, in 
effect, becomes the power that makes for righteousness. Jesus, says Arnold, brought the Jews back to an 
understanding of the emotional power of righteousness. What had become social and national in character 
(righteousness) had now to become inward and personal. Jesus brought them back to that "abiding Power 
not of man's causing which makes for righteousness" that they had at one time had. Jesus, continues 
Arnold, had a "method" and a "secret". His method was a "great unceasing inward movement of attention 
and verification" in matters of conduct. To keep the commandments of God was to be inwardly pure - "to 
have the heart and thoughts in order as to certain matters". This method is allied to the secret by which it is 
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performed. His is a character of "mildness and sweetness". The "renouncement" and "inward appraisal" 
which Christ calls upon us to make is performed, in him, in a tone of "sweet reasonableness" and 
"exquisite, mild, winning felicity". 
One can perhaps blame Arnold for not seeing that sweetness and mildness are hardly the terms to use in 
connection with the Jesus who drove the money-changers from the Temple, or who argued with the Scribes 
and Pharisees or, finally, went to an agonising death on the cross. It would be uncritical, however, to charge 
Arnold for not seeing the developments ahead in Christology. Certainly opinions about the character and 
status of Jesus have undergone profound changes in the century following Arnold. The century that began 
with Johannes Weiss and Albert Schweitzer proclaiming that the original Jesus was no longer available to 
modem day Christianity has reached the position where leading theologians such as Jurgen Moltmann and 
Wolfhart Pannenburg have recovered that original message as, in their opinion, essential to Christian 
faith.^^ One can, however, censure a critic such as Livingston who, having knowledge of the fundamental 
changes in Christology (he admits that the moral interpretation of Christianity is now "out of favour")^ ® 
persists in presenting the basic thrust of Arnold's argument as normative for Christianity. Whilst 
Livingston recognises that there is a central issue at stake in the question of what religious language is 
saying about religious experience (he has an entire chapter devoted to the "Status of Religious Language 
and Experience") it is clear that die critic simply accepts Arnold's fundamental premiss that religion is all 
about human conduct. Thus while Livingston makes the claim that religious language was not only useful 
for Arnold but "true" and that for Arnold such language 
is not only a more adequate mode of expression, it is grounded in and refers to objects of our common 
human experience; it is referential and cognitive as well as evocative. It gives us knowledge of crucial 
aspects of human existence in the world ... 
the "knowledge" here given is, however, purely that of the (supposedly) empirically verifiable moral order. 
According to Arnold (and Livingston agrees here) the proof of the truth of diis meaning of religion is 
readily available to human experience. "How", Arnold asks in Literature and Dogma, "are we to verify ... 
[the] ... "not ourselves"?" The answer Arnold gives is "by experience" - "as you verify that fire bums". It 
is no surprise that Arnold limits his religious experience in this analogy to what is empirically verifiable. 
As I hope I have shown, however, this interpretation of religious experience is limited by Arnold's 
'^In his pioneer work on Jesus' eschatology Weiss claimed that Jesus' entire message could be reducible to his belief in an 
imminent judgmental end of the world. As opposed to then recent liberal ideas of Jesus as the proclaimer of a this-worldly moral 
order Weiss countered: 
The Kingdom of God is [in Jesus' view] a radically superworldly entity which stands in diametric opposition to this world. The dogmatic 
religious-ethical application of this idea in more recent theology, an application which has completely stripped away the original 
eschatological-apocalyptical meaning of the idea, is unjustified. 
(From Jesus' Proclamation rf the Kingdom of God - English translation by Richard Hyde Hiery and David Larrimore Holland 
(Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1971) (First Gemian ed., 1892) p. 114.) As Moltmann suggests (Theology of Hope p. 38) this turns 
Jesus into "an apocalyptic fanatic". Pannenburg completely reverses this by saying that the eschatological message - that the future is 
in God's hands - is integral to Christianity: "This resounding motif of Jesus' message - the imminent Kingdom of God - must be 
recovered as a key to the whole of Christian theology." (Wolfhart Pannenburg - Theology and the Kingdom of God (Westminster 
Press, PhUadelphia, 1969) p. 53.) 
^®Livingston, p. 138. 
5'lbid., p. 94. 
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"historical conditioning". His position is certainly not adequate as a description of religious experience as a 
whole and neither is it adequate for the present age in which scientific positivism has been shown to be 
much less secure in its "truth value" than was previously thought. 
Ruth apRoberts' suggestions about the nature of religious language and experience certainly point in the 
right direction. As with Livingston, however, she is guilty of projecting onto Arnold an advanced 
understanding of the problem which he did not, in fact, have. The truth is that if we can appropriate for 
religious language as a whole what Arnold says about symbol in "A Comment on Christmas", such 
language is only important if the idea to which it does homage has "worth". The limitations of Arnold's 
conception of "worth" can be illustrated by a specific and important example - his attitude to Jesus' 
parables as explicative of the Kingdom of God. For Arnold, seeking to institute the moral absolute as the 
foundation stone of his scheme, the parables are secondary in importance to what he calls the "direct 
teaching" of Jesus: 
Instructive and beautiful as the parables are, however, they have not the importance of the direct teaching of 
Jesus. But in his direct teaching we are on the surest ground in single sentences, which have their 
ineffaceable stamp.^ 
The immediately interesting thing here is that Arnold has been asking how we can be sure that we have the 
original words of Jesus in the Gospels. He shows a good critical sense in realising that stories such as the 
parables are likely to have been less embellished or invented than other parts of Jesus' message. Then, 
however, he changes tack. The "surest ground" becomes something other than the "clearest evidence". 
Instead it becomes an indication of the worth for Arnold of the particular part of the Gospel. The "single 
sentences", which are, in effect, what Arnold perceives as moral maxims, or rules of conduct, are only 
unforgettable because they fit Arnold's conception of the character of Jesus. Whilst this throws some doubt 
on to the authenticity of these pieces of moral advice (a question that Arnold does not consider) it also begs 
the question as to what the parables (which Arnold admits are the only truly recoverable part of Jesus' 
message) are about in terms of purpose and importance. "Instructive and beautiful" is really a dismissal 
through lack of knowledge on Arnold's part. If they had really been instructive he would have pursued 
them further. As for their supposedly "beautiful" nature, it is quite clear that such a word is totally 
inadequate to describe their contents. The truth is that, owing to his preconceptions about the character of 
Jesus and the nature of religion generally, Arnold is dismissing the parables as anachronisms that obscure 
the "true" message of Jesus. 
I said earlier^^ that the modem understanding of metaphor as the essential mode of communication in 
religious matters was a vitally important issue in present-day theology. This recognition is, as we shall see, 
particularly important for an understanding of the parables whilst, in turn, the parables are vitally important 
for a true understanding of Jesus. It will therefore be necessary to review briefly this Christological issue in 
order to put Arnold's criticism of Jesus in its proper light. 
^'Literature and Dogma chapter six. 
filSee above, 
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Scholars are agreed nowadays that the parables are the single most important source for an understanding 
of Jesus' message. "We are standing right before Jesus when reading his parables", the respected exegete 
Joachim Jeremias believes.^^ The importance of the parables in our discussion of religious language is that 
they are, as Eta Linnemann has observed, not primarily conveyors of information (as Arnold supposes therti 
to be) at all. A parable is a "language event" by which the speaker tries to induce a profound change in the 
person a d d r e s s e d . ^ ^ c.H.Dodd observes further that a parable is, at its simplest, 
a metaphor or simile drawn from nature or common life, arresting the hearer by its vividness or strangeness, 
and leaving the mind in sufficient doubt about its precise application to tease it into active thought.^ 
This suggests further that the parables are, in a subtle sense, arguments. As Eta Linnemann points out, the 
parables of Jesus usually address situations in which the antagonists hold polar positions. The speaker of 
such a parable, by making the opponent regard the situation from an entirely different viewpoint, can give a 
wholly new understanding, building bridges across chasms of opposition that could never be crossed by 
what she calls "controversy dialogue".^^ The resulting decision, which the parable compels, may well 
concern not just superficial matters of opinion, but matters of profound existential orientation.^ 
This latter observation is important. It is clear from the synoptic Gospels that the majority of the parables 
speak of the coming of the Kingdom of God; indeed, the preaching of the Kingdom is the very centre of 
Jesus' message: 
Now after John was arrested, Jesus came into Galilee, preaching the gospel of God, and saying, 'The time 
is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand; repent, and believe in the gospel". (Mark 1:14-15.) 
Set at the very beginning of what scholars recognise to be the earliest Gospel, we have here a good 
indication of the dominant message of Christ. One of the most important questions to be addressed here is 
whether the kingdom spoken of is to be realised here and now, or whether it will be a future coming in the 
manner of Jewish apocalypse. No agreement has been reached amongst theologians as it is clear from the 
evidence in the Gospels that Jesus' own words are equivocal. The parable of the Faithful and Unfaithful 
Servants (Matt. 24:45-51, Lk. 12:44-46) or that of the Ten Virgins (Matt. 25:1-12) can be seen, for 
example, as Jesus' exhortation to watch for a future apocalyptic event - "Watch therefore, for you know 
neither the day nor the hour". On the other hand, in many of his actions and sayings Jesus seems to be 
proclaiming that the kingdom is akeady here. Following the casting out of a demon from a dumb man, 
Jesus daringly proclaims: "But if it is by the finger of God that I cast out demons, then the kingdom of God 
has come upon you." (Lk. 11:20) 
^Rediscovering ^ Parables (SCM Press Ltd., London. 1966) p. 10. 
«'ParaMes oC Jesus, Introduction and Exposition (S.P.C.K., London, 1966) p. 30. 
Parables of the Kingdom (Nisbet, London, 1935) p. 16. 
^ 'Linnemann, p. 2 I f . 
p. 32. 
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A number of American literary critics^^ have taken these latter "parabolic actions" or sayings as evidence 
that the theologians' approach needs a profound re-orientation. Where theology has been looking for the 
kingdom of God as a fact to be described as already here or to be expected in the future, literary critics 
point out that all of Jesus' parables, actions and sayings have a proclamatory nature. The word "if in the 
above saying from Luke indicates that Jesus is not conveying information at all, he is proclaiming the 
inbreaking of the kingdom itself for whoever is willing to receive it. This demands in the listener the 
"profound existential orientation" suggested by Linnemann, in that Jesus' words never finally conceptualise 
the kingdom as a present or future state of affairs. What they do is instead challenge the hearer to accept the 
reality of both God's presence in the world and the reality of his plan of salvation. Jesus calls, in fact, for a 
radical approach to reality. In one sense it is obvious that the kingdom was not yet there. None of the 
apocalyptic happenings had ocurred, the course of history continued, Palestine was still under Roman 
domination. To believe that God's reign was beginning was absurd. And yet Jesus proclaims the reality of 
the kingdom of God. That this proclamtion is not a description of an empirically verifiable nature is clear 
from some of the extraordinary proverbial sayings of Jesus: "leave the dead to bury their own dead" (Lk. 
9:60); "If anyone strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also" (Matt. 5:39). If the kingdom 
was fact, there would be no need for these radical demands! In his proverbial sayings Jesus demands the 
combination of an attitude of faith towards the certainty of the future coming of the kingdom and an 
inbreaking of the kingdom in the present for anyone who has ears to hear. 
This ties in with our earlier observations on the nature of metaphor, symbol and myth. In one sense, 
metaphor juxtaposes descriptions of reality that are radically discontinuous. They do not exist together in 
the present. Yet their coming together actually creates a new meaning. As apRoberts' says, "no one 
believes his love is a red rose, or really very like a red rose".^^ In describing the experience, however, the 
user of the metaphor suggests that it is only by such a paradox that his goal of embodying the reality he 
feels is there can be brought about. It should be clear now, why, as apRoberts says, metaphor must be "of 
the essence in the religious mode", since religion is obviously beset by the problem of attesting to realities 
that seem to be contradicted by appearances. As on the Coleridgean model it is only the "Imagination", that 
faculty that does not rely on the empirically verifiable observation of the senses but on intuition and 
inference, that can grasp "real" reality. By necessity it can only do this by the indirect means of metaphor, 
symbol and image. 
Given this truth about religious language it is best to see the kingdom of God as symbol. On this reading 
Jesus' parables can be seen as extended metaphors, language-games which seek to bring about a new 
reality by compelling imaginative adherence in the listener. This is not the giving of specific ideas or 
®''Such as Robert W. Funk, Dan Otto Via and John Dominic Crossan. See Norman Perrin - Jesus and the Kingdom of God (SCM 
Press Ltd., London, 1976). 
^apRoberts, p. 216. 
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orders. As Amos Wilder says, we have gone beyond the idea of Jesus as a teacher who imparts moral rules 
for life: 
JesTK* speech had the character not of instruction and ideas but of compelling imagination, of spell, of 
mythical shock and transformation.^^ 
The extended metaphors express an attitude of faith, they do not demand a particular conceptual state of 
mind. This leaves the essential ambiguity of existence still open. The kingdom, then, remains a symbol 
because, as Norman Perrin says, its meaning can not be exhausted or fully expressed by any one referent"^" 
By evoking the myth of God's powerful intervention, as Jesus' language of the kingdom does, the symbol 
points beyond itself to the ineffable mystery of the ultimate salvation that is the message at the very heart of 
the Christian faith. 
It should be clear now that Arnold's reconstruction of Christianity is inadequate. Both his historical 
understanding of the roots of Judaism and his understanding of the personal role of Jesus are seriously 
flawed owing to his preconceptions as to the nature of religion generally. Given what we have discovered 
about the nature of Jesus' proclamation, the words of Arnold on the "religious consciousness of humanity", 
that it has produced in Christianity not ideas but imaginations, "and it is ideas, not imaginations which 
endure", must be seen to be radically opposed to the insights that have been developed by the majority of 
theologians and literary critics over the last century in the fields of Biblical exegesis and the nature of 
religious experience. 
Throughout his work, in fact, we can see the same problems arising in each area - in his poetry, criticism 
and theology. As with his poetry, where the search for a ruling Idea and an objective vision caused him to 
fail to tap, to quote D.G. James, the "spiriuial sources of Romanticism", so his theology, in resting on 
"ideas", fails to understand the real impulses behind Christianity and religion. As I have argued throughout 
my analysis the Coleridgean model of knowledge attained via the Imagination is a much more successful 
post-Enlightenment epistemology than is Arnold's attempt to fit poetry and religion into the empiricist 
scheme of reality. As a final assessment of Arnold's religious reconstruction I will appropriate James' 
phrase in his estimation of Arnold's poetry. His attempt to find a place for religion in his critical scheme is 
a failure owing to his "fluctuating, picturesque dismay" when faced with questions of spirituality. 
3.2.5. Conclusion 
And what of Arnold himself? We asked earlier the question of the adequacy or otherwise of Arnold's 
view of religious language (and therefore, religion) for himself. Does he believe, finally, that he has 
encapsulated, in his criticism, the religious object "as in itself it really is"? 
"ScePcn in .p . 129. 
•'Olbid..p.21. 
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We said earlier that the change in tone in the writing of the religious works of the 1870s was a reflection 
of Arnold's personal need to "atone" for his sons' deaths and to fulfil the religious role his father had cast 
for him. Whilst this is certainly true there is, nevertheless, a parallel critical principle, running alongside 
this, that demands expression. In the Conclusion to Literature and Dogma, despite all that has been said 
previously about religion as morality, Arnold turns to what he calls "the other quarter" of life - art and 
science. The conception of God as righteousness meets, he says, only three-quarters of us: 
For the total man, therefore, the truer conception of God is as "the Eternal Power, not ourselves, by which 
all things fulfil the law of their being;" by which, therefore we fulfil the law of our being so far as our being 
is aesthetic and intellective, as well as so far as it is moral. 
Art and science, he says, have been misemployed by religion in the past, giving us "doggerel hymns" and 
"metaphysical speculations". Yet "as man makes progress" and our knowledge of art and science increases, 
these will become "stringent like rules of conduct and will invite die same sort of language in dealing with 
them". But for our time "the God of the Bible" is "the Eternal who makes for righteousness". 
There could not be a clearer statement than this of Arnold's need to satisfy the demand within him that he 
pursue the manifesto of the German historicists to its end. Despite the undoubted element of personal 
seriousness and sincerity that has entered into his religious work, Arnold looks forward to a time when 
religion will be superseded by a humanist New Jerusalem. That the God that Arnold looks forward to 
proclaiming will be as scientifically verifiable as ever is evidenced by the fact that perfection in the 
knowledge of art and science "will invite the same sort of language" in dealing with them as "rules of 
conduct" do at present. 
All this points to an inescapable conclusion - that on this model of progressive human development there 
is actually no need for reUgion. Arnold here underlines a problem with the entire liberal theological 
movement of the nineteenth century. The reason that theologians such as Karl Rahner (1904-84) saw a 
need to revive the roots of Christian tradition - as Moltmann says, by "stressing the meaning of the mystical 
dimension of the depths of Christian faith"^' - was their perception that die Christian religion had been 
made redundant by the liberal theologians' attempts to compromise with post-Enlightenment norms of 
belief. Arnold is typical amongst nineteenth century religious apologists in his attempt to resurrect the 
Bible as the one thing that is really sure in religion. For Arnold this is particularly pressing as he sees it as 
a sort of midwife to his vision - a vital provider of the rules of conduct that will one day govern all human 
life. Where Arnold is unusually bold amongst Victorian religious apologists is in his implications that 
religion as he knows it w ^ pass away. 
Whilst this should confound any critical attempt such as Livingston's to recommend Arnold's religious 
reconstruction as a future blueprint for Christianity, it is also a questionable solution for Arnold himself. 
The personal need for religion, bred into his temperament by his father and furthered, in its aesthetic side 
7'Theology Today (SCM Press Ltd., 1988) p. 75. 
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by his affinity for poetry, does not actually wish to see Christianity pass away. This is the main impulse 
behind his frequent paeans to Catholic worship - such as in the conclusion to God and the Bible, where he 
claims that, just like Catholic architecture. Catholic worship must survive and prevail "because it is the 
worship which, in a sphere where poetry is permissible and natural, unites the most of the elements of 
poetry". The proviso here, however, underlines Arnold's problem. Arnold the apprehender of aesthetic 
realities can, finally, never prevail in the face of Arnold the intellectual progressivist. The division in 
Arnold between thought and feeling remains to the end. The problem for the latter incarnation of Arnold is 
that, under the law of complete relativity that continually dogs the empiricist, the future carries with it the 
unwelcome spectre of complete chaos. If even the Bible, as the one thing sure, is to pass away along with 
the rest of religion, then the question of authority rears its head. What authority is there for believing in the 
ultimate progression of human history? In a universe without God the optimism of Arnold the historical 
progressivist seems unfounded. 
One comes back, in the end, to D.G.James' cry of "what might have been" had Arnold committed himself 
to "the Extreme" and the "spiritual sources of Romanticism". Sadly, Arnold the poet who wished for an 
"immense future" for poetry, was unable to rest with the merely provisional knowledge of reality that 
poetic language provides and at which religious worship is aimed. Poetry's answer to the question of 
existence (according to James, Keats' "uncertainties, mysteries, doubts") was the solution which Arnold the 
creator of the Scholar-Gipsy needed to embrace. His actual solution - historical progressivism in the name 
of what he perceives to be the "facts" of history - ends up, finally, by becoming less of a defence against the 
threat of anarchy than he supposed. Perhaps this can best be summed up by Arnold himself. Following 
God and the Bible's defence of the position he had marked out for himself in Literature and Dogma, Arnold 
turned to a subject that tested all his assumptions. In March, 1877, the Nineteenth Century ran an article by 
Arnold on Lord Falkland, the seventeenth century statesman who became a martyr to righteousness with 
his determination to hold fast to principle above political expediency. As John P. Farrell suggests in a 
perceptive article on the essay, the parallels between Falkland and Arnold are striking.^^ Falkland, says 
Arnold, was a hero because he "had rank, accomplishment, sweet temper, exquisite courtesy, liberality, 
magnanimity, superb courage, melancholy, misfortune, early death". "The ordering of this list", Farrell 
comments, "is revealing: it begins in the seventeenth century and it ends in the nineteenth century". 
Farrell's conclusion is that Arnold is casting a role for himself, the role of the tragic hero. As Arnold says, 
Falkland has "the charm" for the "imagination", 
... of one who is and must be, in spite of the choicest gifts and graces, unfortunate, - of a man in the grasp of 
fatality ... He is surely and visibly touched by the finger of doom. And he knows it himself. 
I think that Farrell is correct in his thesis. During the course of the essay Arnold rages bitterly against the 
small questions made great of the 1870s - of "simpletons" ranged against "savages" in religious questions 
of ritualism, disestablishment and the Burials Bill. Falkland's problems are paralleled by Arnold's own: 
•^ i^n Matthew Arnold ; A Collection of Critical Essays - D.J. DeLaura (ed.) (Prentice-HaU, New Jersey, 1973) pp. 99-118. 
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He and his friends, by their heroic and hopeless stand against the inadequate ideals dominant in their time, 
kept open their communications with the future, lived with the future. Their batde is ours too; ... 
But perhaps the faith in inevitable progress is unfounded?: 
To our English race, with its insularity, its profound faith in action, its contempt for dreamers and failers, 
inadequate ideas in life, maimers, govenunent, thought, rehgion, will always be a source of danger. 
Arnold's conclusion itself seems to question the whole artificial ordering of reality undertaken in order to 
give intellectual solidity to life: 
Slowly, very slowly, his ideal of lucidity of mind and largeness of temper conquers; but it conquers. In the 
end it will prevail; only we must have patience. The day will come when this nation shall be renewed by it. 
But, O lime-trees of Tew, and quiet Oxfordshire field-banks where the first violets are even now raising their 
heads! - how often, ere that day arrive for Englishmen, shall your renewal be seen! 
Perhaps the Scholar-Gipsy himself is treading the field-banks of Falkland's estate at Tew. It is certainly an 
appropriate concluding epitaph to Arnold's work that his doubts over the inevitability of man's historical 
progress are answered by that other side of Arnold that finds salvation in poetry. One is left with the ironic 
vision of Arnold returning to the haunts of his Scholar-Gipsy: 
Rapt, twirling in [his] hand a withered spray. 
And waiting for the spark from heaven to fall. 
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